Table 3. Situating Existing Theoretical Accounts within the Human Affectome.
Theoretical Accounts | Explanatory Goal | Methodology | Situated within The Human Affectome |
---|---|---|---|
Affective computing | matching, recognizing, or simulating affective phenomena often using multidimensional data (Picard, 2000; Gratch and Marsella, 2004; Poria et al., 2017) | computational modeling; machine learning | Can be used to articulate affective algorithms. To entertain abstraction, Operational concerns. |
Appraisal | 1. the commonality of relations between evaluations and emotions across populations (discrete appraisal theories; Lazarus, 2001; Roseman and Smith, 2001) | subjective report (fixed options); behavioral paradigms; physiological measures; affective computing | The actionable orientation with which the human organism evaluates an object as relevant. Affective Concerns. |
2. the variability in relations between emotions and combinations of evaluations across populations (dimensional appraisal theories; Grandjean and Scherer, 2008; Scherer, 2009; Scherer and Moors, 2019; Lerner and Keltner, 2000, 2001) | subjective report (dimensional responses); behavioral paradigms; physiological measures; affective computing | ||
3. evaluations as distinguishing between what constitutes different emotion types, rather than causing them (OCC model; Ortony et al., 1988) | computational modeling and formalism | ||
Autopoiesis | See enactive: autopoietic. | ||
Basic emotion | the commonality of physiological, neural, and behavioral indicators of types of emotion across populations | subjective report (fixed options); behavioral paradigms; physiological measures; neuroimaging | Emotions can be grouped by their cluster of operational concerns but are not necessarily biologically determined. Operational concerns. |
Bayesian inference | 1. predictive inference of explanation for sensory data (Bayesian brain hypothesis or predictive coding) | behavioral paradigms; computational modeling and formalism; neuroimaging | Objects are evaluated by their meaning. Affective Concerns. |
1a. predictive inference of explanation for sensory data based on principle of minimizing free energy by considering action (active inference) | Objects are evaluated by their actionable meaning. Affective Concerns. | ||
Cognitive science | interdisciplinary field studying the mind | behavioral paradigms; computational modeling and formalism; neuroimaging | Entertaining abstraction allows us to engage in cognitive science, but we can also question whether cognition and affect are indeed separate. Conclusions. |
Computational psychiatry | the individual computational mechanisms at play in different people with psychiatric disorders | behavioral paradigms; computational modeling and formalism; neuroimaging | Mechanisms in psychiatric disorders can be construed as algorithms of adaptivity gone awry. See representation: misrepresentation. To entertain abstraction. |
Connectionism | the distributed activity across nodes of a neural network (see attractor states in Table 4 and dynamical systems) | computational modeling and formalism | An organism’s processes unfold across many nodes. To ensure viability. |
Constructionist | 1. the presence of felt bodily changes during emotional experience (somatic marker hypothesis) (Damasio, 1996) | subjective report; behavioral paradigms; physiological measures; neuroimaging | Emotions being felt reflections of algorithms addressing operational concerns, which can be inferences of lower-level affective concerns. Operational concerns. |
2. the dimensional commonalities across all emotional experiences (core affect) (Russell, 2003; Russell et al., 1989; Posner et al., 2005; Kuppens et al., 2013) | subjective report (dimensional responses); behavioral paradigms; physiological measures; neuroimaging | ||
3. the variability in subjective reports of emotional experience (theory of constructed emotion) (Barrett, 2017) | subjective report (free labeling); behavioral paradigms; physiological measures; neuroimaging | ||
Dynamical systems | the dynamics of distributed activity across time (see attractor states in Table 4) | computational modeling and formalism | An organism’s processes unfold across time as a complex system. To ensure viability. |
Embedded | interactions between organism and environment shape organism’s capacities (see situated) | conceptual analysis | The human organism must interact with the environment to enact its relevance. To enact relevance. |
Embodied | mental processes involve whole body, not just brain and nervous system | subjective report; behavioral paradigms; physiological measures; neuroimaging; conceptual analysis | All processes in an organism are contributing to enacting relevance. To enact relevance. |
Enactive | 1. everything an organism does, including cognition, is active—specifically, as interactions with its environment | computational modeling and formalism; conceptual analysis conceptual analysis | The Human Affectome is guided, in part, by the Teleological Principle that human organisms enact relevance. All affective phenomena are enactive. (Emotions, as references to operational concerns, can therefore also be considered enactive.) |
1a. to be an organism is to self-generate and self-distinguish (autopoietic) | To ensure viability. | ||
1b. the organism both makes sense of the world and makes the world make sense (sense-making) | To enact relevance. | ||
2. how perception and action can guide each other (sensorimotor) | subjective report; behavioral paradigms; physiological measures; neuroimaging;conceptual analysis | To enact relevance. | |
3. enaction allows us to do away with representation (radical) | conceptual analysis | The Human Affectome does not assume a strong claim on representation, but representations can be used to describe algorithms. To enact relevance, To entertain abstraction. | |
Evolutionary | affective phenomena can be explained based on aspects that developed via natural selection (Izard, 1978; Nesse, 1990; Porges, 1997; Panksepp, 1998; LeDoux, 2012; Al-Shawaf et al., 2016). | behavioral paradigms; neuroimaging; conceptual analysis | The Human Affectome does not take up an explicit evolutionary perspective, despite the assumption that part of the purpose of affective phenomena is to ensure viability. All else, such as metabolism, reproduction, and evolution, arise from necessarily being a unity in the first place (Varela et al., 1974; Maturana, 1980) |
Extended | the mind extends further than the body to objects used in a relevantly similar and reliable way (Clark and Chalmers, 1998) | conceptual analysis | The Human Affectome does not assume an extended mind, but merely highlights the interactions between human organism and environment. To enact relevance. |
Goal-directed theories | integration of dimensional appraisal and constructionist theories of emotion (Moors, 2017a; 2017b) | conceptual analysis | Emotion types grounded by clusters of goal-orientedness or action tendency. Operational concerns. See goal in Table 4. |
Homeostasis | how organism remains within viable states despite environmental change | behavioral paradigms; physiological measures; neuroimaging; conceptual analysis | This is entailed by autopoiesis. To ensure viability. |
Human Affectome | what affective phenomena are and how they work based on why they exist | conceptual analysis | Entire framework of the Human Affectome. |
Intentionality | the aspect of a mental state being about something | conceptual analysis; phenomenological analysis | Objects are relevant to an organism based on its actionable orientation toward them; allows distinction between affective types based on clusters of affective concerns. Affective Concerns. |
projecting intentionality onto something whose behavior seems to have it (intentional stance) | We can use the intentional stance to articulate processes, whether the source has intentionality or not. To entertain abstraction. | ||
Moral emotions | emotions that concern beliefs about violation | behavioral paradigms; conceptual analysis | Moral emotions as affective experiences grounded by algorithms addressing a moral subset of operational concerns. Operational concerns. |
Motivational theories | 1. the drive to act in emotion (action tendency; Frijda, 1986); see appraisal. 2. the evaluation in emotion in light of the drive to act (felt bodily attitude; Deonna and Teroni, 2012) 3. the drive to act as well as emotional actions (motivational theory of emotions; Scarantino, 2014) |
conceptual analysis; behavioral paradigms; physiological measures; neuroimaging | The actionability implied by an object in an affective phenomenon. To enact relevance, Affective Concerns. |
Phenomenology | the rich structure in the meaning of experience | conceptual analysis | This rich structure accompanies the organization of felt actionability implied by objects in affective phenomena. To enact relevance. |
Reinforcement learning | 1. learned behavior based on reward | behavioral paradigms; computational modeling | Reward as intrinsic rather than in the environment. To enact relevance. |
1a. momentary affect as a function of reward | Valence as metric of evaluation of goodness or badness. Valence. | ||
1b. mood as a momentum of reward | Mood as trajectory. Trajectory concerns. | ||
Representation | 1. mental content; can be written as propositional attitudes | conceptual analysis | We human organisms can seem as if we have representations, but this framework does not make a strong claim on representationalism. See intentionality: intentional stance. |
1a. mental content can be unjustified (misrepresentation) | If meaning is captured by actionability, then unjustified meaning is associated with maladaptivity. To entertain abstraction. | ||
2. providing sufficient coverage of the interests of members within a group; in this case, of the affective field (see pragmatic in Table 1) | The Human Affectome provides a sampling of Western perspectives, but lacks in coverage of Eastern or non-analytic approaches. Conclusions. | ||
Situated | the mind is shaped by environment in the interactions that are possible; see embedded; can be applied to affective phenomena (situated affectivity; Griffiths and Scarantino, 2005; Colombetti, 2010; Piredda, 2020; Stephan and Walter, 2020) | conceptual analysis | The human organism’s capacities are shaped by possible interactions with the environment. To enact relevance. |
Unconscious emotions | 1. the behavior of organisms whose mental state we cannot access | behavioral paradigms; physiological measures, neuroimaging; computational modeling | The systematicity in feeling can be inferred to explain behavior, assuming that system is rational. See intentionality. To enact relevance. |
2. conscious feelings that the organism is not aware of on a higher-order, reflective level | conceptual analysis | Emotions, as affective experiences, are feelings that are minimally felt, but do not require reflection or reporting to be felt. To enact relevance. |