Fig. 4.
Results of Steps 1 and 2. Each condition is the average of 30 simulation runs. The value is calculated as the average value from the 4,000th to the 5,000th iterations of each simulation run. The error bars show the SEs. On the Left side of each plot are the results from Step 1; on the Right are the results from Step 2. Plot (A) shows that gossipers evolve only when both reputation dissemination and selfishness deterrence functions exist (i.e., with-gossip and with-rep-manage). Plots (B and C) show that the existence of gossipers (yellow) increases reputation accessibility and cooperation. Plot (D) shows that opportunists evolve only when both reputation dissemination and selfishness deterrence functions exist. Plots (E and F) show that the existence of gossipers increases the proportion of reputation-sensitive agents.