Table 1.

Income matrix of the evolutionary game among supply and marketing cooperatives, sellers, and farmers.

Game subject	Marketing cooperative
Seller	Farmer	Strong regulation (α)	Weak regulation (1-α)
Actively undertake (β)	Take part in (γ)	E1 − C1 + G − S1	E1
		E2 + V1 − C2 + S1 + A1 − S2	E2 + V1 − C2 + A1 − S2
		E3 − C3 + M1 + R1 + S2	E3 − C3 + R1 + S2
	Drop out of (1-γ)	E1 − C1 + G − P1 − S1	E1
		E2 + V1 − C2 + S1 + A1 − S2	E2 + V1 − C2
		E′3	E′3
Negative bear (1-β)	Take part in (γ)	E1 − C1 + F1 + G	E1
		E2 + G	E2
		E3 − C3 + M1	E3 − C3
	Drop out of (1-γ)	E1 − C1 − P1 + G + F	E1
		E2 − F	E2
		E′3	E′3