Formal Security Reassessment of the 5G-AKA-FS Protocol: Methodological Corrections and Augmented Verification Techniques

. 2024 Dec 13;24(24):7979. doi: 10.3390/s24247979

AK	Anonymity key
AKA	Authentication and Key Agreement
AUSF	Authentication server function
AUTN	Authentication token
CK	Cipher key
$(e p k_{H N}, e p k_{H N}^{- 1})$	HN’s ephemeral public–private key pair, where $e p k_{H N} = e p k_{H N}^{- 1} \cdot G$
$(e p k_{U E}, e p k_{U E}^{- 1})$	UE’s ephemeral public–private key pair, where $e p k_{U E} = e p k_{U E}^{- 1} \cdot G$
FS	Forward secrecy
HN	Home network
$I D_{H N}$	Identifier of home network
$I D_{S N}$	Identifier of serving network
IK	Integrity key
k	A permanent key shared between UE and HN
$K_{A U S F}$	A master session key
$K_{S E A F}$	An anchor key
$k_{U E}$	UE’s shared key established by ECIES-KEM
$k_{H N}$	HN’s shared key established by ECIES-KEM
KDF	Key derivation function
MAC	Message Authentication Code
ME	Mobile equipment
$(p k_{H N}, s k_{H N})$	HN’s ECIES public–private key pair, where $p k_{H N} = s k_{H N} \cdot G$
RES	Response
SEAF	Security anchor function
SN	Serving network
$S Q N_{H N}$	HN’s sequence number
$S Q N_{S N}$	SN’s sequence number
SUCI	Subscriber Concealed Identifier
SUPI	Subscription Permanent Identifier
UE	User equipment
USIM	Universal Subscriber Identity Module
XRES	Expected response