Apparent lack of mind-brain identity correlations	Possible interpretations that could save the mind-brain identity theory
Corpus callosotomy and hemispherectomy keep selfhood unified.	Residual subcortical structures may connect the two hemispheres preventing ‘self-splitting’.
Cerebellar agenesis leads to only mild or moderate motor deficits.	Neuroplasticity: The remaining hemisphere takes over the tasks of the missing one.
Hydrocephalus can be quite extreme without necessarily leading to mental impairment.	Neuroplasticity again: Brain tissue may not be lost but only compressed maintaining its functionality.
The hypothesis of the cerebral cortex being the ‘generator’ of conscious experience is contradicted by research on congenitally decorticated children and non-mammalians.	What do we know about what it is like to be a bird?
Thalamus stimulation acts as a ‘gate of consciousness’, not as its ‘generator.’	The thalamus is a hub that ‘modulates’ consciousness; it does not ‘generate’ consciousness.
Brain size (nr. of neurons, mass, volume) does not correlate with cognitive skills.	A minimal nr. of neurons is necessary, then size does not necessarily scale with intelligence.
The brain’s complexity (connectivity, efficiency of information transfer) does not correlate with cognitive skills.	Complexity is more than connectivity and information transfer.
Evidence for engram cells remains debatable, and no memory loss was observed in hydrocephalus or hemispherectomy.	Progress has been made, it is only a matter of time before we will discover the physical basis for memory.
The intensity of psychedelic-altered states of consciousness inversely scale with network disruption.	Maybe psychedelic experiences are unfolding in the brain all the time in the form of unconscious processes. Psychedelics may present it to the surface awareness.
Basal cognition exists without a brain, like in plants and cells.	Will sooner or later be explained away by complicated cell signaling adaptive processes.