

1 **First imported Cases of MPXV Clade Ib in Goma, Democratic Republic of the Congo:**
2 **Implications for Global Surveillance and Transmission Dynamics**

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53 **ABSTRACT**

54 The ongoing national mpox outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has resulted in
55 more >30,000 suspected cases in the country from January 2023 to August 2024. While these
56 historic case totals have been driven by primarily by zoonosis, the emergence of Clade Ib
57 monkeypox virus (MPXV), which is connected to more sustained human-to-human transmission,
58 has been associated with increasing public health impacts in eastern DRC. First identified in South
59 Kivu province, Clade Ib MPXV has been identified in multiple non-endemic East African
60 countries for the first time. In DRC, there have been concerns over broader Clade Ib expansion in
61 the country that could further complicate containment and mitigation responses. Here, we report
62 the first introductions of Clade Ib into North Kivu province, including within internal displacement
63 camps, with suspected close contact transmission that includes non-intimate contacts and children.
64 These findings demonstrate that mpox case investigations and community messaging campaigns
65 should include considerations for non-sexual contact-mediated transmission of Clade Ib that
66 includes children <15 years.

67 **INTRODUCTION**

68 Mpox, an emerging zoonotic disease caused by Monkeypox virus (MPXV), garnered significant
69 international attention in 2022 due to virus expansion and broad human-to-human transmission
70 concentrated within dense sexual networks in more than 100 historically non-endemic countries
71 (1), which resulted in a first declaration of a public health emergency of international concern
72 (PHEIC) by the World Health Organization (WHO) in the same year (2-4). Human mpox was first
73 described in 1970 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and is endemic among tropical
74 forested regions of Central and West Africa (5). While outbreaks have been sporadic historically,
75 there has been a generally increasing burden of disease across endemic areas with the DRC facing
76 the greatest public health impact (2, 6, 7). This has coincided with decreasing immunity to human
77 orthopoxviruses among the population over time following the cessation of the global smallpox
78 vaccination program, and in increasing immune naive population (8-10). In 2024, a surge in cases
79 in the African region which followed the emergence of a new MPXV variant resulted in a second
80 declaration of a PHEIC (11).

81 Historically, zoonosis has been the primary driver of human mpox within endemic regions with
82 rodent species being the presumed reservoir and limited secondary transmission among close
83 contacts. However, sustained human-to-human transmission has been increasingly associated with
84 MPXV infections such as in Nigeria following re-emergence of the virus in 2017 and during the
85 global 2022 mpox outbreak (12, 13). Close sexual (intimate) contact and altered or atypical
86 clinical disease presentation was highly overrepresented among cases during the global outbreak
87 (3, 14), with 96% of cases being males and 87% of cases globally self-identifying as MSM (15).

88 Since early 2023, there has been an ongoing historic national mpox outbreak in DRC that has
89 included virus expansion and transmission within communities in adjacent non-endemic countries.
90 Notably, MPXV infections associated with sustained human-to-human transmission including
91 sexual (intimate) contact have been reported for the first time in Kwango and South Kivu provinces
92 within the country (16, 17). In addition, suspected mpox cases have been reported in 25 of 26 of
93 the provinces in DRC including multiple large urban centers. This has also included sustained
94 virus transmission chains within regions having infrequent reports of suspected mpox cases.
95 Notably, mpox has rapidly expanded in South Kivu province, with cases increasing from 10
96 suspected cases per week to >381 suspected cases per week in epidemiological week 31, 2024
97 (18). In Kamituga Health Zone, a mining region in South Kivu province, mpox cases were first
98 reported in September 2023, with 51.9% of cases identified in women, 29% among professional
99 sex workers (PSW), and a median age of 22 years among confirmed cases (16). We identified
100 APOBEC3-like mutations in high-quality complete MPXV genomes from Kamituga, which led
101 us to recommend the subdivision of Clade I MPXV into subclades Ia and Ib, with the latter related
102 to sustained human-to-human transmission trends (16), and the former predominantly linked to
103 zoonotic transmission (19). Estimates from molecular clock analysis suggest that Clade Ib MPXV
104 has been circulating locally in Kamituga since mid-September 2023 (95% highest posterior density
105 intervals July 2023-October 2023) (16).

106 Given the ongoing historic impacts of mpox in DRC and further geographic expansion, the
107 increasing burden of Clade Ib-associated infections, ongoing internal displacement due to armed
108 conflicts, and the commercial activities within the region, there is a critical need for expanded
109 mpox surveillance in Eastern DRC (20). Here, we describe the observed expansion of Clade Ib
110 MPXV from South Kivu into North Kivu Province, including mpox circulation within internal
111 displacement camps. Our results also provide evidence for Clade Ib transmission associated with

112 both sexual (intimate) and non-sexual close contacts, including among children, with important
113 implications for infection prevention and control recommendations in the recent declaration of the
114 second PHEIC for mpox.

115

116 **MATERIALS AND METHODS**

117 **Ethical Considerations**

118 This study was exempted from ethical approval since it was conducted as part of the national
119 surveillance activities and carried out in the public interest by the Ministry of Health, the
120 Democratic Republic of the Congo. All activities described were undertaken as part of regular
121 public health surveillance conducted and approved directly by the Ministry of Health, Democratic
122 Republic of the Congo. Data was provided by the National Programme for Control of Mpox and
123 Viral Haemorrhagic Fevers and the National Institute for Biomedical Research, the Democratic
124 Republic of the Congo, as part of the case investigations. No written informed consent for research
125 was provided as the analyses conducted in this study were done retrospectively and the information
126 and diagnostic samples were collected for surveillance and clinical care purposes.

127

128 **Suspected mpox case investigations**

129 Human mpox is a mandatory reportable disease in the DRC, with an established case definition
130 from the Ministry of Health which has been in use since 2001. This definition was expanded upon
131 in 2010 to better enhance surveillance in Tshuapa Province. In this expanded case definition, a
132 suspected case was defined as follows: a patient with a vesicular pustular eruption characterized
133 by hard and deep pustules and with at least one of the following symptoms: fever preceding the
134 eruption, lymphadenopathy (inguinal, axillary, or cervical), and/or pustules or crusts on the palms
135 of the hands or soles of the feet, and having an exposure such as a travelling history from an
136 affected area, a high risk contact with people coming from affected area or exposure to wild animal
137 dead or with lesions (21). Formal investigation of a suspected mpox case included the collection
138 of samples and the completion of a case investigation form by trained staff from Health zone and
139 Provincial Health division (DPS).

140

141 **Sample collection and laboratory diagnosis of mpox**

142 Lesion swabs and/or lesion crusts are the preferred samples for MPXV diagnostics, but blood
143 samples and nasopharyngeal swabs were also collected. These samples were then shipped to the
144 Rodolphe-Merieux INRB-Goma Laboratory for PCR assay and whole genome sequencing
145 (WGS). To confirm the diagnosis of mpox, the GeneXpert platform was used with clade IIB-
146 specific cartridges, according to the manufacturer's instructions. Mpox-positive samples with a Ct
147 value < 30 were selected for subsequent WGS.

148

149 **Bioinformatics analysis**

150 FASTQ files from GridION were base called with the High accuracy model from Guppy v6, and
151 reads were demultiplexed and adapter-trimmed by the GridION built-in MinKNOW software.
152 MPXV consensus genomes were generated using the artic ([https://github.com/artic-network/artic-](https://github.com/artic-network/artic-mpxv-nf)
153 [mpxv-nf](https://github.com/artic-network/artic-mpxv-nf)) and metatropics pipelines ([https://github.com/DaanJansen94/nextflow-metatropics-](https://github.com/DaanJansen94/nextflow-metatropics-INRB)
154 [INRB](https://github.com/DaanJansen94/nextflow-metatropics-INRB)).

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156 **Phylogenetic and APOBEC-3 analysis**

157 We estimated a maximum likelihood phylogeny using IQ-TREE 2 version 2.2.5 (22) with the
158 Hasegawa, Kishino, Yano (HKY) substitution model. Ancestral reconstruction was performed for
159 each internal node on phylogeny using IQ-TREE 2, enabling mapping of single nucleotide
160 polymorphisms (SNPs) along branches. SNPs were categorized on the basis of whether they were
161 consistent with the signature of APOBEC3 editing, assuming this process induced specific
162 mutations (TC → TT and GA → AA) as previously described (23, 24).

163

164 **RESULTS**

165 **Case investigation and epidemiological assessment**

166 We describe a total of nine confirmed mpox cases identified in North Kivu, DRC, which includes
167 six cases confirmed as Clade Ib MPXV by whole genome sequencing. A map of the geographic
168 locations of the identified cases is presented in Figure 1. Epidemiological links among Cases 1-9
169 are presented in Figure 2.

170 Case 1, an adult female (15-30 years) from North Kivu, developed vesicular lesions and pustules
171 on day 5 post-symptom onset and healthcare consultation in May 2024. The patient was discharged
172 one day later (day 6) and cared for at home. Vesicle and nasopharyngeal swabs were collected on
173 day 8 post-symptom onset and confirmed positive for orthopoxvirus by PCR. Additional tests for
174 syphilis rapid plasma reagin (RPR) and HIV (determine) were negative. The individual reported
175 travel to South Kivu, which is currently affected by an ongoing Clade Ib MPXV outbreak, during
176 the 21 days prior to symptom development. However, this could not be confirmed. Follow up
177 investigations of contacts from the healthcare consultation (n=23) and at their residence (n=19)
178 did not identify any additional mpox cases.

179 Case 2, an adult male, 15-30 years from North Kivu, received consultation for management of
180 vesicular lesions, which were in the process of healing in June 2024. Lesion swabs were collected
181 and confirmed positive for mpox one day following consultation. Sexual intercourse within 21
182 days of symptom onset with an occasional sexual partner from North Kivu was disclosed during
183 case investigation though the individual did not notice any visible lesions on the partners' body.

184 Case 3, an adult male aged 15-30 years from North Kivu received medical consultation eight days
185 post-symptom onset. Mpox was confirmed by PCR one day following consultation. The individual
186 reported that his spouse had received consultation for similar symptoms. Through this, the case
187 investigation established an epidemiological link with his spouse, a probable mpox case, that
188 included recent travel to South Kivu in the prior 21 days (probable case 1). There were no
189 epidemiological links established between Cases 1-3.

190 Five additional confirmed mpox cases, Cases 4-8, were residents of Mudja displaced persons
191 camp, North Kivu. Probable epidemiological links were made among Cases 4-6 based on frequent
192 interactions among residents within the camp, including probable cases.

193 Case 4, a male child <15 years, developed fever and headache. The child reported common use of
194 a sponge that had been used on his male sibling (<15 years) who recently had dermatological
195 lesions similar to Case 4 though no confirmatory testing had been performed (probable case 2).
196 The male sibling of Case 4 had also interacted with a neighbor who had developed skin lesions a
197 few days prior to the sibling though no further information or testing information was available
198 (probable case 3). It was also noted that Case 4 and their male sibling had shared sleeping quarters.

199 Skin eruptions including vesicles and pustules were noted for Case 4 on day 3 post-symptom onset;
200 mpox was confirmed from samples taken on day 5.

201 Case 5, a female 15-30 years, developed symptoms in mid-June 2024 including chills, cough,
202 headache, lymphadenopathy, eruptions on the lips, and pubic lesions. A female child living within
203 the same household had reportedly developed similar symptoms ~14 days earlier but had not
204 sought clinical consultation (probable case 4).

205 Case 6, a male child <15 years, presented with lesions on the back, face and abdomen. Case 6 was
206 friends with probable case 2.

207 Case 7, a female >30 years, developed a rash on the buttock, thigh, hands, and feet at symptom
208 onset. Case 7 had no epidemiological link to other cases in Mudja camp; however, she reported
209 having provided recent care for her son (<15 years;) who had a similar illness presentation and
210 with whom she shared a bed (probable case 5). Probable epidemiological links were made among
211 Cases 4-6 based on frequent interactions among residents within the camp, including probable
212 cases.

213 Case 8, a female child (<15) living in Mudja camp, had fever at symptom onset followed by
214 vesicular eruptions on the cuisses, abdomen, back and face, with no adenopathy. An
215 epidemiological link has not been clearly established with other probable or confirmed cases in
216 the camp; however, they had contact with other children through regular plays activities.

217 Case 9, a 15-30-year-old female, presented with vesiculo-pustular lesions on day 3 post-symptom
218 onset (fever starting on day 0). Samples were taken for testing on day 10 and confirmed positive
219 for MPXV. There were no epidemiological links to any of the other cases, confirmed or probable.

220 **Case demographics and clinical symptoms**

221 Demographic and clinical data for all nine confirmed mpox cases are presented in Table 1. Of all
222 cases, five (5/9) were residents at the Mudja displaced persons site for internally displaced people.
223 Males comprised 5/9 cases; 4/9 cases were female. The mean age was 18 years (6 - 45 years). The
224 majority of cases were identified among those aged 15-30 years (5/9) and three cases were
225 identified among those <15 years. Most patients (6/9) required hospitalization and included three
226 males and three females. Of those hospitalized, 3/6 were aged 15-30 years, 2/6 were <15 years,
227 and 1/6 was >30 years. There were no fatal infections recorded among the nine confirmed cases.

228 Cutaneous eruptions were reported for all patients (9/9) with genital and oral eruptions frequently
229 reported (7/9 and 6/9 cases, respectively). Genital eruptions were similarly reported whether male
230 or female (4/5 and 3/4 cases, respectively); however, oral eruptions were reported more frequently
231 among female cases than males (4/4 and 2/4 cases, respectively). Myalgia (8/9), headache, (7/9),
232 and fever (6/9) were common among mpox patients. Lymphadenopathy was also frequently
233 reported with cervical lymphadenopathy being the most commonly reported among cases (7/9) as
234 compared to inguinal (5/9) or axillary (3/9).

235 **Genome sequencing identifies Clade Ib introduction into Goma, North Kivu**

236 Genomic analysis of the first three confirmed cases showed that they all clustered within MPXV
237 Clade Ib together with Mpox cases detected in South Kivu (Figure 3). Their position in the tree
238 with MPXV sequences from South Kivu suggests they were part of the sustained human outbreak
239 first reported in Kamituga health zone. These findings are consistent with the reported travel of
240 the first case from South Kivu. The genomes from the cases 1 & 2 are closely linked suggesting
241 they are part of the same transmission chain, although no epidemiological link between the two
242 was proven by the investigation. The third sequenced case is separated from the first two in the
243 Clade Ib outbreak tree, implying an independent introduction into Goma.

244 Of the 21 single nucleotide mutations reconstructed in this tree (Table 2), 15 are of the type
245 expected due to the action of human APOBEC3. The viruses sequenced from cases 1 & 2 are
246 descendants of viruses present in Kamituga in October 2023 or earlier. Furthermore, the branch
247 leading to cases 1 & 2 has four APOBEC3-type mutations which even at the elevated rate of
248 evolution induced by APOBEC3 would represent months of human transmission. In combination
249 with the reported recent travel history, this indicates a likely recent introduction into the Goma
250 area from the South Kivu region with ongoing transmission.

251 The branch leading to case 3 has four APOBEC3 mutations and one other mutation, possibly the
252 result of an error during replication, indicating a similar timespan for this branch. However, this
253 branch joins the Kamituga tree clustering with viruses sampled in January 2024, suggesting a direct
254 link to that outbreak. The long unbroken branch with 5 single nucleotide mutations, and the fact
255 that this lineage has not yet been sampled in Kamituga, may either be explained by undersampling
256 in Kamituga, or an unresolved epidemiological link to South Kivu (i.e. by not having identified
257 nor sequenced the contact of Case 3 who may also be epidemiologically linked to South Kivu).

258 However, the third hypothesis, being that the virus has been circulating in Goma for weeks or
259 months, can also not be entirely excluded.

260 **DISCUSSION**

261 Here, we present the first case series of Clade Ib mpox reported in North Kivu province, DRC,
262 with probable introduction to the Mudja internal displacement camp. Case investigations and
263 epidemiological analysis demonstrates non-sexual contact mediated transmission of Clade Ib
264 MPXV that included cases among children. The investigations also suggested potential linkage of
265 one of the mpox cases to recent travel to South Kivu, which has recently reported mpox cases. The
266 introduction and expansion of mpox in large urban centers in DRC including Bukavu (urban pop.
267 >1 million) and Goma (urban pop. ~2 million) further increase the risk for greater public health
268 impacts from the ongoing outbreak, which has already far surpassed the scale of prior outbreaks
269 across endemic regions. Of particular note is the identification of MPXV Clade Ib circulation,
270 which is linked to sustained human-to-human transmission chains, among both urban centers (16,
271 25). This risk is further compounded by Goma's role as a major commercial hub and regional and
272 international connection point, including air travel. Additionally, Goma's proximity to
273 international borders with East African countries and frequent unmonitored cross-border
274 movement increases the potential for the virus to spread to new regions through cryptic
275 transmission.

276 A concerning finding from this investigation was the identification of mpox cases among
277 individuals at the Mudja displaced persons site. The introduction of MPXV to, and circulation
278 within, displaced persons sites could have deleterious public health impacts. Importantly, this
279 includes the potential for broad disease transmission given the poor sanitation conditions, highly
280 dense populations, and very limited healthcare or surveillance support. Thus, ongoing political
281 instability in the region could further destabilize mpox containment and mitigation efforts. Case
282 investigations among the nine confirmed mpox cases in this study identified potential contacts
283 with unreported symptomatic infections within households, highlighting the need for greater
284 community engagement focused on both case recognition and suspected case reporting.
285 Additionally, the case investigations also noted the potential for contacts among children through
286 common play areas. Given the cases identified herein among children, and considering the
287 disproportionate disease severity associated with mpox among children, additional vigilance

288 should be undertaken to inform communities regarding the potential risks for mpox within
289 children. Of important note was the potential linkage of Case 1 to recent travel to Bukavu, South
290 Kivu, where there have been increasing detrimental public health impacts from mpox linked to
291 sexual (intimate) contacts. Ongoing conflict within the region could also impact containment and
292 mitigation efforts for MPXV circulation within Mudja given the potential for onward transmission
293 among current residents as well as further introductions of virus through undiagnosed infections.
294 Clade Ib introduction into Mudja is currently being assessed by viral genome sequencing from
295 samples collected during this investigation.

296 Our investigation also demonstrated that infection risks for the recently identified MPXV Clade
297 Ib extend beyond sexual (intimate) contacts to include caregivers and children as well as adults.
298 Taken together, these factors create a critical bottleneck for response to public health emergencies
299 reminiscent of those encountered in the region during the Ebola virus disease outbreak in 2018-
300 2020. While the DRC already faces expansive public health hurdles, including extreme economic
301 and development hardships, these impacts are further elevated within internal displacement sites
302 (camps). The convergence of resource limitations within these sites including healthcare access,
303 sanitation, clean water, and food as well as overcrowding will likely further facilitate rapid mpox
304 circulation and broaden this outbreak to a larger humanitarian crisis. Consequently, the high risk
305 of the mpox outbreak further expanding nationally and internationally must be considered an
306 urgent issue and a priority for all stakeholders. These cases involved adult males and females, as
307 well as children, who were infected by MPXV through various transmission routes, including close
308 non-sexual contacts. Our analysis demonstrates the further expansion of Clade Ib MPXV and the
309 first identification of cases within a displaced persons' site highlighting concerns for rapid
310 expansion of the outbreak among highly vulnerable populations.

311 The spread of Clade Ib MPXV in the city of Goma, North Kivu, is highly concerning, as the virus
312 has the potential to expand further geographically within the DRC as well as more broadly
313 internationally. This risk is exacerbated due to Goma's proximity to porous international border
314 regions, massive population displacement due to armed conflicts, and its international airport.
315 Therefore, there is an urgent need for collaborative efforts and actions to combat mpox before its
316 further spread to other countries.

317

318 **COMPETING INTERESTS**

319 None of the other authors declare competing interests.

320

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407 **TABLES**

408 **Table 1: Demographic and clinical symptom data for mpox cases identified in Goma to**
 409 **date.** Column percentages are presented in parentheses.

<i>Age group (years)</i>	Male	Female	Total
<15	2	1	3
15-30	2	3	5
>30	1	0	1
Total	5	4	9
Hospitalization	3 (60%)	3 (75%)	6 (67%)
<i>Clinical symptoms</i>			
Cutaneous eruptions	5 (100%)	4 (100%)	9 (100%)
Genital eruptions	4 (80%)	3 (75%)	7 (78%)
Oral eruptions	2 (40%)	4 (100%)	6 (67%)
Fever	3 (60%)	3 (75%)	6 (67%)
Headache	4 (80%)	3 (75%)	7 (78%)
Myalgia	5 (100%)	3 (75%)	8 (89%)
Arthralgia	4 (80%)	3 (75%)	7 (78%)
Fatigue	1 (20%)	2 (50%)	3 (33%)
Cervical lymphadenopathy	3 (60%)	4 (100%)	7 (78%)
Inguinal lymphadenopathy	3 (60%)	2 (50%)	5 (56%)
Axillary lymphadenopathy	2 (40%)	1 (25%)	3 (33%)

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412 **Table 2.** List of mutations in the 2023-2024 DRC mpox outbreak.

Branch label¹	Genome position²	Mutation³	APOBEC3?
(a)	103,660	GA->AA	yes
	130,155	GA->AA	yes
	142,587	GA->AA	yes
	161,978	TC->TT	yes
(b)	165,597	C->A	no

Branch label¹	Genome position²	Mutation³	APOBEC3?
(c)	64,117	GA->AA	yes
(d)	30,660	T->C	no
(e)	181,268	GA->AA	yes
(f)	167,805	A->G	no
(g)	115,484	GA->AA	yes
(h)	57,332	GA->AA	yes
(i)	89,000	GA->AA	yes
	127,619	A->G	no
(k)	183,181	G->A	no
(l)	71,751	TC->TT	yes
	139,485	TC->TT	yes
	148,221	GA->AA	yes
	168,749	GA->AA	yes
	169,501	T->A	no

413 ¹ Branch labels refer to Figure 3

414 ² Coordinates relative to Clade I reference genome, NCBI accession NC_003310

415 ³ Dinucleotide mutations are ascribed to APOBEC3 mutations

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
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426 **FIGURES**

427

428 **Figure 1: Geographic locations of cases identified in North Kivu including Mudja**
429 **displacement camp.** Map constructed using QGIS3.22.11. The fading red coloring on the inset
430 signifies the three Goma health zones where the sequenced samples originated from. The star
431 representing Mudja (or Muja) camp location within Nyirangongo health zone utilizing coordinates
432 from Google maps and OpenStreetMap.



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
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
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438 **Figure 2: Epidemiological linkages and suspected transmission chains among Clade Ib**
439 **mpox cases identified in Goma, North Kivu, DRC.** Transmission chain at the Division
440 Provincial de la Santé (DPS), North Kivu. Clade Ib MPXV has been confirmed for cases 1-3 and
441 results are pending for cases 4-9 at this time.



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443 **Figure 3:** A maximum likelihood tree constructed using IQ-Tree 2 (22) with the HKY
444 substitution model (26). We included a Clade Ia genome as an outgroup and then removed it
445 after rooting. Single nucleotide mutations are reconstructed and displayed denoting whether they
446 are APOBEC3-mediated (red bars) or other mutations (blue bars). Genomes from recent cases in
447 Goma, North Kivu are denoted with yellow circles. Patients 1 and 2 each have multiple genomes
448 sequenced from different samples. Blue circles are genomes from Kamituga, South Kivu from
449 October and December 2023, and January 2024. Letters in parentheses are referenced in Table 2.



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