Table 1.

Parameter settings of the model.

Subjects	Parameter	Description
Local government	$R_G$	The government's profits when choosing the strategy of “active supervision"
	$k$	The ratio of the profit the government receives when it opts for the “passive supervision” strategy to the profit received when it opts for the “active supervision” strategy.
	$C_G$	The cost for the local government when choosing an “active supervision” strategy.
	$C_{GA}$	The financial subsidy given by the government when leading enterprises to choose the strategy of “positive participation”.
	$C_{GB}$	The financial subsidy given by the government when leading enterprises to choose the strategy of “negative participation".
	$T$	The punishment imposed by the government on enterprises when the latter choose the strategy of “negative participation".
Leading enterprises	$R_A$	Initial return of leading enterprises.
	$C_A$	The cost when only leading enterprises choose the “active participation” strategy.
	$c_A$	The cost for leading enterprises when both types of enterprises choose the strategy of “active participation".
	$R_{A1}$	The innovation benefit brought by leading enterprises when they improve their innovation capability.
	$R_{A2}$	The excess profit brought by leading enterprises when they improve the level of organization construction.
Following enterprises	$R_B$	Initial return of following enterprises.
	$C_B$	The cost when only following enterprises choose the “active participation” strategy.
	$c_B$	The cost for following enterprises when both types of enterprises choose the strategy of “active participation".
	$R_{B1}$	The innovation benefit brought by following enterprises when they improve their innovation capability.
	$R_{B2}$	The excess profit brought by following enterprises when they improve the level of organization construction.
	Variables	Description
	$\alpha$	Innovation capability coefficient
	$\beta$	Organization construction coefficient
	$\gamma$	Industry resources coefficient
	$x$	The probability of local government choosing the “active supervision” strategy
	$y$	The probability of leading enterprises choosing the “positive participation " strategy
	$z$	The probability of following enterprises choosing the “positive participation " strategy