The Evolution of Al-Qaeda: Between Regional Conflicts and a Globalist Perspective

Abstract

The article analyzes the prospects for the evolution of the odious terrorist group of modern times, al-Qaeda. This topic is relevant since the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, Africa and Asia continue to serve as an “ideal” environment for the development of radical groups and ideologies. Based on a detailed study of the history of the formation of this organization, its ideology, goals, objectives and strategy, the authors consider the possibility of al-Qaeda becoming the dominant force in the global extremist movement in the coming years. The article examines the main stages of activity of this group, presents the results of a comparative analysis of the tactics of al-Qaeda and its main competitor ISIS.³ It is concluded that the strategic goal of al-Qaeda is to strengthen unity among foreign fighters of the global extremist movement. Al-Qaeda’s tactics with regard to civil wars demonstrate its capacity for pragmatism. The entanglement of local concerns with problems of global jihad has fostered al-Qaeda relationships and sustained alliances in a number of countries and regions. By engaging in some conflicts that are both fundamental and highly symbolic, al-Qaeda can further enhance its image as the “true” vanguard of Islamist insurgents. The article focuses on the relationship between al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq, Algeria, Yemen, and South Asia. In addition to the obvious advantages of demonstrating “worldwide reach” and growing influence, the creation of affiliates also has some negative aspects. The authors’ conclusions are based on an analysis of publications and speeches in the media space of A. al-Zawahiri, the leader of the radicals. The authors conclude that modern al-Qaeda is a decentralized, networked transnational terrorist organization. A conclusion is made about the possibility of al-Qaeda entering a new phase of activity, which will include strengthening territorial control, expanding recruitment and high-profile terrorist attacks around the world.

INTRODUCTION

International counterterrorism forces have focused in recent years on fighting ISIS unwittingly providing al-Qaeda2 with operating space to maneuver and plan. The collapse of ISIS gave its rival a chance to reassert itself as a dominant force in the global extremist movement. Al-Qaeda, which turned 30 years old in 2018, has been a central hub of the jihadist movement around the world all these years. The organization has continued to evolve and now, entering its fourth decade, al-Qaeda is a terrorist organization, a global jihadist network, a high-profile brand, and a franchise group for Salafist jihadists all over the world. The experience of fighting in Syria has expanded al-Qaeda’s contacts and, given the spread of jihadist groups around the world (67 active organizations in 2019 [Richards, 2020, p. 5]), it now can boast a larger and more robust network. Cells of this network also extend to the North Caucasus regions of the Russian Federation, which makes it necessary for Russian experts to give close attention to new trends in the activities of the radicals.

In order to predict the path of this radical group’s development in the coming years, it is necessary to answer several important questions: What are the origins of the global extremist movement and how it has evolved over time? What is the ideology underlying and motivating this organization? What are its goals and objectives? and What strategy does the al-Qaeda leadership follow to achieve its goals?

The authors resorted to a comparative political analysis in this research to be able to study methods used by adherents of radicalism in implementing their ideology. The transformation of al-Qaeda was examined in conjunction with the history of radical Islamism as a whole taking into account the landmarks in the development of this phenomenon using cross-national and cross-temporal analysis. The methodology of this article is also based on the general principles of the civilizational approach.

Various aspects of this theme have been analyzed fairly well due to their relevance in Russian, Arab, and Western scholarly literature. For instance, in Russian historiography this issue is most fully reflected in the works of Naumkin, Baranovskii, and  Dolgov [Naumkin and Baranovskii, 2018; Dolgov, 2019]. It is also explored in a monograph by  Vasiliev and articles by Nechitailo,  Bakonina, Pavlov, and Yashlavskii devoted to the analysis of changes in the activities of today’s odious terrorist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda [Vasiliev, 2018; Bakonina, 2016; Nechitailo, 2017; Pavlov, 2017; Yashlavskii, 2017]. Among the works of Arab scholars who have studied modern terrorism, a monograph by Ali Soufan [Soufan, 2017] and books by Al-Ashmavi, Khal, and Salakh, who contributed to the interpretation of the fundamental provisions of Salafist dogmatics [Al-Ashmavi, 1992; Khal, 1992; Salakh, 1981] deserve special attention. A separate mention should be made of the involvement in this study of publications, statements, and video messages of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, which address a wide range of theoretical and practical jihad issues [Al-Zawahiri, 2001, 2011, 2009, 2007]. The works of American and European authors including Grenshaw, Mendelsohn,  Hoffman, and Zelin analyze the theoretical content and practical implementation of the ideas of Islamist fundamentalism [Grenshaw, 2017; Mendelsohn, 2016; Hoffman, 2018; Zelin, 2017].

The novelty of this study lies in the analysis of recent forms that global jihad is taking today. Modern scholarship classifies Islamist terrorist organizations as networked or hierarchical. However, this classification does not take into account the emergence in recent years of a new type of global terrorism as al-Qaeda operates dynamically and changes rapidly associating itself simultaneously with and distancing from local groups while creating a global effect. The authors regard the group’s capacity of maneuvering between different interests and its concomitant ability to integrate into regional conflicts as a new quality that contributes to its survivability. A wide range of connections between the center of the organization and peripheral groups from tactical cooperation to mergers is also pointed out in the study.

THE GROUP’S ORIGINS AND LANDMARKS OF DEVELOPMENT

Studying the history of al-Qaeda is a key to understanding the ideology and even the mentality of the movement as a whole. It began in Afghanistan in 1979 in response to the introduction of Soviet troops into the country, which caused an influx of foreign fighters from all over the Islamic world. The U.S. and its regional ally Saudi Arabia exploited the conflict during the Cold War by organizing support of the fighters with arms and funding. The earliest known attempt to organize foreign fighters, many from Arab countries, was made by creating al-Qaeda (Arabic for “base”) at a meeting in Peshawar, Pakistan, in 1988 [Hamid and Farral, 2015, р. 61].

According to Nechitailo, an authoritative Russian researcher of Islamic radicalism, al-Qaeda went through three main stages of evolution including the formation between 1998 and 2000; the second stage beginning with the September 11, 2001, attack; and the third stage continuing to this day [Nechitailo, 2017]. The authors would like to offer their vision of this process. Since its creation in 1988, al-Qaeda has gone through four phases of activity. The first reached its peak in 2001 marked by the September 11 attacks in the United States. This was followed by a decline because a large number of al-Qaeda fighters were captured or killed in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States, and other parts of the world. The second phase began in 2003 after the US invasion of Iraq and was characterized by high-profile terrorist attacks in Iraq, Casablanca, Madrid, London, and elsewhere. But al-Qaeda had been seriously weakened in Iraq by 2006 as British and American intelligence agencies disrupted several operations and U.S. drones killed several high-ranking al-Qaeda fighters in Pakistan. The third phase lasted from 2007 through 2009 resulting from the rise of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In January 2009, Al-Qaeda publicly announced that its Saudi and Yemeni fighters had united under the banner of a single group in Yemen. The end of this period was marked by the death of Osama bin Laden and other top leaders in 2011. Finally, the Arab Spring helped set the stage for a fourth phase of activity when al-Qaeda took advantage of the Arab uprisings and of escalating wars in Syria, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, and Afghanistan. During this period, al-Qaeda found itself in competition with ISIS. Despite growing competition in 2014, jihadist leader Ayman al-Zawahiri announced in September that year that al-Qaeda would expand its network and would set up a regional affiliate in the Indian subcontinent relying on local organizations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.

Given increasing political and economic instability in the world late in 2019–2021 and growth of mass protest movements even in previously calm and prosperous regions, the authors believe it is likely that al-Qaeda may enter a new fifth phase of activity, which will include increased territorial control, expansion of recruitment, and high-profile terrorist attacks around the world. Several factors can affect the rise or fall of al-Qaeda over the next few years. Most are beyond the organization’s control although much will depend on how al-Qaeda or other Salafi-jihadi groups will respond. The growth of al-Qaeda’s influence in the West has been facilitated by the recently aggravated situation with the integration of Muslim citizens including new migrants and by the escalation of inter-confessional conflicts. Possible events such as another round of the Arab Spring or the collapse of one or more governments in the Arab world or those that have already taken place, such as the US military drawdown in Afghanistan that began in March 2020, will give al-Qaeda a chance to exploit the resulting power vacuum. Even after losing its obvious successor with the death of Hamza bin Laden al-Qaeda strengthened its position in 2019 in conflicts in Syria and Yemen as well as in all parts of Africa including the Sahel and the Horn of Africa.

THE IDEOLOGY, GOALS, AND METHODS OF THE GROUP

It would be a mistake to believe that the global jihadist movement shares the same ideology. But by and large, it is ideology that is the main banner that unites the radicals. This ideology is a distinct strand of militant Sunni Islamism and can be defined as a call for a return to the “pure” Islam practiced by Salafis.

Originally the term jihad (zeal in the path of Allah, struggle for faith) had not only a militant connotation, but also meant the struggle in defense of Islam and for the spread of Prophet Muhammad’s teachings throughout the world. The idea was radicalized gradually and Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood association, made perhaps the most decisive contribution to this process by proclaiming jihad to be the sixth pillar of Faith thereby making it a sacred duty and obligation of every Muslim. Ayman Azzam, an influential Palestinian theologian, a teacher, and spiritual mentor to Osama bin Laden, declared that “Jihad must continue until the Caliphate is reestablished from which Muslims must spread the light of Islam throughout the world” [Azzam, 1987].

The dominant ideology espoused by groups such as al-Qaida, ISIS, and others reflects the notion that violent jihad is the only way to protect the Islamic world. In declaring jihad to the United States, Osama bin Laden argued that the West, and the United States in particular, is openly hostile to Islam and that the only way to respond to this aggression is to use force, the only language America understands [al-Zawahiri, 2018].

Although the totalitarian ideology of jihad is a closed system, it also allows controversy over strategy, tactics, and other important issues. The group is tolerant of internal disagreements and debate among its members and leadership. A well-known ideological difference in the broader jihadist universe dates back to the early 1980s and occurred between those who wanted to strike at the “far enemy” (Western countries) and those whose interests were focused more on the local level preferring to target what they perceived as “apostate” regimes throughout the Muslim world. Anyway, al-Qaeda adopted a dual strategy that allowed it to pursue both goals simultaneously.

The leaders and most prominent members of al-Qaeda, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Musab al-Suri, Anwar al-Awlaki, and Abu Yahya al-Libi, are both theorists of modern jihadist strategy and ideologists of modern Salafism. The assassination in 2011 of Osama bin Laden, al-Qaida’s founder and first emir, dealt a heavy symbolic and tactical blow to the organization, but it did not mark the end of the global jihadist movement that al-Qaida helped to spawn. Ayman al-Zawahiri became emir of al-Qaeda in 2011. Ideologically, he also adheres to the concept of a unified Muslim Ummah and “one jihad.” For instance, he vehemently criticized Pakistan for complicity with the United States in the persecution of the Taliban and other jihadists operating in the region, first of all in Afghanistan. According to al-Zawahiri, the US–Pakistani relationship is an “alliance of thieves” and therefore the Pakistani government and its army should not be trusted to fight for the liberation of Kashmir [Bacon, 2017, p. 84]. Al-Zawahiri emphasized in his General Guidelines for the Work of Jihad published in 2013 that “al-Qaeda’s military activities are directed, first, against the head of the infidels, America and its ally Israel, and second, against its local allies who run our countries” [Clarke, 2017]. He explained that the goal of fighting the United States was to “exhaust them and bleed them to death” [How to confront America, 2018]. In October 2018, al-Zawahiri devoted an entire statement to Sharia issues. He criticized in it the Muslim countries that use secular law and hold democratic elections calling them “failed experiments.” Al-Zawahiri further said that there was nothing higher in the “call to jihad” than defending Sharia laws and he emphasized that Sharia is a “doctrine of governance” [How to confront America, 2018]. Given al-Zawahiri’s advanced age and the ongoing active search by Western intelligence agencies for al-Qaeda’s leader to eliminate him, a change of power within the group seems likely in the near future. The leader of the next generation, whoever it may be, will have to follow the dictates of the times and continue the policy of decentralization and organization of governance through al-Qaeda’s media structure.

The primary goal of the global jihadist movement has long been assumed to be the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. Perhaps one of the biggest misconceptions about the differences between al-Qaeda and ISIS is that the latter advocated the establishment of a caliphate in the near future while the former postponed it to a later date. Both organizations believe in the creation of a caliphate, but each believes it will happen on different dates. For al-Qaida, the creation of a global caliphate, which is part of the final victory for its long-term plan, would not happen before 2020–2022 [Rudner, 2013, p. 971]. Al-Qaeda’s plans changed over time because the group’s leadership recognized that its initial orientation toward a caliphate stretching from historical Al-Andalus to Southeast Asia first required gaining legitimacy at the local level. It is with this goal in mind that al-Qaida has intervened in numerous civil wars all these years. Its interventions have helped to spread foreign fighters, destabilize regimes in the countries where extremists maintain a presence, and to cultivate anti-Western sentiment among large Muslim communities, particularly in Europe. Although al-Qaida’s goals have changed and evolved over time, its original purpose remains the most important for the movement in general, which is to promote awareness of jihad and to train and arm a cadre of jihadists for developing a unified international jihadist movement. Accordingly, as stated in al-Qaeda’s organizational documents, all other goals are subsidiary to jihad: “An Islamic Group, its only mission is Jihad, because Jihad is one of the basic purposes for which Al Qaeda personnel come together. In addition, they perform other Islamic duties if possible. Jihad will take precedence over other duties in case of interference” [Al Qaeda, 2020].

Another strategic goal of al-Qaida is to enhance unity among foreign fighters of the global extremist movement. Smaller groups should perceive al-Qaida as a world leader and strive to unite with it. Al-Qaeda’s tactics with regard to civil wars demonstrate its capacity for pragmatism. In Yemen, Iraq, Mali, and Somalia, jihadists infiltrated local rebel groups and began to protect local interests of certain parties in order to foment uprisings against “apostate regimes” [Grenshaw, 2017, p. 62]. The entanglement of local concerns with problems of global jihad has fostered al-Qaeda relationships and sustained alliances in a number of countries and regions. By engaging in some conflicts that are both fundamental and highly symbolic, such as the disputed territory of Kashmir, al-Qaeda can further enhance its image as a “true” vanguard of Islamist insurgents committed to protecting Muslims. For instance, on July 9, 2019, al-Qaeda emir Ayman al-Zawahiri issued a video message entitled “Don’t Forget Kashmir” [Roul, 2019, p. 4]. It included calls for violence against India and Pakistan and fierce criticism of these countries for the plight of Muslims in Kashmir. According to al-Zawahiri, Kashmir is a “bleeding wound” in the heart of every Muslim and any aggression against Kashmir is seen as an attack on the entire Muslim Ummah. Al-Zawahiri appealed to Muslim clerics around the world asking them to preach that jihad in Kashmir is the responsibility of every Muslim. Al Qaeda, which has struggled for years to gain a foothold in the region, regards Kashmir as a major component of its Islamist campaign in South Asia. Despite a dedicated South Asian branch known as “al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent,” the jihadists have not been particularly successful in luring Kashmiri youth into their fold. Nevertheless, since July 2017, al-Qaeda has successfully cooperated with the local Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind. Both organizations openly demonstrate jihadist solidarity and a desire to establish a caliphate in Kashmir in accordance with “Sharia law” [Usama, 2017].

STRUCTURE AND DEPLOYMENT

Al-Qaeda was originally set up as a supranational organization with global objectives quite distant from its national “affiliates.” al-Qaeda’s main goal is to harm the collective West—the United States, Europe, Russia, and Israel—to free the Islamic world from Western domination. Organizationally, al-Qaeda is so global and not tied to any specific territory that Israeli political scientists S. Mishal and M. Rosenthal have even suggested a new name for this mode of organizational thinking: Dune. “The Dune movement is almost random, moving from one territory to another, affecting each territory, changing its characteristics and moves on to the next destination” [Mishal and Rosenthal, 2004, p. 12]. R. Labévière, editor-in-chief of Radio France International, also used an image to describe the organizational form of al-Qaeda. It is like a rhizome; unlike a root, a rhizome has no beginning, no end, no center, no organizing memory, any point of it can be connected to any other point. This emphasizes al-Qaeda’s amorphousness and ability to take many forms [Tripp, 2007, р. 92].

Al-Qaeda is also unique in the diversity of financial sources which it and its many affiliates use from sponsor donations to classic smuggling, kidnapping for ransom, and drug and arms trafficking. The tandem of organized crime and terrorism emerges in the areas plunged into chaos by protracted conflicts.

Although al-Qaida was created as a single entity, today it is a decentralized, networked transnational terrorist organization. At its peak, the group maintained a persistent or semipermanent presence in 76 countries including some that had no discernible Muslim communities but were suited to meet the group’s needs, such as Japan, Bulgaria, and Slovakia [Byman, 2017, р. 1109].

There is no permanent headquarters for the global jihadist movement. Jihadists move to the world areas that are most inaccessible to official governments and regular armies. Failed states can serve as “hospitable hosts” for non-state actors including transnational terrorist groups. In many ways, Afghanistan has served as one of, if not the most important, centers of global jihad over the past four decades despite its geographic location outside the Middle East and North Africa. It is a place where fighters continue to return even after other conflicts have driven them away. The symbolic importance of Afghanistan has been emphasized in at least five statements by al-Zawahiri [Stenersen, 2017, p. 171]. He said that al-Qaeda had planted the seed for its future state around the “Islamic Emirate” in Afghanistan and called on Muslims to join the Taliban and al-Qaeda to create the state that would eventually serve to unify Islamic jihad “from Turkestan to the Atlantic coast.” This suggests that al-Qaida probably views the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan as a plausible project.

AL-QAEDA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH AFFILIATES

In addition to the obvious advantages of demonstrating “worldwide reach” and growing influence, the creation of affiliates also has some negative aspects. An affiliate can damage the brand image with its actions, as al-Qaida in Iraq did with its incessant sectarian attacks on Iraqi Shiites. A.M. al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, has never kept pace with al-Qaeda core program and has been in constant conflict with bin Laden and al-Zawahiri successfully maintaining autonomy and ignoring repeated calls from the leadership to focus on attacks on American soldiers rather than on local Shiites. There was more than just a theological dispute behind these disagreements. The most striking example of the irreparable image damage suffered by jihadists is the situation in Algeria. It was the brutality in the 1990s of the local Armed Islamic Group, a Salafist gang that used terror methods against fellow Muslim civilians in Algeria, that caused most to turn away from the extremists.

Interactions with affiliates have often led to a change in the strategic direction of mainstream al-Qaeda that had to be distracted by narrow concerns of local groups at the expense of “general jihad.” For instance, al-Qaeda’s alliance with the Salafist Group for Preaching and Jihad (SGPJ) in Algeria, which was called “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM), was set up in 2006 to expand operations and to establish a brand throughout North Africa. However, even in 2013, almost 90% of AQIM’s operations were still taking place in Algeria and 80% of its attacks were directed against state security forces in its home country [Soulages, 2014, p. 7].

This affiliate pioneered new methods including an intense focus on propaganda and “media jihad.” Starting 2007, AQIM used makeshift explosive devices and coordinated suicide bombings. AQIM is best known among other things for its ability to fund the group through criminal activities, its hallmark being the kidnapping of foreigners for ransom.

Сore al-Qaeda desperately needed an affiliate that would be able to bring its activities up to an “international level,” that is, to carry out spectacular terrorist attacks against Western countries. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) became such an affiliate. Saudi and Yemeni al-Qaeda networks merged in early 2009 and in 2013 AQAP leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi was promoted to deputy emir and general manager of al-Qaeda by its leader al-Zawahiri, which demonstrates the importance of AQAP among all affiliates [Mendelsohn, 2016, p. 64]. It proved to be the most “productive” as it was the AQAP that was associated with the most high-profile terrorist attacks in the United States in 2009 and in France in 2015 when AQAP members attacked the French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo as a result of which 11 French citizens were killed and 11 more wounded.

CONCLUSIONS

Thus, having analyzed the path the organization has taken in 30 years, we can conclude that al-Qaida in 2020 is a very different organization than even ten years ago. It is less centralized, less rigorous in its application of Shariah, and less popular. A survey conducted in 14 Muslim countries found that the vast majority of the population has an unfavorable view of the group founded by Osama bin Laden more than 30 years ago [Hoffman, 2018]. But it does not mean that Islamist extremism represented al-Qaeda will disappear soon. In its 30 years of existence, al-Qaida has experienced four waves of popularity growth and subsequent declines. The current decline is, among other things, a historical credit to the Russian Federation since the strengthening of the Syrian regime as a result of support from the Russian military has forced the terrorists to temporarily roll back their positions. But radicalism is not something that arose spontaneously in the Middle East; on the contrary, it is closely linked to the operation and contradictions of the current international system. The circumstances that produced it—the backwardness of Muslim countries in the economic, military, and informational sphere; exploitation of their resources by the West; and their unequal position in a globalizing world and rejection of Western values—not only did not disappear, but are aggravating. This leads us to the conclusion that the dangers posed by al-Qaeda and similar groups are increasing. Transnational terrorism carries a much higher level of threat than conventional terrorism because local militant groups with Islamist orientation may also be internationalized to a certain extent in terms of logistics, tactics and ideology, but their agenda will still be driven by a sense of local mission that does not challenge the international system as such. Conversely, al-Qaida-driven transnational terrorism is characterized by two distinctive features. First, its goals transcend the international system of national states and, second, it represents a new organizational form. An example is Russian North Caucasus radical groups that apply actively the tactics rehearsed by al-Qaeda in Syria and in some other conflicts. Having returned to the Russian Federation regions such as the North Caucasus, the Volga area, and Tatarstan, adherents of these groups can become a link between local radicals and the international terrorist center.

Geopolitics also gives al-Qaida and similar groups a chance to strengthen their position since waves of protest movements around the world in the second half of 2019–2021 associated with political, economic, and even coronavirus discontent could lead to new bursts of violence and chaos. Amid growing turbulence, the focus of the leading powers shifts from fighting terrorism to saving dwindling resources and to mutual competition. And while al-Qaida’s leaders do not control the circumstances that lead to its resurgence, but rather respond to them in their own interests, the circumstances of recent years have favored them.

FUNDING

The article was written under grant no. 19-18-00155 from the Russian Science Foundation “Islamist extremism in the context of international security: Threats to Russia and opportunities for counteraction.”

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest.