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. 2023 Mar 29;9(4):e14982. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e14982

Table 2.

Tripartite evolutionary game payoff matrix.

Entities of the game				Following enterprises
Entities of the game				Positive participation $z$	Negative participation $1 - z$
Local government	Active supervision $x$	Leading enterprises	Positive participation $y$	$R_{G} - C_{G} - C_{G A} - C_{G B}$	$R_{G} - C_{G} - C_{G A} + T$
				$R_{A} + α R_{A 1} + β R_{A 2} - (1 - γ) c_{A} + C_{G A}$	$R_{A} + R_{A 1} + R_{A 2} - C_{A} + C_{G A}$
				$R_{B} + α R_{B 1} + β R_{B 2} - (1 - γ) c_{B} + C_{G B}$	$R_{B} - R_{B 1} - {R_{B}}_{2} - T$
			Negative participation $1 - y$	$R_{G} - C_{G} - C_{G B} + T$	$R_{G} - C_{G} + 2 T$
				$R_{A} - R_{A 1} - R_{A 2} - T$	$R_{A} - T$
				$R_{B} + R_{B 1} + R_{B 2} - C_{B} + C_{G B}$	$R_{B} - T$
	Passive supervision $1 - x$	Leading enterprises	Positive participation $y$	$k R_{G}$	$k R_{G}$
				$R_{A} + α R_{A 1} + β R_{A 2} - (1 - γ) c_{A}$	$R_{A} + R_{A 1} + {R_{A}}_{2} - C_{A}$
				$R_{B} + α R_{B 1} + β R_{B 2} - (1 - γ) c_{B}$	$R_{B} - R_{B 1} - R_{B 2}$
			Negative participation $1 - y$	$k R_{G}$	$k R_{G}$
				$R_{A} - R_{A 1} - R_{A 2}$	$R_{A}$
				$R_{B} + R_{B 1} + R_{B 2} - C_{B}$	$R_{B}$