Skip to main content
NCBI home page
Frontiers in Psychology logoLink to Frontiers in Psychology
editorial
. 2025 May 19;16:1615234. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1615234

Editorial: Law and neuroscience: justice as a challenge for neurorights, neurolaw, and forensic psychology

Eric García-López 1, Cristina Nombela 2,*, Eduardo Demetrio Crespo 3
PMCID: PMC12141849  PMID: 40486892

Since the introduction of the term “neurorights” by Ienca and Andorno (2017) and Yuste et al. (2017), there has been a significant increase in academic interest in this concept. The notion of “neurorights” (Ienca, 2021) emerges from translational knowledge that involves various fields, including Law, Philosophy, and Neuroscience. However, this interdisciplinary dialogue faces inherent difficulties due to variations in terminology and methodology across disciplines.

One prominent example is the concept of “free will,” which has traditionally been associated with philosophical and legal debates. Neuroscience research, notably by Libet et al. (1983) and Gruart and Delgado-García, has experimentally explored the neural foundations of voluntary action, raising questions about the very existence of free will (Libet, 1985). Nevertheless, from a cognitive and behavioral perspective, free will encompasses more than motor actions; it involves cognitive processes that are essential in Psychology (Baumeister, 2008; Racine, 2017) and Forensic Psychiatry (Morse, 2007; Meynen, 2009; Schleim, 2012).

Recent advancements in neuroimaging have substantially impacted our understanding of criminal responsibility (Glannon, 2014; Vitacco and Coleman, 2024), specifically with regard to legal concepts such as culpability and dangerousness. These developments pose significant challenges for Forensic Psychology and Psychiatry, raising questions such as: How do these neuroscientific insights reshape our understanding of mental disorders and their forensic implications (Morse, 2015; Meynen, 2013, 2015)? How will violence risk assessments evolve (Haarsma et al., 2020)? How might these insights inform research in victimology, such as the evaluation of torture or gender-based violence (García-López, 2024)? Do criminological models of decision-making in psychiatric contexts require reevaluation (Levander and Levander)?

Furthermore, neurorights are increasingly relevant due to advancements in Neurotechnology and Artificial Intelligence, raising critical human rights concerns that are being addressed by international organizations and government agendas worldwide (UNESCO, 2023; Andorno, 2023; Garrigues Walker and González de la Garza, 2024). Commercial applications, such as those pursued by companies such as Neuralink, necessitate clear regulatory frameworks to mitigate the risks and ethical dilemmas involved (Pérez Manzano, 2023; González Tapia, 2023). Various international bodies have initiated protective measures, exemplified by the Inter-American Declaration of Principles on Neuroscience, Neurotechnologies, and Human Rights (Inter-American Juridical Committee - OAS, 2023), Mexico's proposed General Law on Neurorights (Herrera-Ferrá et al., 2025), and Chile's constitutional reforms (Muñoz, 2019; McCay, 2024), despite ongoing debates (Bublitz, 2023; Ruiz et al., 2024).

This paper aims to highlight two key areas of research: (1) personal identity in terms of cognitive freedom and mental privacy, both as a basis for assigning criminal responsibility and as a fundamental right to be protected; and (2) forensic implications of neurotechnological advancements in the assessment of criminal behavior, particularly with regard to tools for evaluating risk of violence and recidivism. These topics should be examined from neuroscientific, empirical, methodological, and interdisciplinary perspectives. The field of criminal justice is increasingly incorporating predictive neurocognitive methodologies and machine learning algorithms, significantly influencing real-world forensic and judicial decision-making processes (Miró Llinares and Castro Toledo, 2002).

This Research Topic brings together 18 rigorously developed scientific articles addressing critical issues, including the role of neurotechnology in memory neuromodulation (González-Márquez), false memory evaluation (Pérez-Mata and Diges), and potential mind-reading technologies (Andorno and Lavazza). Other central topics include neuroscientific analyses of criminal behavior (Lee), virtual emotions (González-Tapia), and evidence-based sentencing (Martínez-Garay). The Research Topic features original research on juvenile justice systems (Patiz and Bayraktar), sentencing for dangerous driving offenses (Liu et al.), ethical considerations in the integration of computer perception with neurotechnology (Hurley et al.), cognitive strategies in child custody decisions (de Alcântara Mendes and Ormerod), self-control in criminology (Levander and Levander), and bias differences in judicial simulations involving avatars vs. humans (Frumkin et al.).

In summary, this Research Topic underscores the necessity of interdisciplinary collaboration among Neuroscience, Law, and Forensic Psychology to address the profound challenges that neurotechnological advancements pose for justice systems and the broader notion of justice itself.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank the reviewers for their valuable contributions.

Funding Statement

The author(s) declare that financial support was received for the research and/or publication of this article. This publication is part of the R&D&I project “Neuro-Human Rights and Criminal Law” (PID2023-149978NB-I00), funded by MICIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by FEDER/EU. EG-L acknowledges the support from the Sistema Nacional de Investigadores and the Secretaría de Ciencia, Humanidades, Tecnología e Innovación. CN acknowledges support from the Francisco Tomás y Valiente Research Fellowship at the Madrid Institute for Advanced Study—Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (MIAS-UAM, 2020-2025), the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 (Grant No. PID2020-114962RA-I00), and the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid and Comunidad de Madrid (Grant No. SI3/PJI/2021-00431).

Author contributions

EG-L: Conceptualization, Supervision, Writing – review & editing. CN: Conceptualization, Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft. EDC: Writing – review & editing, Conceptualization, Writing – original draft.

Conflict of interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

The authors declared that they were members of the editorial board of Frontiers at the time of submission. This had no impact on the peer review process and the final decision.

Publisher's note

All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

References

  1. Andorno R. (2023). Neurotecnologías y derechos humanos en América Latina y el Caribe: desafíos y propuestas de política pública. Montevideo: UNESCO. [Google Scholar]
  2. Baumeister R. F. (2008). Free will in scientific psychology. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 3, 14–19. 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00057.x [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  3. Bublitz J. C. (2023). What an international declaration on neurotechnologies and human rights could look like: ideas, suggestions, desiderata. AJOB Neurosci. 15, 96–112. 10.1080/21507740.2023.2270512 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  4. García-López E. (2024). “Psicopatología forense: contexto de vulnerabilidad por razones de género y TEPT-Complejo,” in Cómo se prueba la violencia por razones de género en el proceso judicial? ed. E. García-López (Coord) (México: Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación; ), 1–60. [Google Scholar]
  5. Garrigues Walker A., González de la Garza L. M. (2024). Qué son los Neuroderechos y Cuál es su Importancia para la Evolución Humana. Reflexiones Sobre el Derecho, las Neurotecnologías y la IA Emergentes. Las Rozas de Madrid: Aranzadi. [Google Scholar]
  6. Glannon W. (2014). The limitations and potential of neuroimaging in the criminal law. J. Ethics 18, 153–170. 10.1007/s10892-014-9169-y [DOI] [Google Scholar]
  7. González Tapia M. (2023). “Protección penal de los Neuroderechos: El uso directo de las neurotecnologías sobre el ser humano,” in Inteligencia artificial y Filosofía del Derecho, ed. F. Llano Alonso (Murcia: Laborum; ), 331–336. [Google Scholar]
  8. Haarsma G., Davenport S., White D. C., Ormachea P. A., Sheena E., Eagleman D. M. (2020). Assessing risk among correctional community probation populations: predicting reoffense with mobile neurocognitive assessment software. Front. Psychol. 10:2926. 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02926 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  9. Herrera-Ferrá K., Muñoz J. M., Becerril A., García-López E., Marinaro J. A., Sánchez L. R., et al. (2025). The regulation of neurotechnology: the neurorights bill in Mexico. Lancet Psychiat. 12, 88–90. 10.1016/S2215-0366(24)00286-4 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  10. Ienca M. (2021). On neurorights. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 15:701258. 10.3389/fnhum.2021.701258 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  11. Ienca M., Andorno R. (2017). Towards new human rights in the age of neuroscience and neurotechnology. Life Sci. Soc. Policy 13:15. 10.1186/s40504-017-0050-1 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  12. Inter-American Juridical Committee - OAS (2023). Inter-American Declaration of Principles on Neuroscience, Neurotechnology, and Human Rights (CJI/RES. 281 (CII-O/23)corr.1). [Google Scholar]
  13. Libet B. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. Behav. Brain Sci. 8, 529–566. 10.1017/S0140525X00044903 [DOI] [Google Scholar]
  14. Libet B., Gleason C. A., Wright E. W., Pearl D. K. (1983). Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain 106, 623–642. 10.1093/brain/106.3.623 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  15. McCay A. (2024). Neurorights: the Chilean constitutional change. AI Soc. 39, 797–798. 10.1007/s00146-022-01396-0 [DOI] [Google Scholar]
  16. Meynen G. (2009). Should or should not forensic psychiatrists think about free will? Med. Health Care Philos 12, 203–212. 10.1007/s11019-008-9166-7 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  17. Meynen G. (2013). A neurolaw perspective on psychiatric assessments of criminal responsibility: decision-making, mental disorder, and the brain. Int. J. Law Psychiatry 36, 93–99. 10.1016/j.ijlp.2013.01.001 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  18. Meynen G. (2015). “How mental disorders can compromise the will,” in Free Will and the Brain: Neuroscientific, Philosophical, and Legal Perspectives, ed. W. Glannon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 125–145. 10.1017/CBO9781139565820.008 [DOI] [Google Scholar]
  19. Miró Llinares F., Castro Toledo F. (2002). “Correlación no implica causalidad? El valor de las predicciones algorítmicas en el sistema penal a propósito del debate epistemológico sobre el “fin de la teoría,” in Derecho penal y Comportamiento Humano, ed. E. Demetrio Crespo (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch; ), 507–529. [Google Scholar]
  20. Morse S. J. (2007). The non-problem of free will in forensic psychiatry and psychology. Behav. Sci. Law 25, 203–220. 10.1002/bsl.744 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  21. Morse S. J. (2015). “Neuroscience, free will, and criminal responsibility,” in Free Will and the Brain: Neuroscientific, Philosophical, and Legal Perspectives, ed. W. Glannon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 251–286. 10.1017/CBO9781139565820.014 [DOI] [Google Scholar]
  22. Muñoz J. M. (2019). Chile - right to free will needs definition. Nature 574:634. 10.1038/d41586-019-03295-9 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  23. Pérez Manzano M. (2023). “Justicia penal y neuroderechos,” in Estudios político-criminales, jurídico-penales y criminológicos. Libro Homenaje al Profesor José Luis Díez Ripollés (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch; ), 331–350. [Google Scholar]
  24. Racine E. (2017). A proposal for a scientifically-informed and instrumentalist account of free will and voluntary action. Front. Psychol. 8:754. 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00754 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  25. Ruiz S., Valera L., Ramos P., Sitaram R. (2024). Neurorights in the Constitution: from neurotechnology to ethics and politics. Phil.Trans. R. Soc. B 379:20230098. 10.1098/rstb.2023.0098 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  26. Schleim S. (2012). Brains in context in the neurolaw debate: the examples of free will and “dangerous” brains. Int. J. Law Psychiatry 35, 104–111. 10.1016/j.ijlp.2012.01.001 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  27. UNESCO (2023). The Risks and Challenges of Neurotechnologies for Human Rights. Brooklyn, NY: UNESCO. [Google Scholar]
  28. Vitacco M. J., Coleman S. (2024). “Insanity evaluations in the age of neuroimaging,” in The impact of technology on the criminal justice system: A psychological overview, eds. E. Pica, D. Ross, and J. Pozzulo (London: Routledge; ), 94–110. 10.4324/9781003323112-6 [DOI] [Google Scholar]
  29. Yuste R., Goering S., Arcas B., Bi G., Carmena J. M., Carter A., et al. (2017). Four ethical priorities for neurotechnologies and AI. Nature 551, 159–163. 10.1038/551159a [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]

Articles from Frontiers in Psychology are provided here courtesy of Frontiers Media SA

RESOURCES