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. 2024 Dec 13;24(24):7979. doi: 10.3390/s24247979
Algorithm 9 Declaration and Queries
       (* Channel specification *)
       free sch: channel [private].
       free usch: channel.
       
       (* 5G functions *)
       fun f1, f2, f3, f4, f5.
       
       (* Secrecy verification *)
       Q0: query attacker (SUPI).
       Q1: query attacker (kseaf).
       
       (* Security requirements verification *)
       Q2: supi: bitstring, uepk: pubKey, hnpk: pubKey;
               inj-event(endUE_HN_SUPI(supi, uepk, hnpk))
               ==> inj-event(beginUE_HN_SUPI(supi, uepk, hnpk)).
       Q3: supi: bitstring, K: key, rand: pubKey, sqn: seq;
               inj-event(endUE_HN_MAC(supi, K, rand, sqn))
               ==> inj-event(beginHN_UE_MAC(supi, K, rand, sqn)).
       Q4: supi: bitstring, K: key, rand: pubKey, sqn: seq, res’: bitstring, kseaf: key;
               inj-event(endSN_ANCHOR_KEY(supi, Kseaf))
               ==> (inj-event(middleHN_RES(supi, K, rand, sqn))
               ==> (inj-event(middleSN_RES(res’, rand))
               ==> inj-event(beginUE_RES(supi, K, rand, sqn))