Table 1.
Bidding decisions in land auctions.
| Reference | Assumption framework | Research focus | Market conditions | Auction formats |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yang and Peng16 | Fully rational | Equilibrium bidding | – | First-price sealed-bid auction and English auction |
| Marlene et al.17 | Fully rational | Equilibrium bidding | – | First-price sealed-bid auction |
| Wu et al.4 | Fully rational | Equilibrium bidding and mechanism design | Housing price control | First-price sealed-bid auction |
| Zhang and Wang5 | Fully rational | Equilibrium bidding and mechanism design | – | First-price sealed-bid auction |
| Cai and Guo6 | Fully rational | Equilibrium bidding and mechanism design | Limiting land price | First-price sealed-bid auction |
| Deng et al.18 | Fully rational | Equilibrium bidding and mechanism design | – | First-price sealed-bid auction and second-price sealed-bid auction |
| Peng and Liu19 | Bounded rational | Equilibrium bidding | – | First-price sealed-bid auction |
| This study | Bounded rational | Equilibrium bidding | Market transformation | First-price sealed-bid auction |