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. 2023 May 29;9(6):e16510. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e16510

Table 7.

Moderating effects of information disclosure on board characteristics and information asymmetry.

VARIABLES QBAS
AF −0.108***
(0.012)
BoDS −0.105***
(0.009)
BINED −0.031***
(0.010)
BFE −0.293***
(0.068)
BBusy 0.033***
(0.009)
CEOD 0.126***
(0.016)
BDG 0.009***
(0.002)
BoDS*AF 0.002*
(0.001)
BIND*AF 0.008***
(0.001)
BFE*AF 0.003
(0.011)
Bbusy*AF −0.002*
(0.001)
CEOD*AF −0.006**
(0.002)
BDG*AF −0.116***
(0.021)
FSIZE −0.135***
(0.011)
FAGE 0.083***
(0.0137)
FLV 0.059***
(0.007)
R&D −0.087
(0.061)
FATR −0.014***
(0.002)
Constant −0.714***
(0.108)
Observations 5905
R-squared 0.497
YEARS FE YES
INDUSTRY FE YES

Note: ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Robust standard errors are found in parentheses.

BAS is bid–ask spread, AF is analyst following, BoDS is board size, BINED is board independence, BFE is board financial expertise, BBusy is board busyness, CEOD is CEO duality, BDG is board diversity gender, FSIZE is firm size, FAGE is firm age, FLV is financial leverage, R&D is Research and development expenditure, and FATR is assets tangibility.