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. 2023 Jun 10:1–15. Online ahead of print. doi: 10.1007/s43576-023-00091-4

Table 2.

Virtual kidnapping typology

Offenders’ Nationalities* Structure** Gender and roles*** Methods of operation trends Payment & ICT used Crimes committed Victims/targets & relationship to offenders

USA

Mexico

Hong Kong

UK

Canada

Argentina

Australia

Ireland

Malaysia

Singapore

Nigeria

Lone actors

Dyads

Groups

- including cyber organized criminal groups, particularly clustered hybrids

Note: While we could not confirm in other cases whether lone actors, dyads, or groups were involved, we were able to identify at least one offender, at least two offenders, and possible group involvement. In most cases, the offenders were not identified so it was difficult to determine if a group was involved in the incident

Lone actors: In all but one case where one offender was mentioned and the gender of this offender was identified, the gender was a male

Dyads: Mainly made up of a man and a woman. In most of these cases a perpetrator was identified (i.e., the perpetrator served as the primary or sole contact) and one other person who served the role of pretending to be the child (male or female) of the target. In many of these cases where a person pretended to be the child of the target, the targets claimed hearing women’s/girls’ voices

Groups: Of the few cases in the dataset that included the gender of offenders, the identified members of the group were either only men in the group; an equal number of men and women; or more men than women in the group. In the few cases we identified with group member gender information, men served as leaders, organizers, and contacted targets, and women served as money mules and recruiters of money mules

USA: Callers pretended to be kidnappers and/or impersonated others. The call included a person pretending to be kidnapped who screamed in the background. Scammers told various stories ranging from significant others or relatives being in car accidents, having debts, taking the place of intended kidnapping targets, being in trouble, to having witnessed something they should not have witnessed

Mexico: Callers threatened harm or death to “kidnapped” victim unless ransom is paid and used a third party to masquerade as the “kidnapped victim.” The third party would cry or scream so the target can hear them on the phone. A few of the cases in our dataset originated in Mexican prisons

Chinese students/immigrants: Perpetrators claimed to be Chinese officials; targeted Chinese immigrant students in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Singapore; frightened or coerced targets into conducting fake staged kidnappings and/or isolating themselves and cutting off communications with their families; threatened legal action, arrest, and/or deportation for noncompliance. Some common stories used were that targets were implicated in a crime in China, were under investigation, had immigration or visa issues, or were victims of identity theft

Most offenders used telecommunications, such as mobile phones and/or smartphones, to contact potential targets

A few cases involved the use of encrypted communication platforms, such as WhatsApp or WeChat to commit the virtual kidnapping

Payments were made via bank wire transfers, online payment system (i.e., Venmo, PayPal and Zelle), Western Union, MoneyGram, or physical cash drop

Social media, such as Facebook and Instagram, are used to identify targets and find information about them

Wire fraud;

Conspiracy to commit wire fraud;

Conspiracy to commit money laundering;

Extortion;

Interstate or foreign communication involving kidnapping threats with the intention of extortion;

Conspiracy to deal with property that represents proceeds of a crime/known or believed to represent proceeds of an indictable offense;

False imprisonment;

Wasting police time;

Staging kidnapping;

Blackmail;

Public mischief;

Attempted fraud;

Providing false information about a kidnapping;

Disorderly conduct;

Malicious communications;

Publishing false or misleading material to obtain an advantage; false representation resulting in a police investigation;

Scheming with one or more unknown persons;

Fraud by false representation;

Giving false statements to federal agents;

Second-degree grand larceny;

Fourth-degree conspiracy;

Fraud;

Conspiracy to obtain property by false pretense

Gender: The gender of one or more victims was identified in 64 out of the 75 cases

From the 64 cases, 30 identified at least one woman, 20 identified at least one man, and 14 cases identified at least one man and one woman

Relationship between offenders and targets/victims: The targets of virtual kidnappers include family members (i.e., parents, siblings, children, or grandparents), significant others, contacts on target’s phone, friends, employers, the police, or persons within one’s social environment, such as a community and church

Location of targets/victims: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Hong Kong, Ireland, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Singapore, South Korea, the UK, and the USA

*Nationality of offenders was only identified in the cases where the offenders were identified, charged, and/or convicted of their crimes

**This information is only from the cases where gender and role information were available

This table is not produced for quantification purposes. It merely serves to indicate that certain trends/patterns exist and that certain behaviors/patterns have been observed in the cases collected for the purpose of this research. We acknowledge that there could be many more cases that have not been collected for the purpose of this research due to language barriers, lack of court data, and/or media coverage, among other limitations and challenges encountered during our research