. 2023 Sep 6;9(9):e19903. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e19903

Table 1.

Tripartite evolutionary game payoff matrix when the government chooses strict regulation $(x)$ .

Internet recycling companies	Residents
	Participation in recycling $(z)$	No participation in recycling ( $1 - z$ )
Protecting information security $(y)$	$I_{1} + R_{2} - C_{1}$ ; $I_{2} + β R_{3}$ ; $R_{4} + I_{3}$ ;	$I_{1} - C_{1}$ ; $I_{2}$ ; $I_{3}$ ;
Not protecting information security $(1 - y)$	$I_{1} + R_{1} + R_{2} - C_{1}$ ; $R_{3} - R_{1} - D_{2}$ ; $R_{4} - D_{3} - C_{2}$ ;	$I_{1} + R_{1} - C_{1}$ ; $- R_{1} - D_{2}$ ; $- D_{3}$ ;