Table 1.
Evidence of Industry Influence on Public Understanding of PFAS toxicity (strategies adapted from White and Bero 2010).
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INDUSTRY STRATEGY | YEAR | INDUSTRY DOCUMENTS EVIDENCE |
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Influence Research Question: Industry decides what to study, or not, in order to produce evidence detracting from harms of their product. | ||
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1978 | DuPont’s occupational physician noted “unusually high” liver enzyme elevations but dismissed findings as clinically insignificant, despite inadequate statistical power, neglecting to pursue research [87]. | |
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1981 | DuPont’s contract lab used alternate protocol to run liver enzyme samples of exposed employees; after “reevaluation” the majority of concerning tests were ruled “normal [88].” | |
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Fund and Publish Favorable Research: Industry funds and publishes research that concludes their products were safe. | ||
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1996 | 3M funded a study of occupationally exposed men and found no clinical hepatic toxicity [79]. | |
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Suppress Unfavorable Research: Industry documents harms that are not made public. | ||
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1961 | C6, C9, and ART increased liver size of rats even at low doses, should be handled “with extreme care [89].” | |
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1970 | Industry Lab report finds C8 “highly toxic when inhaled and moderately toxic when injected [90].” | |
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1979 | DuPont’s Haskell labs found “corneal opacity and ulceration” in rats, death in two dogs from ingesting APFO in low doses [91]. | |
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1981 | Record of two children born to exposed workers with eye and facial defects; PFAS found in cord blood in a third [92]. | |
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1981 | Confirmed fetal eye changes related to C8[93]. | |
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1990 | DuPont lab links C8 to testicular adenomas in rats [94]. | |
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1994 | 3M knew of “possible” prostate cancer and shared with DuPont [95]. | |
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Distort Public Discourse: Industry works to distort public discourse, both within and outside the companies. | ||
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1980 | 3M internal communications says that C8 is “about as toxic as table salt [96].” | |
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1981 | DuPont and 3M joint employee communications denies workers have been exposed at levels that could cause adverse health effects, denies adverse pregnancy outcomes [97]. | |
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1991 | DuPont public press release denies adverse health effects [98]. | |
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2000 | With Tenant lawsuit on the horizon, email from DuPont manager says, “the plant recognizes it must get public first… better late than never [99].” | |
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2006 | DuPont demands the EPA certify Teflon as safe and deny any adverse health effects linked to PFOA [100]. | |
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Change or Set Scientific Standards: Industry sets occupational safety standards within the workplace as well as public safety standards. | ||
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1991 | DuPont insisted no EPA notification was warranted, years after determining PFAS were a chronic hazard [101]. | |
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2000 | Public water utility informs customers that DuPont insists its own exposure guidelines are health protective [102]. | |
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Targeted Dissemination: Industry strategically disseminates information to key policymakers. | ||
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N/A | ||
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