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. 2023 Jul 8;14:4049. doi: 10.1038/s41467-023-39823-5

Fig. 7. Single-round reciprocity games.

Fig. 7

a In the positive reciprocity task, participants played as trustees were paired with 7 other players. The investor in this version of the game received 800 points and could either keep everything or give everything to the trustee, who could then decide how to split the points. The investors were pre-programmed so that 5 out of 7 transferred everything to the trustee. b In the single-round negative reciprocity game, the participants played the investor. In the beginning of the round both players were given 10 points. The investor could then decide to transfer everything or nothing. The transferred investment got multiplied by a factor of four and the trustee could them decide to either equalise or betray. Crucially, after the choice of the trustee, both players received another 20 points and the investor could use his points to punish the trustee, with a factor of three. c, d Mean and 95% CrI of Back-transfer (c) and punishment (d) across the four groups, plotted over raw means (±SEM) per participant. Means, 50%, and 95% CrIs of effect sizes shown below, with the following sample sizes: in A1+ group, n = 17 placebo, n = 21 sulpiride, and in A1− group n = 21 placebo and n = 17 sulpiride.