Table 3. The revenue matrix of three-party game.

airline and consumer		There is platform misconduct (1-y)	There is not platform misconduct (y)
The airline’s regulation is negative (1-x)	The consumer protects the rights (z)	$-L_1-\lambda K-\eta {\lambda }^{2}W$ R2−λV $-L_3-C_3+{\eta }^2{\lambda }^{2}W$	$-\lambda K-{\eta }^2{\lambda }^{2}W$ $-C_2-\lambda V-\lambda M+\lambda N$ $-C_3+{\eta }^2{\lambda }^{2}W$
	The consumer doesn’t protect the rights (1-z)	−L1−H R2 −L3	0 −C2 0
The airline’s regulation is positive (x)	The consumer protects the rights (z)	$-L_1-C_1+R_1+\eta \lambda F-\alpha \eta \lambda F-{\eta }^2{\lambda }^{2}W$ $R_2-\eta \lambda F-m{L}_3-\lambda V$ $-L_3-C_3+m{L}_3+\alpha \eta \lambda F+{\eta }^2{\lambda }^{2}W$	$-C_1+R_1-{\eta }^2{\lambda }^{2}W$ $-C_2+\lambda Q$ $-C_3+{\eta }^2{\lambda }^{2}W$
	The consumer doesn’t protect the rights (1-z)	−L1−C1+R1 R2 −L3	−C1+R1 −C2 0

Note: The first to third rows of the revenue matrix are revenue of the airline, the OTA platform, and the consumer respectively.