Barriers to and opportunities for the restoration of mana in emergency management legislation and its implementation for Māori

Abstract

Ever since colonisation by the British in 1840, Māori, the indigenous peoples of Aotearoa New Zealand, have been fighting to reclaim their mana (authority and influence) over their whenua (land). They were set to regain mana in emergency management (EM) through a parliamentary Bill, but a recent change of government has seen this legislation discharged. This paper explores the barriers to and the opportunities for gains in authority and influence in EM, with authority understood as representation on the national and regional EM bodies, and influence as incorporation of the Māori worldview into legislation and supporting EM implementation documentation. The study applies these different levels of analysis to two case studies to examine any EM‐related changes between the Christchurch earthquake in February 2011 and the arrival of Cyclone Gabrielle in February 2023. The paper offers several strategies at both analytical levels that Māori could use to further their mana under the current government.

1. INTRODUCTION

As an island nation exposed to two tempestuous bodies of water (the Tasman Sea and the Pacific Ocean), and sitting on two tectonic plates, Aotearoa New Zealand (hereafter Aotearoa) is a hazard‐prone country. In fact, it ranks second on Lloyd's of London's list of nations most exposed to natural hazards (Mateparae et al., 2024, p. 12). The interplay between the country's two main worldviews—te ao Pākehā (the worldview of New Zealanders of European descent) and te ao Māori (the worldview of the indigenous peoples of Aotearoa)—generates analogous hazardous pressures, such as the decades of state assimilation policies that have resulted in disastrous outcomes for Māori as well as provoking strong resistance.

Ever since colonisation by the British in 1840, Māori have been fighting to reclaim their mana (authority and influence) over their whenua (land). Mana is a cosmic force, understood as emanating from the atua, the departmental gods or progenitors and personifications of all known phenomena, but also acquired through connection to whenua, ancestral lineage, and personal qualities (Hēnare, 2001; Rout et al., 2021). Its description here as encompassing authority and influence is admittedly constrained as it also has aspects of self‐worth, charisma, and dignity, but this narrow depiction helps to operationalise the concept for the purposes of the paper.

In recent decades, largely owing to significant action by Māori, mana has been restored, often through incorporation in legislation. The country's founding document of 1840, te Tiriti o Waitangi (The Treaty of Waitangi), has been vital to this process as well. Although brief, with three short articles, two different versions exist, one in English and one in te reo Māori (the Māori language). This, along with many breaches of the agreement by the Crown (New Zealand Government), necessitated the creation of a standing Waitangi Tribunal in 1975. This body was to decide on issues raised by the differences between the two versions, as well as to make recommendations to the Crown based on its inquiries into grievances.

Critically, the te reo Māori version promised to protect tribal rangatiratanga (the right to exercise authority, closely aligned with mana, particularly ‘mana whenua’ or jurisdiction over tribal territory), which has been vital in securing increased legislative authority and influence for Māori. The Tribunal's findings and broader Māori activism have seen gains made in many spheres; however, these have been hard‐fought, and the election in October 2023 of a coalition government, which brings together the conservative/right‐leaning National Party and two arguably even more right‐wing parties, has seen much of the progress of recent decades threatened. Māori authority and influence were explicitly included in a recent emergency management (EM) Bill, but the installation of the National Party‐led coalition resulted in this legislation being discharged.

This paper explores the barriers to and the opportunities for increased mana in EM legislation and its implementation. It examines both aspects of mana, with authority understood as representation on the various national and regional bodies responsible for EM, and influence as the incorporation of te ao Māori and mātauranga (Māori knowledge/knowledge system) in the different statutes and supporting documentation that guide EM. While there are a number of different potential pieces of legislation that shape EM in Aotearoa, the focus here is largely on the primary EM statute, the Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Act 2002, and its now discharged replacement, and the various implementational ramifications and manifestations of the Act. This is largely due to space, particularly as the recent change in government has seen the legislative framework undergo significant transformation, which would necessitate considerably more room to explain. Thus, the study first briefly outlines a Māori view of disaster risk reduction (DRR), before exploring the legislative and implementational barriers to and opportunities for greater incorporation of te ao Māori in legislation. It then uses both levels of analysis (authority and influence) to analyse EM in relation to two case studies: the Christchurch earthquake on 22 February 2011; and Cyclone Gabrielle that impacted the country from 11–17 February 2023. Next it outlines several strategies at the legislative and implementational levels that Māori could apply to further their mana. The paper ends with a brief conclusion.

2. TE AO MĀORI DRR AND EM

Te ao Māori DRR stands in contrast to the dominant DRR framework, which despite trying to merge social/subjective with material/objective conceptions, along with efforts to democratise management, remains entrenched in a physicalist–technocratic paradigm. This has a hazard/event focus, is linear in its framing, sees nature as an external, controllable entity, and prioritises hierarchical expert‐led management (Oliver‐Smith, 2016; Gaillard, 2019; Andhari, 2020; Chmutina et al., 2021). This is, it is argued, owing to the Pākehā worldview, which is mechanistic, upon which the physicalist–technocratic paradigm is built. Hence, any true correctives will require some alteration of or additions to this dominant lens (Rout and Reid, 2020).

The association between te ao Māori DRR and EM, honed through centuries of relational bonds with whenua, is informed by a deep mātauranga that covers everything from predictive hazard indicators and risk amelioration strategies to recovery and response structures and approaches (Kenney and Phibbs, 2015; Kenney et al., 2015; Lambert, 2015; Rout, 2023; Rout et al., 2024; Matthewman and Lambert, 2025). It is guided by the four core presuppositions of te ao Māori: reality is holistic—nature and culture are one and the material and spiritual are indivisible; relationships are fundamentally important and mutually‐shaping; maintaining balance in relationships is of the utmost importance; and time is cyclical, making both the past and the future as important as the present (Hēnare, 2001; Spiller et al., 2011; Rout et al., 2021). It is also built on an understanding of the central importance of two cosmic forces in te ao Māori: mauri, an interactive life force of every element of creation, which is enhanced or depleted by relationships, and is negatively impacted by hazards/disasters; and mana, which is also augmented or diminished by interactions and is required for effective DRR and EM (Hēnare, 2001; Spiller et al., 2011). The final key concept and the epistemological centrepiece through which these interactions and relationships can be mapped and understood, is whakapapa, which communicates that all things in creation are related, traced back to the originating atua (Sadler, 2007).

3. LEGISLATIVE AND IMPLEMENTATIONAL BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES

This section outlines the various legislative and implementational barriers to and opportunities for increased mana in EM. These run from ontological factors through to the legislative framework, and down to the implementation of the latter. At the ontological level, the barriers are largely a product of colonisation and the consequent ongoing conflicts between te ao Pākehā and te ao Māori. Even though te ao Māori has slowly been incorporated in legislation, te ao Pākehā remains dominant, and is almost axiomatically opposed to the core presuppositions of the Māori worldview (Spiller et al., 2011; Rout and Reid, 2020). Yet, while the ontological level is important, the paper focuses on more applied constraints and potentialities, starting with the legislative framework before working down to its implementation. This is not only because of space, but also efficacy, as we believe that the normalisation of te ao Māori through lower‐level changes is the most likely route to progress. Nevertheless, it is important to flag the fundamental misalignment between worldviews as an underlying issue.

Before examining the legislative framework and its implementation, a brief comment on the political regime is useful. Aotearoa is a unitary state, with the power of subnational authorities conferred by the central government, and has a Westminster parliamentary system of government, meaning that power is centrally located, which historically has resulted in Māori facing a monolithic opponent (Kelsey, 2015; Miller, 2015; Harris, 2017). Since the 1980s and 1990s, the country has adopted a neoliberal political economy and a mixed‐member proportional electoral system, which has driven some devolution and created more political opportunity for Māori; however, the political system has also been riven by public‐sector restructuring and legislative tinkering instead of long‐term planning and vision (Bargh, 2013; Kelsey, 2015; Harris, 2017).

3.1. Legislation

The EM legislative framework has been the focus of a number of official reviews, driven largely by a spate of events since 2010, including the Christchurch earthquakes in 2010–11, the Kaikōura earthquake in 2016, the Port Hills fires in 2017 and 2024, the COVID‐19 (coronavirus disease 2019) pandemic from 2020, and Cyclone Gabrielle in 2023. McLean et al. (2012) produced a report into the 2011 Christchurch earthquake, the Technical Advisory Group (Sowry et al., 2017) carried out a general review of Aotearoa's emergency response capabilities and framework, McLean (2022) analysed the legal and institutional framework for pandemics and other threats, and Bush International Consulting (BIC, 2024) and Mateparae et al. (2024) conducted an inquiry into Cyclone Gabrielle and other devastating weather events. The national body charged with EM, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), has also performed several reviews (NEMA, 2021, 2022). Despite the plethora of such assessments, at the time of writing (2024), the key piece of legislation guiding EM in Aotearoa remains the CDEM Act 2002. Although it was amended in 2016 to give specific direction concerning recovery, it otherwise is substantively the same (Johnson et al., 2022). The current Act is therefore ‘out of date’ (NEMA, 2021, p. 6) and the present EM system is ‘not fit for purpose’ (Mateparae et al., 2024, p. 13). Unsurprisingly, in the most recent review of the EM system, the authors underscore that they are ‘frustrated that many of these recommendations are not new and are suggested in previous reviews’ (Mateparae et al., 2024, p. 5).

The CDEM Act 2002 is ‘an all‐hazards, all‐risks, comprehensive, multi‐agency, integrated and community focused approach’, setting out ‘the duties, functions and powers of central government, local government, emergency services, lifeline utilities and the general public, and outlines significant powers and authorities for some individuals’ (McNaughton and Van Hove, 2014, p. 20). The two key purposes of the Act are to: improve and promote the sustainable management of hazards in a way that contributes to social, economic, cultural, and environmental well‐being; and encourage and enable communities to achieve acceptable levels of risk (Kipp, 2016). Robert Kipp (2016, p. 176) argues that the Act creates ‘a risk‐based, integrated and comprehensive framework – but it has also followed the trend of neglecting recovery in practice’. On recovery, he notes that the Act creates a ‘response‐based system with an optional recovery component’ (Kipp, 2016, p. 185). Generally, while the Act has a more holistic focus than its predecessor (the Civil Defence Act 1983) as it covers a range of forms of well‐being, it retains the largely linear, hazard/event‐centric framing of the dominant physicalist paradigm, in stark contrast to te ao Māori presuppositions. Furthermore, the limited spotlight on recovery weakens the holistic element, particularly as recovery is the component linked to well‐being. Sowry et al. (2017, p. 6) criticised the vagueness of the legislation, noting that many respondents had called for ‘greater clarity and direction in the legislation (fewer “mays” and more “musts”)’.

The Act also introduced a devolved system that places significant responsibility on CDEM Groups based within regional or unitary councils (Kipp, 2016). Yet, as McNaughton and Van Hove (2014, p. 21) note, ‘[t]his shift from a centralised to devolved system has taken some time to embed and for individuals and organisations to understand their new roles and responsibilities, including philosophies to become ingrained, and for partnerships to develop’. The report by Sowry et al. (2017, p. 6) found that ‘devolution to this degree has resulted in wide variation of practice, performance, and capability across [regional] Groups, and unclear command, control and coordination authority across agencies’. Furthermore, when a national state of emergency is declared, the central government has statutory authority to operationalise a national emergency management response, overriding regional CDEM governance (Kenney, 2022). Devolution aligns with Māori aspirations for more influence and input at the local level, in theory at least. To date, the outcomes have not lived up to the early promises, and the motivations for this structure have somewhat compromised it (Bargh, 2013). ‘Most of the responsibility was put at the local level’, Kipp (2016, p. 228) explains, ‘while the power, decision making, and money was at the top’. In essence, this is a way for central government to reduce the responsibilities, risks, and costs it might face, rather than empowering communities (Kipp, 2016).

The CDEM Act 2002 itself does not mention Māori, hapū (clans, traditional sociopolitical groupings), iwi (tribes, larger, more modern sociopolitical groupings), or cultural infrastructure like marae (Māori meeting grounds often used in EM), and there are only two vague references to Māori across the CDEM regulations under the Act (Lambert, 2015). Historically, Māori have been largely invisible in official EM legislation and documentation, but the broader trend is towards more explicit inclusion (NEMA, 2021). The official report on the 2011 Christchurch earthquake (McLean et al., 2012) makes no reference to Māori or iwi; there are several brief references to the role that marae play in EM. In their broad assessment, Sowry et al. (2017) highlight that their terms of reference did not even mention iwi, although they covered them anyway. In recent years, the majority of official reviews emphasise that the role of Māori in EM needs to be clearly defined in legislation (Sowry et al., 2017; McLean, 2022; BIC, 2024; Mateparae et al., 2024). Most have followed the recommendations of Sowry et al. (2017), which are that any EM legislation should mandate the inclusion of iwi representatives on CDEM Groups' Joint Committees, effectively all councils within the region, and CDEM Groups' Coordinating Executive Groups (CEGs), the entities tasked with providing strategic advice to the Joint Committees. The Waitangi Tribunal goes further, recommending that Māori representatives should be able to speak directly to the Cabinet (McLean, 2022).

As these reviews note, inclusion is needed not simply because it is the legally, politically, or morally correct thing to do, but also because it makes sense practically. For example, in their independent review for the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group following Cyclone Gabrielle, on the topic of Māori involvement in EM, Bush International Consulting (BIC, 2024, p. 30) asks: ‘Quite aside from partnership obligations, why invent new arrangements when well tested default arrangements and providers [referring specifically to marae and Māori responders] are already in place?’. NEMA (2021, p. 59) also underlines that the lack of legislative recognition does not reflect ‘the reality of ongoing, significant contributions of iwi and Māori to emergency management’.

The previous Labour‐led government had developed replacement legislation for the CDEM Act 2002: the Emergency Management Bill (EMB) (225–1 of 2023). The Bill increased Māori mana by requiring regional CDEM Groups to have Māori members and engage with Māori during plan development, as well as establishing a National Māori Emergency Management Advisory Group to assist the Director of Emergency Management. In its General Policy Statement, the EMB included what it described as a descriptive Tiriti o Waitangi/Treaty of Waitangi clause. As NEMA (2023, p. 5) states, this would outline the Crown's te Tiriti 'responsibilities and describe how the proposals to strengthen the [national and regional] role of Māori. .. are to be given effect’. ‘The Bill’, as then Labour Party Minister for EM Kiri Allan details, would ‘better enable Māori throughout the system, at governance, planning and operational levels – by recognising the crucial role Māori and marae play in community responses to emergencies’ (Williamson, 2023). But some questioned whether it had been developed with enough consultation or went far enough. Local Government New Zealand (2022, p. 6) notes that:

Given the Government's very limited engagement to date with local government on its proposals, we have concerns that there has likely been a similar lack of meaningful engagement with iwi/Māori. We strongly encourage the Government to engage in more meaningful conversations with iwi/Māori before progressing with these reforms at pace.

Labour Member of Parliament (MP) Meka Whaitiri (2023) said about her own government's then Bill: ‘There's a lot of wording in there. .. where it talks about “should do” and “may do”, and it should be a “must”.. .. So here we go yet again: Māori are being asked to be advisers, but will the advice be listened to?’

During the EMB's first reading, then opposition MPs questioned why only Māori were referenced for specific inclusion. James McDowall (2023) of the ACT Party, part of the new coalition government, stated that ‘what it lacks in transformation and actual usefulness and coordination, it tries to make up for by somehow being a co‐governance bill’. Co‐governance is a mana adjacent concept that played a role in the 2023 general election, with all three parties in the new National‐led coalition opposed to it to varying degrees (de Silva, 2023; Duff, 2023).

Although Labour's Bill represented significant progress in providing Māori with authority and influence in EM, the National‐led government discharged it in April 2024, with the aim of introducing another EMB (DPMC, 2024a). Two reasons for this were given by the new Minister for Emergency Management and Recovery Mark Mitchell (DPMC, 2024a, p. 3):

I am concerned that much of the Bill is bureaucratic rather than practical and will not make much difference on the ground. I am also concerned that some provisions treat certain groups in our community differently from others.

The target of the latter concern is made clear when Mitchell (DPMC, 2024a, p. 2) lists the ‘contentious’ areas of the Bill: ‘providing Māori with formal roles and responsibilities in emergency management, and not providing this for community groups and businesses’. In the interest of balance, it should be noted that Mitchell (DPMC, 2024a, p. 4) also points out that:

The Minister for Māori Crown Relations and Minister for Māori Development notes that the proposal to discharge the Bill will have implications for iwi and hapū and their marae. I agree with the Minister that, in developing a new Bill, we will need to engage with iwi and Māori and draw on the information and input already provided by them.

Likewise, in October 2024, the government released a response to the Report of the Government Inquiry into the Response to the North Island Severe Weather Events (Mateparae et al., 2024). It indicates greater inclusion of Māori than suggested in April of that year, with one of the 15 focus areas detailing the need to ‘[r]ecognise and enable the significant contribution of iwi and Māori in emergency management’ (New Zealand Government, 2024, p. 6). It also highlights the need to ‘formalise’ their role in legislation, although there is no specific detail about the parameters of that formalisation (New Zealand Government, 2024).

The decision to discharge the Bill was announced at the same time as the government's review of the Cyclone Gabrielle response was published. Ironically, one of the 14 recommendations, referencing Sowry et al. (2017), was to:

Legislate to enable iwi to participate in planning for and responding to a natural disaster or other emergency [including]. .. [a]ppropriate iwi representatives to be part of the Groups Coordinating Executive Group [and]. .. [a]ppropriate iwi representatives to be included on the Group Joint Committee (Mateparae et al., 2024, p. 23).

That said, Mateparae et al. (2024, p. 15) also found that the EMB was ‘insufficient as a legislative basis for an effective, future‐proof system’—although based on their above position, it seems unlikely that they would support Mitchell's justification for discharging the Bill.

The National‐led coalition have reversed many policies aimed at restoring mana, including repealing the newly created Māori Health Authority, as well as proposing to review the principles of te Tiriti o Waitangi (Duff, 2023). This last point is critical. Te Tiriti itself is not law, but since 1975, many laws have referred to the principles of the Treaty (Duff, 2023). These are found in new laws, as well as in court cases, Waitangi Tribunal findings, and a statement by the government in 1989. They capture the ‘spirit’ rather than the letter of te Tiriti, and form a network of layered interpretation and guidance. In its Regulatory Impact Statement prepared to guide the development of the previous EMB, NEMA (2021, pp. 58–59) notes:

The current arrangement is inequitable and inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty. Specifically it does not represent partnership as it does not allow for a direct relationship between Māori and the Crown.. .. Allowing the Status Quo to remain in place is incompatible with the trajectory of the Māori–Crown Treaty relationship or the reality of ongoing, significant contributions of iwi and Māori to emergency management. Long‐term, this could lead to deteriorating Crown–Māori relations.. .. Relations at the local and regional levels may also be undermined, potentially impairing the effectiveness of emergency responses and undermining the contribution iwi and Māori make to the emergency management system.. .. To address the policy problem, change is required to ensure that iwi and Māori are involved at every level of the emergency management system.

The very ‘trajectory of the Māori–Crown Treaty relationship’ appears to have changed course since the 2023 election, and specifically any legislative inclusion of Māori that matches the previous EMB looks unlikely under the National‐led coalition, despite a potential softening of attitude in its latest response. Māori remain reliant on the continuing goodwill of successive governments, their mana contingent on the Crown, which is the major barrier to the incorporation of the te ao Māori DRR framework in EM.

3.2. Implementation

Legislation needs implementation—that is, it needs entities to apply it and specific documentation to guide its application. Implementation of the CDEM Act 2002 required the establishment of a national agency and regional CDEM Groups and the development of both a national strategy and plan, as well as regional CDEM Group plans (Wilson, 2007). It has been noted that many of the major issues with the legislation came from its implementation rather than from the Act itself (McNaughton and Van Hove, 2014; Kipp, 2016).

Māori authority and influence have been largely absent at the national scale, creating ‘barriers to the inclusion of Māori perspectives, capacity and capability in emergency response initiatives’ (Phibbs, Kenney, and Solomon, 2015, p. 75; see also Kenney and Phibbs, 2015). Since it replaced the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) in 2019 (Sowry et al., 2017), NEMA (2021) has built a relationship with national Māori groups, expanded its network of key Māori partners, developed a Māori work programme, and created a Māori adviser role in its National Coordination Centre, showing a more relational approach to EM that aligns with te ao Māori. Still, as NEMA (2021, 2022) acknowledges, Māori need to be formally included at the national level across planning and management. NEMA (2022) also identified the inconsistent inclusion of Māori in regional CDEM Groups as a problem in its recent review. A scan of the 16 CDEM Groups' documentation reveals that six have an iwi representative on their CEG (Canterbury; Marlborough; Northland; Otago; Tairawhiti; and Wellington) and two have Māori members on their management committee (Auckland; Hawke's Bay). In addition, several others list iwi as ‘strategic stakeholders’ (Nelson), note that the council has an iwi liaison (Waikato), or include Te Puni Kokiri, the principal policy adviser to the Government of Aotearoa on Māori well‐being and development, on their CEG (Bay of Plenty).

The reason for this inconsistency is that Māori inclusion in local government emergency management structures is discretionary rather than mandatory (Mateparae et al., 2024). Sowry et al. (2017, p. 2) highlight how the lack of clarity and specificity in the CDEM Act 2002 and associated documentation, along with the passivity of the MCDEM, led to ‘marked variations in practice and patchy capability across the country, and different understandings about roles, responsibilities and authority’ among regional CDEM Groups. The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the entity charged with providing support and advice to these key actors, recently implemented EM leadership training; however, it only invited one of the more than 50 government‐recognised iwi to join the national consortium tasked with developing this, raising significant concerns about inclusiveness (Kenney, 2022). Māori inclusion in national and regional EM authorities has been inconsistent, informal, and largely ad hoc. More generally, the devolved system faces funding issues, with resources coming from local taxes, which vary significantly across regions, and differing levels of capacity and interest in EM across regions have led to inconsistent outcomes (McNaughton and Van Hove, 2014; Kipp, 2016).

The development of the first National CDEM Plan was shambolic, with two years of work wiped out when, only a few weeks before submission in 2005, it was realised that the CDEM Act 2002 specified that it needed to be a regulation (Wilson, 2007). A whole new document was quickly written, resulting in inconsistencies and errors—and because of the rules regarding regulations, it was more difficult to amend, resulting in these inconsistencies and errors essentially being set in stone until the second plan could be produced (Wilson, 2007).

The current National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2015 only references Māori interests in relation to the ‘welfare cluster’, with Te Puni Kōkiri given the role of facilitating and coordinating culturally‐relevant support and generating links with marae (McLean, 2022). Initial national and regional strategies and plans for implementing the CDEM Act 2002 were also largely devoid of Māori authority and influence, both in terms of input and reference. Sowry et al. (2017, p. 52) found that there ‘is inconsistent reference to the participation of iwi in the key CDEM documents and the role of iwi is different in the various layers of CDEM planning’. Kenney et al. (2015, p. 17) concluded that ‘Māori resources and cultural strengths have not been integrated into pre‐disaster planning and emergency response strategies at the national level in any meaningful way’.

The first national strategy, published in 2007, lacked any measurable outcomes, leaving its goals vague and unquantifiable (Wilson, 2007). It included one paragraph on Māori, noting their role as key stakeholders, the importance of their worldview, and the usefulness of their resources, such as marae, in emergencies (MCDEM, 2008). Published in 2019 by the MCDEM, the National Disaster Resilience Strategy (NDRS) is the third strategy to outline the vision and long‐term goals of the CDEM Act 2002. The NDRS constitutes a significant improvement regarding the incorporation of Māori roles and insights. It acknowledges the Treaty of Waitangi, cites the building of relationships with iwi/Māori as an objective, and highlights the importance of integrating te ao Māori into EM and resilience‐building (MCDEM, 2019). As Lambert and Mark‐Shadbolt (2021, p. 369) explain, the strategy ‘notes a role for IK [indigenous knowledge] in its inclusion of Māori concepts and institutions’. This role is not specified or quantified, however, with the ‘underpinning knowledge’ identified as ‘including indigenous and scientific knowledge, and up‐to‐date information on risks and effective resilience practices’ (MCDEM, 2019, p. 19). NEMA (2021, p. 59) later outlines the importance of ‘reinforcing the contribution of Mātauranga Māori. .. for example by drawing on this to shape how we respond to and recover from events, particularly at the local level’, but again it is all very vague. Bush International Consulting recognises the need to incorporate Māori knowledge in EM documentation, with three of its nine ‘priority recommendations’ emphasising the need to formalise the use of mātauranga approaches to land and water management (BIC, 2024, p. 13).

The regional CDEM Group plans were unsurprisingly inconsistent, with different procedures, terminology, and response structures used across the 16 entities (Wilson, 2007). Sowry et al. (2017) found that consultation with Māori occurred far too late in the development of the regional plans, leaving them feeling excluded and meaning that the specific needs of local Māori communities and iwi were not recognised in the documentation. The variation among Groups is clear if one just looks at the plans of the West Coast CDEM Group (2016) and the Canterbury CDEM Group (2022). The former makes no reference to iwi and just two brief references to Māori (one demographic and one as a vulnerable population), whereas the latter states in its foreword that ‘our aspiration is to achieve more than a strong working relationship, we want to develop a genuine partnership’, and it devotes significant space in the plan to detailing how iwi and Māori are included (Canterbury CDEM Group, 2022, p. 9). It does underline, however, that ‘[u]nfortunately, the enabling legislation doesn't enable the full application of this [partnership] intent in the current Group Plan’ (Canterbury CDEM Group, 2022, p. 9). One of Bush International Consulting's conclusions was that ‘there is now a clear and pressing requirement for these groups [Māori authorities] to be more formally involved in regional Group Plans’ (BIC, 2024, p. 69).

4. CASE STUDIES

4.1. Earthquake: Christchurch, 2011

The Christchurch earthquake on 22 February 2011 was one of the country's worst disasters, killing 185 people and costing roughly NZD 77 billion (McLean et al., 2012). The ‘geospatial concentration of Māori in the severely impacted areas suggested that in comparison with the wider community, Māori were disproportionately affected in terms of reduced financial resources, access to basic necessities, sanitation, power, transport and support from frontline responders’ (Phibbs, Kenney, and Solomon, 2015, p. 72). The local iwi in Christchurch is Ngāi Tahu and their governance body is Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu (TRoNT).

4.1.1. Legislation

At the legislative level, the earthquake exposed many pre‐existing flaws, particularly the lack of focus on recovery and the weaknesses of the devolved structure. As McLean et al. (2012, p. 11) note in their official report, ‘no legislation was in place for recovery from major events. .. [which] extended the Response beyond what was desirable’. The point being made here is that while response and recovery were inseparable ‘on the ground’, the siloed rather than holistic approach in legislation was problematic. Kipp (2016, p. 175) also identifies the failure of the recovery framework, explaining how this necessitated new legislation, namely, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011. As he points out:

[W]ithin civil defence, form came before clearly articulated functions, and principle before practice. While the CDEM principles of recovery were largely adopted by CERA [Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority], the concept of recovery at the highest level was based on avoidance, not good governance (Kipp, 2016, p. 188).

The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act did provide TRoNT with a statutory governance role in the Christchurch rebuild (Phibbs, Kenney, and Solomon, 2015); however, this formal inclusion came after the immediate response—within which, as detailed below, Māori were largely ignored—was critiqued as nominal, with ‘vested interests’ gaining more sway than local Māori in decision‐making (Lambert, 2022). Criticism has also been levelled at the fact that only TRoNT was recognised in the legislation; 70 per cent of Māori living in the city do not affiliate with Ngāi Tahu (Lambert, 2022). A governmental report, Civil Defence Review Panel Report (McLay et al., 1992), was sceptical that the hierarchical governance structure that placed most responsibility at the local level would survive a major crisis, predicting that the local community would be subsumed by central government responses. Such a forecast would come true after the Christchurch earthquake (Kipp, 2016). McLean et al. (2012, p. 10) conclude that the CDEM structures at the time of the earthquake were ‘dysfunctionally divided’. Among many different conflicts, there was a significant rift between the CDEM Group and Christchurch City Council (CCC) (Mamula‐Seadon and McLean, 2015). Ultimately, a National Controller was deployed to provide the necessary governance (McLean et al., 2012). Regarding recovery in particular, Matthewman and Lambert (2025, pp. 147–148) highlight that the ‘top‐down, command‐and‐control disaster governance model adopted by the National government was criticised as an instance of global worst practice’.

4.1.2. Implementation

Implementation was also presented with a number of constraints and opportunities. Nationally, ‘a military‐based command and control culture within Civil Defence. .. combined with a lack of attention to Māori networks and resources, operated to marginalise and exclude’ during the response (Phibbs, Kenney, and Solomon, 2015, p. 74). It took eight days and external mediation for TRoNT to establish communication with the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (Phibbs, Kenney, and Solomon, 2015). The delay in integrating the Māori response had on‐the‐ground implications, contributing to the absence or inadequate provision of essential services (Kenney, 2022).

The regional level was also problematic. Generally, there was a dearth of pre‐planning, and along with the rift between the CCC and CDEM Group and the consequent deployment of a National Controller, this resulted in an ad hoc governance structure that caused confusion, inefficiency, and duplication (McLean et al., 2012). Ultimately, a national state of emergency was declared, and governance was nationalised (Kenney, 2022). The CDEM Group did not have any Ngāi Tahu members at the time, and local councils lacked the necessary formal relationships and had not included iwi in EM planning (Phibbs, Kenney, and Solomon, 2015). Engagement by regional EM authorities with Māori was also poor in the response phase (Mamula‐Seadon and McLean, 2015). This led to inefficiencies across the response and breaches of Māori cultural protocols (Kenney and Phibbs, 2015; Phibbs, Kenney, and Solomon, 2015). For example, Māori communities only found out that their marae had been designated as a CDEM sector post when Civil Defence arrived to commandeer it, not only slowing down the response but also causing offence as the process contravened Māori protocols (Kenney and Phibbs, 2015; Phibbs, Kenney, and Solomon, 2015). Māori were rendered invisible in the official review, as noted: it did not include a single mention of ‘Māori’, ‘iwi’, or ‘Ngāi Tahu’ (McLean et al., 2012).

Nevertheless, the response from Māori was significant. The National Government Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery, Gerry Brownlee, is reported as saying that ‘what Māori have done, has damned well shamed me, it's been that big’, while the then Labour MP for Christchurch East and the future Mayor of Christchurch, Lianne Dalziel, underlined that ‘the Māori response. .. should be seen as a template for the future’ (Kenney and Phibbs, 2015, p. 51). The day after the earthquake, TRoNT invited Māori tribal leaders and Māori government representatives to a meeting (Kenney et al., 2015). As a result, the national Māori Recovery Network (MRN) was established within 24 hours of the disaster (Phibbs, Kenney, and Solomon, 2015). Through the MRN, TRoNT ‘negotiated communications and collaborative decision making with Government ministries, local authorities, NGOs [non‐governmental organisations] and various Northern iwi’ (Kenney et al., 2015, p. 13). A huge amount of response and recovery work was conducted through the MRN, with intertribal networks ensuring a flow of supplies from around the country and numerous groups on the ground providing a range of support (Phibbs, Kenney, and Solomon, 2015).

This work ‘acted as the genesis for increased engagement and collaboration between local Māori, regional civil authorities, government and private stakeholders who are engaged in civil/disaster preparedness planning and urban rebuilding in Christchurch’ (Kenney and Phibbs, 2015, p. 54). The MRN captured the essence of te ao Māori DRR, operating as a collective intertribal grouping focused on localised yet holistic response and recovery provision, guided by strong leadership and Māori knowledge and values, and directed at the community level (Phibbs, Kenney, and Solomon, 2015; Rout et al., 2024). This was done in spite of, rather than being enabled by, the legal framework and national and regional agencies and their plans.

4.2. Cyclone: North Island, 2023

Cyclone Gabrielle impacted across much of the east coast of the North Island of Aotearoa from 10–14 February 2023, killing 11 people and costing an estimated NZD 10 billion (Williamson, 2023). As with the Christchurch earthquake, many of the most severely affected areas had large Māori populations. The event occurred across the traditional rohe (areas) of numerous iwi.

4.2.1. Legislation

In terms of legislation, the central government passed the Severe Weather Emergency Legislation Act and the Severe Weather Emergency Recovery Legislation (SWERL) Act in the wake of Cyclone Gabrielle, which sought to amend relevant legislation, including the CDEM Act 2002, and create a piece of secondary legislation called an Order in Council, which will be developed in response to requests for information from the community and local government on recovery issues (MfE, 2024). SWERL is of particular interest since it aims to provide opportunities for local Māori and local community group participation without impeding the recovery process (MfE, 2024). SWERL also established a Severe Weather Events Recovery Review Panel, requiring that members have expertise in Māori land tenure, Māori local and community interests, and mātauranga; furthermore, the appointing minister is to seek nominations from Māori entities (MfE, 2024). Claire Charters (2023), a former Rongomau Taketake (Indigenous Rights Governance Partner) at the Human Rights Commission, believes that SWERL falls short in meeting the Crown's obligation to uphold tino rangatiratanga (absolute sovereignty or self‐determination) as set out in te Tiriti o Waitangi, and nor does it mention the Treaty or specifically refer to whānau (extended family), hapū, or iwi within its provisions. Nevertheless, the passing of SWERL suggests that recognition of the importance of Māori authority and influence has increased since the Christchurch earthquake, with a more localised approach and a number of Māori experts from across the law discipline, local politics, and mātauranga included on the Review Panel.

4.2.2. Implementation

There was also improvement in national implementation. ‘[A]fter 12 years of earthquakes, fire, disease and floods’, Williamson (2023) points out, ‘the reaction to this crisis was different: for the first time a small corps of Maori advisors were also inside the [central government's EM] bunker to help mobilise iwi (tribes) as part of the formal disaster response’. The members of the Review Panel have now been assigned, with two Māori law experts, an iwi chair, and a Māori trustee/academic making up 4 of the 11 appointees (DPMC, 2024b). The central government has also created a Cyclone Recovery Unit, whose tasks include supporting locally‐led engagement with communities, iwi, businesses, local governments, regional groups, and others (DPMC, 2024b). In addition, it has established a Cyclone Recovery Taskforce, which includes two iwi chairs and one iwi board representative among its eight members (DPMC, 2024b).

Yet, while Māori have been part of disaster response at the national level, in the initial weeks after the cyclone, some iwi criticised central government for being slow to respond to the needs of Māori communities (Harawira, 2023). Ngāti Kahungunu Chair Bayden Barber, who is one of the members of the Cyclone Recovery Taskforce, said that iwi, whose rohe were impacted by Gabrielle, had reached out to NEMA on two separate occasions to discuss a coordinated response plan, but their efforts ‘met with silence’ (Waatea Team, 2023).

There were issues at the regional level, too. Generally, both official reviews found that CDEM agencies were inadequately prepared, their communications and warnings were insufficient, their capacities and capabilities overestimated and were lacking, and they were overwhelmed by the event (BIC, 2024; Mateparae et al., 2024). Concerning Māori inclusion and engagement, local Māori authorities had no formal role in the regional CDEM Group, and while there were some informal connections, there was a substantial lack of pre‐established relationships between Māori and EM authorities and a low level of understanding of te ao Māori among EM authorities (BIC, 2024). A 2021 review of EM in the Hawke's Bay region emphasised that the regional council ‘could not – and should not – wait for the law to enforce Māori representation on Civil Defence committees’ (Crimp, 2023a). Following Cyclone Gabrielle, the Mayor of Central Hawke's Bay, Alex Walker, criticised the council for not having included Māori already (Crimp, 2023b). In the immediate aftermath of the event, engagement with Māori was largely based around ad hoc relationships, rather than occurring through any systematic and formalised effort (BIC, 2024).

This lack of relations resulted in critical insights being ignored. Early on, Māori contacted EM authorities to voice their concerns about the potential extreme nature of the coming event, only to be told they were ‘overreacting’ (BIC, 2024). The mātauranga that comes through a relationship with land over many centuries was ignored. As Bayden Barber notes: ‘through our iwi eyes. .. most of our marae are right on the river, so we understand how the rivers work. There was that type of intelligence that was put out there and not heard’ (Campbell, 2024). There were also a number of breaches of cultural protocols by EM authorities (BIC, 2024). Chief Ombudsman Peter Boshier travelled through the affected areas, after which he called for ‘more trust and more empowerment of iwi by government and by councils’ (Rosenberg, 2023). He remarked that ‘many people. .. felt external support had not been as visible as they had hoped’ and queried whether the best model was to:

[D]evolve much greater responsibility to people on the ground, who know what's needed, who can be trusted, and who are more likely to act quicker and put the money to better use than if it's channelled through a typical bureaucratic channel (Rosenberg, 2023).

Similarly, Chief Human Rights Commissioner Paul Hunt also visited affected areas, resulting in him criticising the recovery for being dominated by central government, with local communities, including Māori, shut out of decision‐making (RNZ, 2023). Thus, while there might have been greater bureaucratic inclusion of Māori at the national level, this does not seem to have percolated down to the local level where it was needed. This is not surprising given that the entire local response was overwhelmed.

Much like the Christchurch earthquake, the Māori response to Cyclone Gabrielle was generally well considered. Māori were in some cases faster and better prepared to react: ‘Early activation of marae and community structures and networks meant iwi Māori responded more effectively than some councils’ (Mateparae et al., 2024, p. 16). Marae‐based communities were recognised as vital providers of community intelligence and services (BIC, 2024). As Charters (2023) highlights, their response ‘in many ways defined our national response to Cyclone Gabrielle. Manaakitanga [hospitality], respect and care for others was placed above all else’. That said, every scale and type of Māori grouping responded well. Mateparae et al. (2024, p. 16) concluded that:

Some of the most effective and rapid responses to the severe weather events were coordinated and carried out by iwi Māori, including iwi, hapū, marae. .. and whānau. They provided manaakitanga, critical equipment, response and wellbeing support, money, and facilities for welfare to all people in their rohe.

This response was not just focused on Māori: the Ministry of Disabled People is quoted as stating that ‘disabled communities were often well supported by local iwi, who were highly responsive through marae and provided support with minimal, if any, barriers’ (Mateparae et al., 2024, p. 14).

5. STRATEGIES

This section details some strategies that Māori can employ at the legislative and implementational levels to increase their authority and influence in EM given the current status quo.

5.1. Legislation

The discharge of the EMB is a significant setback for Māori authority and influence. Despite its limitations, the Bill provided Māori with mandated representation at the national and regional levels, as well as influence over the development of national and regional strategies and plans. It seems unlikely that any legislation proposed by the National‐led coalition will provide the same level of authority and influence specifically for Māori.

There are several possible strategies available to Māori at the legislative level. The first is to wait. The last government took six years to develop its EMB (McDowall, 2023), so it seems likely that it will take the new government the same amount of time. Recently, governments have enjoyed three electoral cycles, although the last one only managed to secure two. Current economic conditions are unfavourable, and so there is a chance that no new EM legislation will be passed before there is a change of government. A replacement EMB introduced by an incoming Labour‐led government would see gains in EM‐related Māori authority and influence.

A more active strategy is to expand the MRN, working with the other community groups that the National‐led coalition has indicated will be included in its Bill to develop a broader ‘community EM network’. Mitchell (DPMC, 2024a) has signalled that Māori will be included in the broader concept of ‘community groups’, rather than treated separately. This community EM network provides a politically‐palatable solution for the government. Acting as a network would also help to limit the financial and resource costs. In addition, this network could function as a lobby group, joining with supporters and beneficiaries of Māori DRR work, such as the former Mayor of Christchurch, Lianne Dalziel, and the current Mayor of Central Hawke's Bay, Alex Walker, to push for Māori/network inclusion in the next Bill.

5.2. Implementation

The implementational level might appear to be heavily constrained, as this is largely determined by the legislative framework. Part of Mitchell's justification for discharging the EMB was that ‘[e]verything flows from the legislation’ (cited in Green, 2024); this same statutory barrier is also noted by Bush International Consulting (BIC, 2024) and Mateparae et al. (2024). The CDEM Act 2002, now more than 20 years old, is highly problematic for Māori authority and influence, principally because they are not referenced in it, meaning that there are no legal requirements to include them in any national or regional strategies or plans.

It should be clear from the above analysis, though, that some leeway remains regarding inclusion in implementation. The first strategy in this respect is to provide information to regional CDEM Groups on how to work with local Māori authorities and communities and how to integrate te ao Māori and mātauranga into their plans. This could include identification of relevant authorities and communities with which to be connected, locations and uses of marae and other cultural infrastructure, cultural protocols, te ao Māori EM approaches, and mātauranga indicators that could pinpoint hazards. Many regional CDEM Groups have limited resources and capacity, so if Māori supply easily incorporated information and processes then there is a chance that these will be utilised. Employing a collective approach, possibly the community EM network discussed above, will help to spread the burden for Māori in terms of cost and time.

A second strategy is to hope that the general upwards trajectory of greater inclusion of Māori and recognition of te ao Māori continues. At the national level, the trend has been towards increasing inclusion of iwi roles and te ao Māori concepts, with the current NDRS far more inclusive than previous versions. At the regional level, while less than half of the CDEM Groups have Māori representatives in their CEG, it seems probable that representation will rise. Likewise, CDEM Group plans will also probably see greater inclusion, although, as the Canterbury plan made clear, there is a hard limit to this owing to legislative constraints. The pattern so far is that representation comes after an event. For instance, in the wake of Cyclone Gabrielle, Hawke's Bay's CDEM Group Joint Committee noted that it should not wait for the EMB to legislate membership, voting in June 2023 to include local iwi as non‐voting members on the Committee (Crimp, 2023b).

Māori will continue to do what they do every time another disaster unfolds: get on with response and recovery in their own way, despite the impediments and indignations generated by the broader EM system. As they have shown in essentially every disaster, they will do so even when the EM system does not officially recognise them. As Mateparae et al. (2024, p. 16) emphasise: ‘Iwi‐led civil defence readiness, response and recovery are already in effect, and provide a living example of what can be done in an emergency’. This living example played out across the areas impacted by Cyclone Gabrielle, with many marae hosting hundreds or even thousands of people for days before any official EM response arrived, and it could be seen as TRoNT rolled out 24 EM pods, 20‐foot shipping containers filled with emergency resources, across its rohe in 2024 in preparation for a future Alpine fault earthquake (Chittock, 2024; Mateparae et al., 2024).

6. CONCLUSION

Under te Tiriti and its principles, the Government of Aotearoa has an obligation to recognise Māori mana in EM legislation—although it is not legally required to do so. Equally important, there is a practical imperative to do so, because Māori have proven time and again that they have the knowledge, skills, capacity, and will to provide quick, capable EM. Given that this has been done to date without the recognition and resourcing that would come with formal legislative inclusion—that is, in an ad hoc and often friction‐filled manner and based on self‐funding—EM responses by Māori would likely be even more effective if they were able to able to conduct them with formal support. Yet, the current government looks set to provide limited recognition of mana in EM legislation at best, and with added delays.

Sadly, Māori are used to false promises and retracted policies. The history of colonisation is replete with such reversals and losses. Still, this latest setback, in the face of numerous official reviews that have identified the need for Māori authority and influence to be incorporated in legislation and implementation documentation, is difficult to take. It means that when the next event occurs, Māori will have to fight against the current EM system rather than work with it. Furthermore, if Māori mana was formally recognised in legislation before the next hazard manifests itself, the ensuing disaster might not be so bad, as the insights that come from hundreds of years of living in a close relationship with the whenua can be harnessed. Unfortunately, this looks unlikely to happen. Consequently, the next hazard will play out in a predictable fashion, with the risk heightened rather than mitigated and the resulting disaster exacerbated rather than ameliorated because of the pressures between the Pākehā and Māori worlds, even as Māori do everything in their power—limited as it is from a legislative standpoint—to reduce the harm.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This paper reports analysis of secondary sources.

Rout, M. , Awatere, S. , Reid, J. , Campbell, E. , Huang, A. , & Warmenhoven, T. (2025). Barriers to and opportunities for the restoration of mana in emergency management legislation and its implementation for Māori. Disasters, 49(3), e12684. 10.1111/disa.12684

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.