Table 5.

Elasticities of mobility to policy stringency: the role of democratic institutions.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Mobility	Mobility	Mobility	Mobility	Mobility
Policy stringency	-54.50***	-54.88***	-81.03***	-56.19***	-86.41***
	[4.734]	[4.863]	[20.65]	[4.757]	[23.40]
Policy stringency $\times$ democracy (Polity)		-3.377**	-10.41**
		[1.701]	[5.234]
Policy stringency $\times$ autocratic country (WPR)				9.605**	29.21**
				[4.139]	[12.39]
Observations	39,593	37,433	25,234	39,593	26,204
R-squared	0.708	0.706	0.666	0.710	0.661
Number of country-mobility category pairs	555	525	490	555	515
Controls			$✓$		$✓$
Country FE	$✓$	$✓$	$✓$	$✓$	$✓$
Time FE	$✓$	$✓$	$✓$	$✓$	$✓$

Notes: This table presents OLS estimates from regressing mobility on the policy stringency index and an interaction between policy stringency and the Polity democracy index (columns 2–3), or a dummy equal to 1 if the World Population Review flags a country as autocratic (columns 4–5). Columns 3, 5 include: i) the number of confirmed cases and its interaction with policy stringency; ii) the interaction between cases and $D_c$, as well as a three-way interaction between cases, our measure of democracy, and policy stringency; iii) the time varying index of testing policy; iv) the interaction between cases and the dummy for accountability and transparency of the government; v) the interaction between policy stringency and country-level log of GDP per capita; vi) the interaction between policy stringency and the number of mobile phone subscriptions per hundred people; and vii) the interaction between policy stringency and the dummy for experience with previous epidemics. Errors are clustered at the country-level. The coefficients with ${}^{★}{}^{★}{}^{★}$ are significant at the 1% level, with ${}^{★}{}^{★}$ are significant at the 5% level, and with ${}^{★}$ are significant at the 10% level.