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. 2023 Jul 24;18(7):e0288789. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0288789

Table 12. Moderating effect of ownership.

VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
ESG ESG ESG
PT -0.0358*
(-1.861)
Mayor -0.0384**
(-2.134)
Psecretary -0.0220
(-1.192)
PT*State 0.0903*
(1.659)
Mayor*State 0.1104**
(2.053)
Psecretary*State 0.0395
(0.749)
State 0.3415*** 0.3385*** 0.3217***
(7.206) (7.419) (7.102)
Size 0.5606** 0.5610** 0.5626**
(2.004) (2.001) (2.004)
Lev 0.0482 0.0474 0.0486
(0.727) (0.715) (0.733)
ROA 3.3200*** 3.3188*** 3.3241***
(21.132) (21.119) (21.161)
Growth -0.0687*** -0.0683*** -0.0686***
(-5.336) (-5.300) (-5.323)
Indep 0.1587 0.1583 0.1634
(0.771) (0.769) (0.793)
TobinQ -0.0967*** -0.0967*** -0.0969***
(-14.480) (-14.488) (-14.500)
Duality 0.0807*** 0.0807*** 0.0805***
(3.991) (3.992) (3.985)
Top10 0.7972*** 0.7977*** 0.7992***
(15.002) (15.010) (15.021)
Age 0.0661 0.0663 0.0660
(1.198) (1.201) (1.196)
Per capita GDP 0.0079** 0.0078** 0.0080**
(2.206) (2.196) (2.250)
Constant 4.8081*** 4.8061*** 4.7971***
(8.630) (8.626) (8.614)
Year & Firm Yes Yes Yes
Observations 30627 30627 30627
R2 0.198 0.198 0.197
Adj-R2 0.195 0.195 0.194

Note. This table reports the OLS regression results of the moderating effect of ownership on the relationship between political turnover and corporate ESG performance. We use State to measure whether the company is an SOE. PT*State, Mayor*State, and Psecretary*State are multiplication of PT and State, Mayor, and State, and Psecretaery and State respectively. Firm-fixed effects and year-fixed effects are also included. The t values reported in parentheses are adjusted based on robust standard errors clustered by firm, where *, **, and *** denote significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A in S1 Table.