Table 1.

Evidence of Industry Influence on Public Understanding of PFAS toxicity (strategies adapted from White and Bero 2010).

INDUSTRY STRATEGY	YEAR	INDUSTRY DOCUMENTS EVIDENCE
Influence Research Question: Industry decides what to study, or not, in order to produce evidence detracting from harms of their product.
	1978	DuPont’s occupational physician noted “unusually high” liver enzyme elevations but dismissed findings as clinically insignificant, despite inadequate statistical power, neglecting to pursue research [87].
	1981	DuPont’s contract lab used alternate protocol to run liver enzyme samples of exposed employees; after “reevaluation” the majority of concerning tests were ruled “normal [88].”
Fund and Publish Favorable Research: Industry funds and publishes research that concludes their products were safe.
	1996	3M funded a study of occupationally exposed men and found no clinical hepatic toxicity [79].
Suppress Unfavorable Research: Industry documents harms that are not made public.
	1961	C6, C9, and ART increased liver size of rats even at low doses, should be handled “with extreme care [89].”
	1970	Industry Lab report finds C8 “highly toxic when inhaled and moderately toxic when injected [90].”
	1979	DuPont’s Haskell labs found “corneal opacity and ulceration” in rats, death in two dogs from ingesting APFO in low doses [91].
	1981	Record of two children born to exposed workers with eye and facial defects; PFAS found in cord blood in a third [92].
	1981	Confirmed fetal eye changes related to C8[93].
	1990	DuPont lab links C8 to testicular adenomas in rats [94].
	1994	3M knew of “possible” prostate cancer and shared with DuPont [95].
Distort Public Discourse: Industry works to distort public discourse, both within and outside the companies.
	1980	3M internal communications says that C8 is “about as toxic as table salt [96].”
	1981	DuPont and 3M joint employee communications denies workers have been exposed at levels that could cause adverse health effects, denies adverse pregnancy outcomes [97].
	1991	DuPont public press release denies adverse health effects [98].
	2000	With Tenant lawsuit on the horizon, email from DuPont manager says, “the plant recognizes it must get public first… better late than never [99].”
	2006	DuPont demands the EPA certify Teflon as safe and deny any adverse health effects linked to PFOA [100].
Change or Set Scientific Standards: Industry sets occupational safety standards within the workplace as well as public safety standards.
	1991	DuPont insisted no EPA notification was warranted, years after determining PFAS were a chronic hazard [101].
	2000	Public water utility informs customers that DuPont insists its own exposure guidelines are health protective [102].
Targeted Dissemination: Industry strategically disseminates information to key policymakers.
		N/A