Table 5.
Second-Stage Fixed Effects OLS Estimates of Firm Performance: Two-Year ROA
| Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Two-Year ROA | Two-Year ROA | Two-Year ROA | Two-Year ROA | Two-Year ROA | Two-Year ROA | |
| Inverse Mills ratio | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 |
| (0.046) | (0.066) | (0.052) | (0.073) | (0.089) | (0.071) | |
| CEO power | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| (0.417) | (0.272) | (0.513) | (0.299) | (0.243) | (0.538) | |
| Organizational complexity | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| (0.539) | (0.548) | (0.552) | (0.098) | (0.551) | (0.143) | |
| Board leadership demands | −0.01 | −0.01 | −0.01 | −0.01 | −0.00 | −0.00 |
| (0.108) | (0.131) | (0.126) | (0.128) | (0.483) | (0.463) | |
| TMT power | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| (0.094) | (0.305) | (0.410) | (0.039) | (0.137) | (0.045) | |
| Non-executive board chair t-1 | −0.06 | −0.04 | −0.05 | −0.04 | −0.04 | −0.04 |
| (0.058) | (0.116) | (0.091) | (0.130) | (0.158) | (0.126) | |
| CEO duality t-1 | −0.06 | −0.05 | −0.05 | −0.05 | −0.05 | −0.05 |
| (0.027) | (0.047) | (0.036) | (0.051) | (0.067) | (0.051) | |
| Insider CEO | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| (0.067) | (0.098) | (0.085) | (0.157) | (0.114) | (0.140) | |
| Chair ownership | −0.09 | −0.09 | −0.09 | −0.08 | −0.09 | −0.09 |
| (0.264) | (0.283) | (0.229) | (0.322) | (0.277) | (0.248) | |
| Chair's role tenure | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 |
| (0.144) | (0.414) | (0.508) | (0.371) | (0.621) | (0.726) | |
| Chair's board tenure | 0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 | −0.00 |
| (0.783) | (0.842) | (0.818) | (0.796) | (0.782) | (0.707) | |
| Board Independence | −0.04 | −0.03 | −0.03 | −0.03 | −0.03 | −0.03 |
| (0.227) | (0.442) | (0.377) | (0.462) | (0.470) | (0.398) | |
| Lead independent director present | −0.01 | −0.01 | −0.01 | −0.01 | −0.01 | −0.01 |
| (0.329) | (0.319) | (0.337) | (0.292) | (0.302) | (0.302) | |
| R&D intensity | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 |
| (0.136) | (0.134) | (0.127) | (0.128) | (0.132) | (0.117) | |
| Industry instability | −0.00 | 0.00 | −0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| (0.998) | (0.893) | (0.939) | (0.583) | (0.899) | (0.830) | |
| Executive board chair | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 | |
| (0.015) | (0.002) | (0.019) | (0.014) | (0.001) | ||
| Executive Board Chair × CEO Power | 0.01 | 0.02 | ||||
| (0.042) | (0.010) | |||||
| Executive Board Chair × Organizational Complexity | −0.01 | −0.01 | ||||
| (0.008) | (0.026) | |||||
| Executive Board Chair × Board Leadership Demands | −0.01 | −0.01 | ||||
| (0.028) | (0.024) | |||||
| Constant | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.06 |
| (0.042) | (0.102) | (0.096) | (0.089) | (0.096) | (0.079) | |
| Year dummies | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included | Included |
| Observations | 2,122 | 2,122 | 2,122 | 2,122 | 2,122 | 2,122 |
| R-squared | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.09 |
| Δ R-squared (from base model) | N/A | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 |
| Number of firms | 281 | 281 | 281 | 281 | 281 | 281 |
Note: Robust p values are in parentheses.