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. 2025 Nov 9;65(1):e70019. doi: 10.1111/bjso.70019

Please reduce the gap! How psychological distance to politics fuels belief in conspiracy theories

Kostas Papaioannou 1, Myrto Pantazi 2,✉
PMCID: PMC12598269  PMID: 41208296

Abstract

This research examines the impact of psychological distance to politics on the formation of conspiracy beliefs. Psychological distance to politics, defined as the perceived separation or detachment from political processes, can lead individuals to view political events and actors with suspicion. Through two cross‐sectional studies, with nationally representative samples (Study 1: United States, N = 431; Study 2: United States, N = 300), we find that greater psychological distance to politics predicts belief in specific conspiracy theories and conspiracy mentality. In Study 3 (United States, N = 302, pre‐registered), we demonstrate that reducing the sense of psychological distance to politics in participants significantly decreases their likelihood of subscribing to conspiratorial explanations. These findings highlight the importance of psychological distance to politics as a predictor of conspiracy beliefs.

Keywords: conspiracy theories, construal‐level theory, psychological distance

INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, there has been growing evidence that many citizens feel disconnected from political institutions and processes (Dalton, 2017; Kriesi, 2020). This sense of detachment is reflected not only in declining confidence in parties and politicians (Stavrakakis, 2017; Van Haute & Ribeiro, 2022), but also in perceptions that politics is abstract, complex, or inaccessible to ordinary citizens (Zaslove et al., 2021). Such distance may have important implications for how people interpret political events and information, as well as how they engage with politics more broadly (Coleman & Moss, 2023). In particular, individuals who perceive politics as distant and abstract may be more prone to adopt conspiratorial explanations, which can offer clear and simplified narratives for understanding elite behaviour and politics overall (Papaioannou et al., 2024; Van Prooijen & Douglas, 2018).

Conspiracy theories emerge as alternative explanations through which individuals interpret and sense‐make the social and political reality (Van Prooijen & Douglas, 2018). Several reasons exist for the prevalence of these theories. From a psychological point of view, these can be broadly categorized into epistemic motives (the need to understand and reduce uncertainty about the world), existential motives (the need to feel secure and in control in one's environment) and social motives (the human tendency to be part of a group and hold a positive image of it and oneself) (Douglas, et al., 2017).

In this study, we introduce a new, unexplored predictor of belief in conspiracy theories, namely psychological distance to politics, through the lens of construal‐level theory (CLT; Trope et al., 2007; Trope & Liberman, 2010). According to this theory, people perceive different levels of psychological distance between themselves and other entities, which in turn shapes how abstractly or concretely they think about those entities. We argue that belief in conspiracy theories can be explained by the distance or closeness citizens feel towards politics. By exploring this relationship, we aim to offer new insights into the factors that drive conspiracy beliefs and to clarify their broader role in political participation and engagement.

Conspiracy theories

Conspiracy theories are commonly defined as explanations that attribute significant events or actions to covert, malevolent plans of powerful individuals, groups, or institutions (Douglas & Sutton, 2011; Keeley, 1999). These theories often propose that such entities secretly conspire to achieve objectives that are unlawful or harmful, and they tend to involve a belief that the true nature of these actions is being deliberately concealed from the public (Butter & Knight, 2020; Cichocka et al., 2016). Individuals vary not only in their endorsement of specific conspiracy theories—such as claims about the rollout of 5G technology causing the spread of Covid‐19, the Great Replacement theory or the Flat‐Earth theory—but also in their general, more stable, tendency to interpret global events through a conspiratorial lens (Imhoff et al., 2022). This general tendency, often referred to as ‘conspiracy mentality’, is considered to be a relatively stable trait that influences how individuals perceive and make sense of various phenomena (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014).

Conspiracy mentality reflects a predisposition to view events as the result of secretive and malevolent actions by powerful actors, rather than as the outcome of straightforward or transparent processes (Bruder et al., 2013). In our analysis, we capture both dimensions of conspiracy beliefs: the endorsement of specific conspiracy theories and the broader trait of conspiracy mentality.

A large body of scholarly research has sought to identify the antecedents of conspiracy beliefs, which can be broadly categorized into epistemic, existential and social motivations (Douglas et al., 2017). For example, a higher need for cognitive closure or the tendency to attribute agency and anthropomorphism qualities to inanimate objects has been shown to predict a higher propensity to believe in conspiracy theories (Marchlewska et al., 2017; Douglas et al., 2016). Individuals are also more likely to endorse conspiratorial explanations when they feel a lack of control (Van Prooijen & Acker, 2015), feel emotionally or existentially threatened (van Prooijen, 2019; Papaioannou et al., 2025a), or are anxious or generally dislike uncertainty (Liekefett, et al., 2021).

More recently, the focus has shifted to the social and intergroup aspects of conspiratorial thinking, emphasizing how conspiracy theories can reflect perceptions of social, political and historical reality structured around antagonistic groups (Pantazi et al., 2022; Nera et al., 2021; van Prooijen, 2024). Building on this line of work, our study contributes to the social psychology literature by introducing psychological distance to politics as a novel construct that helps predict and explain conspiracy beliefs in the socio‐political realm.

Psychological distance to politics

Our theoretical framework is anchored in CLT (Trope & Liberman, 2010), according to which psychological distance is a core feature of human perception and decision‐making across a variety of domains (Trope et al., 2007). Whether an object, event or person is construed as psychologically close or distant has important implications for how it is construed, evaluated and acted upon. According to Trope et al. (2007), objects that feel psychologically close are usually construed in concrete, detailed and context‐dependent ways—what is often called low‐level construal. In contrast, psychologically distant objects are represented more abstractly, in terms of their essential and stable features, reflecting a high‐level construal.

From this angle, psychological distance becomes particularly relevant for understanding how citizens construe the political reality. Depending on how close or remote political entities are perceived to be, political events and processes will be construed as remote, abstract and detached from everyday life, or proximate, concrete and well‐anchored in individuals' lives. When citizens feel distant from political institutions and elites, they may view them as an ‘alien’ outgroup rather than part of their ingroup. This distance can create fertile ground for conspiracy beliefs, as it heightens the perception that political actors are untrustworthy and/or (potentially) threatening.

In this way, psychological distance can serve as a precursor to the intergroup framing of conspiracy theories: the greater the distance, the easier it is for individuals to construe elites as ‘them’, which makes conspiratorial explanations more plausible and resonant. The abstract thinking related to perceived psychological distance can also more readily accommodate the internally consistent explanations that define conspiracy theories, while allowing people to ignore the potential contradictions (see Douglas et al., 2017).

According to CLT, psychological distance can be broken down into four key dimensions: temporal, spatial, social and hypothetical. In a series of experiments, Bar‐Anan et al. (2007) demonstrated that these seemingly different aspects all converged under a single overarching concept, called psychological distance. Each dimension plays a crucial role in shaping how individuals perceive objects (Hansen & Genschow, 2020) and, accordingly, we argue how they engage with politics.

Temporal distance refers to how far an event or decision is perceived in time. In the context of politics, a policy decision that will take effect in the distant future may seem less urgent and relevant, leading to more abstract thinking about its implications. For example, discussions about climate change policies that aim for results by 2050 are seen as temporally distant (Loy & Spence, 2020), and thus less immediately concerning to some citizens compared to policies that affect next year's budget (McDonald et al., 2015). Perception of the temporal distance of climate change consequences also parallels ideological gaps in climate change perception between conservatives and liberals, thus explaining climate change scepticism (Većkalov et al., 2021).

Spatial distance concerns the geographical proximity of political decisions. Citizens may feel that decisions taken at distant political centres have little relevance for their local community and are, thus, personally less relevant (Rentfrow & Jokela, 2016). Social distance, in turn, refers to the perceived gap between oneself and others in terms of status, group membership, or identity (Ahmed, 2007). When it comes to social distance in politics, citizens may perceive a gap between politicians and themselves, especially in a context where they rarely interact with politicians in their daily life and beyond and that politicians come from a certain elite (Kesberg & Easterbrook, 2025). Social distance in politics can also mean that the prospect of working as a politician might seem beyond their reach, despite democracy technically offering this possibility to every citizen (Ledgerwood & Callahan, 2012).

Lastly, hypothetical distance relates to the perceived likelihood of an event occurring. When the hypothetical distance to politics is high, political outcomes may be perceived as uncertain or intangible, lacking practical implications and tangible effects on the world (Sacchi et al., 2016). For example, the idea of implementing a universal basic income in the distant future might be seen as hypothetical and uncertain, leading individuals to think about it in more abstract terms and consider it with less urgency compared to a policy change that is already scheduled for debate in the current legislative session (Chu & Yang, 2020).

Conspiracy theories & psychological distance to politics

Based on the considerations outlined above, we hypothesize that the construal level of political reality will directly influence citizens' likelihood of endorsing conspiratorial explanations of socio‐political events. While psychological distance has been widely studied in relation to temporal, spatial and social dimensions (Hart & Nisbet, 2012; Trope & Liberman, 2010), its implications for political perceptions—particularly in the context of conspiracy beliefs—remain relatively overlooked in social psychological research.

There are several reasons why perceptions of political distance can predict conspiratorial thinking. It is well‐known that conspiracism is related to political disengagement, defined as reduced participation in normative political behaviour (Imhoff et al., 2021; Jolley & Douglas, 2017). While previous findings suggest that belief in conspiracy theories is predictive of both normative and non‐normative political behaviour, it is also likely that political disengagement increases vulnerability to conspiracy theories. Individuals who endorse those theories are unlikely to be born conspiracists. Rather, in line with recent research recognizing the role of the broader socio‐political reality and institutions in conspiratorial thinking (Hornsey et al., 2022), the propensity to adopt conspiracy theories likely depends on individuals' previous spocio‐political experiences and position.

Indeed, conspiracies are particularly appealing to individuals who feel marginalized or inadequately represented (Adam‐Troian et al., 2023; Casara et al., 2022; Erisen, 2023). Key drivers of conspiratorial thinking include feelings of powerlessness (Jolley & Douglas, 2014; Papaioannou et al., 2023a) and distrust (Dow et al., 2023). It follows that the more distant citizens perceive the political system—especially in a representative democracy, which in theory is a system of government ‘by the citizens’—the more likely they are to interpret political reality in conspiratorial terms. This can offer simplified and resonant narratives that substitute for trust in traditional institutions and a means to regain a sense of understanding in a complex and often inaccessible political landscape (Dow et al., 2023).

As noted above, conspiracy theories also serve an intergroup function: they help citizens identify perceived threats from outgroups, strengthen cohesion within the ingroup, and maintain a positive social identity, particularly in the face of political uncertainty (van Prooijen 2024; Nera et al., 2022). This role is especially relevant in light of the social distance dimension of psychological distance, which is closely linked to perceptions of in‐/outgroup and their hierarchical order. Viewing politicians as an outgroup can increase the propensity to perceive them as immoral, unethical and ultimately ready to conspire. In fact, consistent with this, individuals who endorse conspiracy theories often show greater support for direct forms of democracy, such as referenda, as a way to bypass traditional political institutions they reject (Pantazi et al., 2022; Papaioannou et al., 2024).

Moreover, research has consistently demonstrated that psychological distance significantly influences how people process information (Liberman et al., 2007), with greater distance leading to more abstract thinking (Trope & Liberman, 2010). This tendency towards abstraction may make individuals more susceptible to the broad, overarching explanations often provided by conspiracy theories, which do not easily withstand attentive analysis based on specific details and arguments that may refute the theory (Douglas et al., 2019).

When politics is perceived as distant, individuals may be less engaged with specific details and more inclined to accept generalized conspiratorial narratives that simplify complex political events and issues (Van Prooijen, 2024). Consequently, individuals prone to conspiratorial thinking often display low political constraint, meaning they hold weakly structured ideological views, have a very coarse view of politics and feel generally detached from the political system (Enders, 2019).

An extensive body of work in social psychology also suggests that people are drawn to conspiracy theories as a means to satisfy crucial psychological needs and motives, including epistemic ones (Douglas et al., 2019; Maftei & Holman, 2021). A key epistemic need is the one for knowledge, clarity and certainty (Scrivner & Stubbersfield, 2024). When individuals perceive low proximity to epistemic authorities, such as the government or public officials (Harambam & Aupers, 2015), and when they face uncertainty about important events in their lives—especially during significant ones like a pandemic (Lin et al., 2023)—they may become more prone to endorsing conspiracy theories (Mari et al., 2022) and believe that the coronavirus was an intentional lab leak (Pummerer et al., 2022). Thus, conspiracy theories may offer individuals a way to ‘connect the dots’ and help them make sense of a distant and confusing political environment, which they are otherwise inherently motivated to understand (Van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017; Douglas et al., 2022).

Based on our reasoning and the theoretical framework of CLT, we expect all dimensions of psychological distance to politics to be relevant for understanding conspiracy beliefs. Our argument posits that general psychological distance to politics is a predictor of conspiracy beliefs, independent of citizens' specific views on politics and ideological orientation, as it refers to a more generalized sense of detachment or disconnection from politics as a whole. Thus, we propose and test the hypothesis that distance is a predictor of conspiratorial thinking. At the same time, consistent with much of the existing literature, we conceptualize the relationship between socio‐political factors and conspiracism as part of a broader network characterized by potential feedback loops (Enders, 2019; Papaioannou et al., 2023b; Papaioannou et al., 2024). Accordingly, while we focus on the effect of psychological distance on conspiracy beliefs, we also acknowledge the plausibility that conspiratorial thinking itself may further distance individuals from politics (Enders, 2019), suggesting a mutually reinforcing, bidirectional dynamic between these constructs.

THE PRESENT STUDY—RESEARCH OVERVIEW

Our psychological distance to politics measure, conceptually and methodologically, builds upon Većkalov et al. (2024), who demonstrate that psychological distance to science is a significant predictor of anti‐science beliefs. Transferring the concept of psychological distance to the political realm, we tested whether psychological distance to politics determines their propensity to view politics in conspiratorial terms.

Following the literature overview above, Study 1 examines whether there is a positive relationship between psychological distance to politics and the two measures of conspiracy beliefs (i.e. conspiracy mentality and belief in specific conspiracy theories) in the United States (N = 430), using a nationally representative sample with quotas on age, political orientation, gender and ethnicity. Study 2 replicates these findings in the United Kingdom (N = 301). Using quotas on age, gender and political affiliation, we further test whether psychological distance to politics remains a significant predictor over and beyond common predictors of conspiracism, such as cynicism and powerlessness.

In Study 3, we conducted an experiment involving participants who were provided with a description of a fictitious country (N = 300). Through this description, we experimentally manipulated the degree to which participants felt a sense of distance from politics (versus closeness). This setup aimed to mimic real‐world political environments and allowed us to compare participants' responses in the two conditions. By testing whether reducing perceived distance to politics decreases belief in conspiracies, we directly tested whether subjective proximity to political processes can influence openness to belief in alternative narratives.

Transparency and openness

Our experimental Study 3 was pre‐registered prior to data collection. The pre‐registration includes the research questions, hypotheses, methods, outlier exclusion and planned analyses. Our experimental study was designed to have 80% power to detect small to medium effects. A link to the pre‐registration is available on OSF here: https://osf.io/mjcey.

STUDY 1

Participants and procedure

We recruited 430 U.S. participants through Prolific Academic, who completed an online survey (48.3% ‘Male’, 49.3% ‘Female’, 2.4% ‘Other’; M Age = 45.41, SD = 16.09; 26% ‘Democrat’, 30% ‘Republican’, 44% ‘Independent’; 67% ‘White’, 14% ‘Black’, 10% ‘Mixed’, 9% ‘Other’). All individuals above the age of 18 were allowed to participate in the study. With this sample, we could detect Pearson bivariate correlations (two‐tailed) between our variables of interest as small as .20, with .95 power at the .05 alpha level (G*Power; Faul et al., 2007).

Participants read a page with general information about the study procedure, data use and payment, and then completed an online consent form. Next, participants answered the scales in the order appearing below, followed by demographic information. Participants were fully debriefed about the purposes and hypotheses of the study after the end of the survey and received compensation of $1.00.

Measures

A copy of the full material can be found here: https://osf.io/emvzy/. Participants were guided through a series of questions. We measured the following variables on a 5‐point Likert scale (1 = ‘Strongly Disagree’ to 5 = ‘Strongly Agree’), unless noted otherwise.

Psychological distance to politics

Psychological distance to politics (α = .73) was measured with a 16‐item Psychological Distance to Science scale by Većkalov et al. (2024), adapted to the domain of politics. The scale uses items on all four dimensions outlined in the introduction, including four items for each dimension—i.e. temporal, spatial, social and hypothetical. Temporally, we included items such as ‘Most of today's politics is concerned with solving problems related to the distant future’, ‘The impact of politics is more evident in the distant future than it is in the present’.

For spatial distance, we included items such as ‘Political decisions do not have a substantial impact on my local area’, ‘People from my local area don't become politicians’. For social distancing, we used items like the following: ‘The prospect of working as a politician seems beyond my reach’, ‘It would be difficult for me to meet with a politician’. Finally, for hypothetical distance, we used items such as the following: ‘We can rely on politics to deliver results that can be implemented in real life’ (reversed) and ‘Politics provide the right course of action for addressing the world's problems’ (reversed).

To assess the (four‐dimensional) structure of our psychological distance to politics measure, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis specifying a four‐component solution, as theoretically guided by CLT (Trope & Liberman, 2010). The results provided strong empirical support for this theorized structure (see Table A‐1). The four‐component solution showed a clear and interpretable pattern of loadings, with minimal cross‐loadings and conceptually coherent groupings of items. This analysis confirms the multidimensional nature of the construct, which captures distinct yet related aspects of psychological distance to politics.

Conspiracy mentality

Conspiracy mentality (α = .86) was measured with the five items taken from Bruder et al. (2013) questionnaire. This scale includes items such as ‘I think that government agencies closely monitor all citizens’ and ‘I think that events which superficially seem to lack a connections are often the result of secret activities’.

Belief in specific conspiracy theories

Belief in specific conspiracy theories (α = .89) was measured with five items taken from Papaioannou et al. (2023a). This scale includes items such as ‘The US government permits or perpetrates acts of terrorism on its own soil, disguising its involvement’, ‘Technology with mind‐control capacities is used in the United States on people without their knowledge’ and ‘Climate change is a hoax advanced by scientists who use it as a pretence to continue securing their research funding’.

Results

Descriptive results

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables. Consistent with our line of reasoning, both conspiracy mentality and belief in specific conspiracy theories were positively correlated with psychological distance to politics. The positive association between the two conspiracy variables and psychological distance to politics remains significant even after controlling for key demographics, including political orientation, age, gender, income and education level.1

TABLE 1.

Correlations for Study 1—USA survey sample.

1 2 3
1. Conspiracy mentality 3.60 (0.90)
2. Belief in specific conspiracy theories 0.706*** 2.55 (1.09)
3. Psychological distance to politics 0.277*** 0.281*** 2.96 (0.47)
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Note: Means and standard deviations (parenthesized) reported in the diagonal. Total number of participants were N = 431. Other values present Pearson correlation coefficients.

***

p < .001.

Discussion

Aligned with our theoretical framework, the findings from Study 1 confirm our hypothesis that psychological distance to politics is positively associated with belief in specific conspiracy theories as well as with conspiracy mentality. While the literature emphasizes important distinctions between the two, with conspiracy mentality understood as a relatively stable worldview and generalized readiness to interpret events as conspiratorial, and specific conspiracy beliefs referring to more concrete, context‐dependent narratives (Imhoff et al., 2022), our results show that psychological distance to politics is positively linked to both. This convergence is not surprising given that, in our sample, the two measures are highly correlated (Table 2, r = 0.706). Overall, our results underscore the importance of considering psychological distance in understanding citizens' propensity to conspiracism.

TABLE 2.

Descriptive statistics and correlations—U.K. survey sample.

1 2 3 4 5
1. Conspiracy mentality 3.56 (0.82)
2. Belief in specific conspiracy theories 0.763*** 2.28 (0.97)
3. Psychological distance to politics 0.489*** 0.517*** 2.92 (0.56)
4. Political cynicism 0.633*** 0.557*** 0.607*** 3.62 (0.84)
5. Powerlessness 0.450*** 0.376*** 0.487*** 0.556*** 3.61 (1.11)
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Note: Means and standard deviations (parenthesized) reported in the diagonal. Total number of participants was N = 301. Other values present Pearson correlation coefficients.

***

p < .001.

In the next study, we aimed to replicate this finding while examining the predictive power of psychological distance alongside other well‐established factors in the political domain. Several existing studies have suggested that political cynicism (Pattyn et al., 2012; Tong et al., 2020; Papaioannou et al., 2023a) and feelings of powerlessness (Jolley & Douglas, 2014; Magee & Smith, 2013) both independently predict higher endorsement of conspiracy theories. Importantly, in our Study 2 analysis, these variables are included as controls for conspiracy beliefs, not as mechanisms linking psychological distance to conspiratorial thinking. In other words, we wanted to see if feeling psychologically distant from politics affects people's tendency to believe in conspiracy theories even after taking into account how cynical or powerless they feel.

STUDY 2

Although Study 1 provides evidence for a positive link between psychological distance to politics and belief in conspiracy theories, it is unclear whether these findings generalize across different political contexts or whether the main effect remains significant when other key political variables are accounted for. To address these issues, we opted to replicate the study in a different country, adding additional covariates. Specifically, we conducted another survey using a representative sample from the United Kingdom, using quotas on ethnicity, political affiliation, age and gender.

Building on existing literature, we also examine whether psychological distance to politics remains a significant predictor of conspiracy beliefs even after controlling for two well‐established predictors in the political domain: political cynicism and powerlessness. Prior studies have consistently shown that political cynicism, the belief that political actors are untrustworthy or self‐interested, is strongly associated with conspiratorial thinking (Papaioannou et al., 2023a, 2023b; Bensley et al., 2022; Pantazi et al., 2022). Similarly, feelings of powerlessness have been repeatedly linked to a higher endorsement of conspiracy theories in both experimental and cross‐sectional studies (Biddlestone et al., 2020; Jolley & Douglas, 2014; Van Prooijen, 2018).

Both constructs are conceptually related to psychological distance: citizens who perceive politics as distant are more likely to report distrust in political actors (cynicism) and a diminished sense of political efficacy (powerlessness). By including these variables as controls, we can assess whether psychological distance predicts conspiracy beliefs independently of these well‐established factors. In Study 2, we found it important to test whether psychological distance contributes unique explanatory power for conspiracy beliefs while remaining conceptually distinct from these relevant factors.

Participants and procedure

We recruited 301 British participants through Prolific Academic, who completed an online survey (47.9% Male, 48.5% Female, 3.6% ‘Other’; M Age = 46.07, SD = 15.80; 44.5% ‘Labour’, 18.4% ‘Conservative’, 8.6% ‘Liberal Democrat’, 12.6% ‘Reform UK’, 8.6% ‘Green Party’, 7.3% ‘Other’). All individuals above the age of 18 were allowed to participate in the study.

Participants read a page with general information about the study procedure, data use and payment, and then completed an online consent form. Next, participants answered the scales in the order appearing below, followed by demographic information. Participants were fully debriefed about the purposes and hypotheses of the study after the end of the survey and received compensation of £1.00.

Measures

A copy of the complete material can be accessed here: https://osf.io/emvzy/. We measured participants' responses using Likert scales, employing the same items as in Study 1. For psychological distance to politics, we used the same 16 items as in Study 1 (α = .83). A confirmatory factor analysis presented in the Appendix suggests that the scale structure is broadly as expected, except for two items from the ‘spatial’ dimension, cross‐loading on the ‘social’ one (see Table A‐1, Appendix S1).

In addition, we assessed political cynicism and powerlessness. The political cynicism scale (α = .87) consisted of five items previously used in other research, featuring statements like ‘Most politicians rely on shady practices to remain in power’ and ‘Politicians are only interested in my vote and not in my opinion’ (see Papaioannou et al., 2023a; Papaioannou et al., 2023b). Powerlessness was measured with one item, also used in prior studies (Jolley & Douglas, 2014): ‘My country is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the ordinary person can do about it’.

Results

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables included in the analysis. Consistent with our theoretical framework, psychological distance to politics is positively associated with both belief in specific conspiracy theories and a general conspiracy mentality. Both political cynicism and feelings of powerlessness are strongly and positively correlated with psychological distance from politics. As expected, these variables also show significant positive associations with both measures of conspiracy belief, reinforcing the notion that political cynicism and powerlessness are interconnected factors that contribute to the adoption of conspiracy theories.

Table 3 presents descriptive the bivariate correlations between all sub‐dimensions of psychological distance to politics and the two measures of conspiracy beliefs: conspiracy mentality and belief in specific conspiracy theories. Consistent with our theoretical expectations, all dimensions of psychological distance were positively associated with both constructs of conspiracy beliefs.

TABLE 3.

Correlations between the dimensions of psychological distance and conspiracy beliefs.

1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Conspiracy mentality 1 0.763*** 0.412*** 0.344*** 0.209*** 0.334***
2. Belief in specific conspiracy theories 0.763*** 1 0.520*** 0.282*** 0.193** 0.367***
3. Temporal distance dimension (α = .908) 0.412*** 0.520*** 1 0.234*** 0.140* 0.174**
4. Social distance dimension (α = .735) 0.344*** 0.282*** 0.234*** 1 0.410*** 0.366***
5. Spatial distance dimension (α = .812) 0.209*** 0.193** 0.140** 0.410*** 1 294***
6. Hypothetical distance dimension (α = .752) 0.334*** 0.367*** 0.174** 0.366*** 0.294*** 1
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Correlation is significant

*

At the 0.05 level.

**

At the 0.01 level.

***

At the 0.001 level.

In the following section, we examine whether the effect of psychological distance to politics on both conspiracy mentality and belief in specific conspiracy theories remains significant after controlling for political cynicism and powerlessness.

Hierarchical regression model

To test our hypothesis, we conducted hierarchical linear regressions with conspiracy mentality and belief in specific conspiracy theories as the dependent variables. Step 1 of our hierarchical regression model contained four control variables (gender, age, education level and political orientation); Step 2 included the two key control variables, namely cynicism and powerlessness, and Step 3 included our key independent variable, namely psychological distance to politics. The results of this regression analysis are in Table 4.

TABLE 4.

Hierarchical regression analysis: Psychological distance to politics and conspiracy theories.

Variables β SE t CI95%
Conspiracy mentality
Step 1
Political orientation .05 0.04 1.10 −0.041; 0.147
Age −.01 0.00 −3.66*** −0.017; −0.005
Gender .13 0.08 1.49 −0.042; 0.306
Education −.06 0.03 −1.76 −0.134; 0.007
Step 2
Cynicism .52 0.05 10.00*** 0.423; 0.630
Powerlessness .10 0.04 2.56** 0.024; 0.183
Step 3
Psychological distance to politics .18 0.08 2.04*** 0.007; 0.352
Belief in conspiracy theories
Step 1
Political orientation .15 0.05 2.74** 0.044; 0.266
Age −.00 0.00 −1.62 −0.013; 0.001
Gender .16 0.10 1.58 −0.040; 0.372
Education −.12 0.04 −2.88** −0.207; −0.039
Step 2
Cynicism .59 0.06 9.06*** 0.467; 0.727
Powerlessness .06 0.05 1.30 −0.034; 0.165
Step 3
Psychological distance to politics .44 0.10 4.10*** 0.230; 0.652
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**

p < .01.

***

p < .001.

For the dependent variable conspiracy mentality, Step 1 was significant (R 2  = .060), F (4, 296) = 4.684, p < .001. Conspiracy mentality was negatively associated with age and the education level. Step 2 added significantly to this model (ΔR 2 = .36), F(2, 294) = 92.091, p < .001, which was due to a positive effect of cynicism (β = .52, SE = 0.05; p < .001) and a positive effect of powerlessness, although to a lesser extent (β = .10, SE = 0.05; p = .011). In general, cynical and powerless people exhibit stronger conspiracy mentality, confirming the literature (Jolley & Douglas, 2014; Papaioannou et al., 2023a). More importantly, the effect of psychological distance to politics that was added to Step 3 was significant (ΔR 2 = .01), F (1, 293) = 4.186, p = .041.

For the dependent variable belief in specific conspiracy theories, we obtained similar results. Step 1 was significant (R 2 = .068), F(4, 296) = 5.373, p < .001. Belief in specific conspiracy theories was negatively associated only with education level in this model. Step 2 added significantly to this model (ΔR 2 = .29), F(2, 294) = 66.476, p < .001, which was due to a positive effect of cynicism (β = .57, SE = 0.06; p < .001). Powerlessness, however, was not significant (β = .06, SE = 0.05; p = .193). Crucially, the effect of psychological distance to politics that was added to Step 3 was significant (ΔR 2 = .03), F(1, 293) = 16.878, p < .001.

Discussion

In Study 2, we found that psychological distance to politics strongly predicts belief in conspiracy theories in the United Kingdom, effectively replicating the findings of Study 1. Study 2 suggests that psychological distance to politics (and its sub‐dimensions) is a robust predictor of conspiratorial thinking. The hierarchical regression analysis suggests that this effect remains strong even after accounting for key psychological variables found in the relevant literature on political cynicism (Pantazi et al., 2022; Papaioannou et al., 2023a; Papaioannou et al., 2023b) and powerlessness (Jolley & Douglas, 2014). In other words, psychological distance contributes uniquely and independently to conspiratorial thinking, highlighting its importance beyond what is already explained by established predictors. Building on these findings, Study 3 aims to test the causal nature of this relationship through an experimental design, allowing us to move beyond correlation.

STUDY 3

In Study 3, we aimed to determine the causal direction of the relationship under study and explore whether reducing proximity to politics would (causally) decrease belief in conspiracy theories. Specifically, we conducted a vignette experiment to manipulate psychological proximity and assess its potential effect on conspiracy beliefs. Previous research has attempted to manipulate psychological distance in experimental settings. For example, Većkalov et al. (2025) show that reducing psychological distance to science has the potential to affect anti‐science attitudes. Van Dijke et al. (2018) investigated how psychological distance shaped moral judgements in scenarios involving cheating spouses and corrupt politicians. Our study builds on this work by manipulating psychological distance explicitly in relation to politics, allowing us to examine its direct role in shaping political conspiracy beliefs. Following previous studies (Pantazi et al., 2022; Papaioannou et al., 2024; Papaioannou et al., 2025b), we created a description of a fictitious country named ‘Naperlia’, where we experimentally manipulated how psychologically ‘distant’ or ‘close’ politics in this country were to its citizens.

This setup aimed to mimic the proximity people feel about politics in their country compared to those in a control condition, without altering factors such as government's performance or country's prospects. Our rationale for this approach was to create a realistic and relatable context in which participants could project their perceived proximity to politics, thereby enhancing the ecological validity of our findings (see Papaioannou et al., 2024).

We hypothesized that participants in the condition perceiving a close proximity to politics would exhibit less belief in conspiracy theories than those in the control condition. This expectation was based on our theoretical framework, suggesting that when individuals feel psychologically closer to political processes and institutions, they are more likely to perceive these entities as transparent and accessible. This, as a result, can effectively reduce their tendency to believe in conspiracy theories. Conversely, when psychological distance is high, individuals may feel disconnected, powerless and suspicious of political motives, making them more susceptible to conspiracy thinking. By manipulating the perceived proximity to politics, we aimed to directly test how reducing this distance could mitigate the belief in conspiracy theories.

Method

The study hypotheses and analysis plans were pre‐registered in OSF: https://osf.io/mjcey.2

Participants and procedure

According to a G*Power analysis, we aimed to detect an effect size of f = 0.19 in a two‐group ANOVA with a power of 0.90 at the 0.05 alpha level, which required a sample size of 294 participants. To ensure robustness against potential outliers, we recruited slightly over 300 participants. Multivariate outliers were identified and excluded from each model using the median absolute deviation with a constant of three (Leys et al., 2013). We recruited 302 participants from the United States via Prolific Academic, using quotas on sex, age, ethnicity and political affiliation.

After providing their informed consent, participants were presented with a short excerpt about Naperlia, containing information about the country (including its historical background, economic and political environment). In the short excerpt, they also read that Naperlia is a representative democracy where citizens vote for their representatives every 4 years. The text was equivalent in all other respects, including word count and specific background information about the country.

Each participant was randomly allocated to either the ‘close to politics’ condition (n = 148) or to the ‘distant to politics’ condition (n = 154). In the ‘close to politics’ condition, participants read that: ‘In Naperlia, politics is embedded in the daily lives of its citizens, rather than being a distant or abstract concept. People can clearly see how political decisions directly impact their local communities’. In addition, they read that: ‘It is common for citizens to interact with politicians in Naperlia, and many find them approachable and relatable’, that ‘many citizens are highly engaged in political matters’ and that ‘This sense of connection helps foster a belief among Naperlians that politics is essential for solving the country's problems’.

In the ‘distant to politics’ condition, participants read that: In Naperlia, politics often feels distant from the everyday lives of its citizens. Many people find it hard to see how decisions made by politicians directly affect their local communities and day‐to‐day lives. In addition, they read that ‘interactions with politicians are rare, and many citizens view politicians as quite different from themselves’, that ‘many citizens have turned their back to politics’ and that: ‘This sense of distance leads many Naperlians to feel that politics is not the best way to solve the country's problems’.

To increase participants' involvement, we asked them to imagine being a citizen of the country when reading the information (see Pantazi et al., 2022; Papaioannou, 2025). After reading the excerpt, participants were asked to briefly summarize in their own words how citizens perceive politics in Naperlia.3 They also completed a manipulation check question, which asked them to select a statement that best described what citizens think about politics in Naperlia (e.g. ‘Politics seems distant from daily life, with little impact on local communities and few interactions with politicians’ or ‘Politics is closely connected to daily life, with a noticeable impact on local communities and frequent interactions with politicians’). After the manipulation check, participants responded to the conspiracy mentality items and the items of the two mediators. All participants received a compensation of $1.00.

Measures

A copy of the full material can be found here: https://osf.io/emvzy/. The following variables were measured on a scale from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 5 ‘strongly agree’.

The conspiracy mentality scale (α = .86) was measured with the same items used in Studies 1 and 2, fitted to the Naperlian context (e.g. ‘I think that many things happen in Naperlia, which its citizens are never informed about’).

The political cynicism scale (α = .93) was measured with the same five items, but also adapted to the context of Naperlia (e.g. ‘Most politicians in Naperlia are likely to rely on shady practices to remain in power’). The powerlessness scale (α = .93) was extended with five items and adjusted for the fictional context (e.g. ‘I would feel powerless as a citizen of this country’, ‘It would be foolish to vote in Naperlia as it wouldn't make a difference’) based on previous work by Jolley and Douglas (2014).

Manipulation check

In our pre‐registration, we indicated that participants who failed both manipulation checks (i.e. open‐ended text and multiple choice) would be excluded from the analysis. However, none of the participants failed both manipulation checks. Only two participants missed the multiple‐choice question, but provided elaborate and clear responses in the open‐ended question; therefore, they were retained in the analysis sample. The remaining participants (N = 300 or 99.3% of the initial sample) comprehended and responded correctly in the multiple‐choice check.

Results

The descriptive statistics and correlations of all variables are presented in Table 5. Consistent with our pre‐registered hypothesis, we used a one‐way ANOVA to test whether participants in the ‘close to politics’ condition exhibit lower levels of belief in conspiracy theories. The results of the ANOVA will help determine if there is a statistically significant difference between the two groups, thereby providing evidence for our hypothesis.

TABLE 5.

US sample (Study 3)—experiment.

1 2 3 4
1. Psychological distance to politics (1 = ‘Closer to politics’ condition) 0.49 (0.50)
2. Conspiracy mentality −0.673*** 2.83 (0.98)
3. Political cynicism −0.726*** 0.863*** 2.71 (1.13)
4. Powerlessness −0.560*** 0.640*** 0.667*** 2.32 (1.07)
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Note: Means and standard deviations (parenthesized) reported in the diagonal. Total number of participants was N = 302. Other values present Pearson correlation coefficients.

***

p < .001.

Consistent with our hypothesis, participants in the ‘close to politics’ condition were less likely to believe in conspiracy theories compared to participants in the ‘distant to politics’ condition (M Close  = 2.15, SD = 0.75; M Distant  = 3.48, SD = 0.70; F(1, 300) = 248.961, p < .001, η 2  = 0.45). Additionally, participants in the ‘close to politics’ condition became less cynical (M Close  = 1.88, SD = 0.71; M Distant  = 3.52, SD = 0.82; F(1, 300) = 339.149, p < .001, η 2  = 0.53) and more empowered (M Close  = 1.72, SD = 0.77; M Distant  = 2.91, SD = 0.98; F(1, 300) = 137.234, p < .001, η 2  = 0.31). A visual illustration of the main differences is presented in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1.

FIGURE 1

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Mean difference by condition.

Notes: 95% Confidence Intervals are presented.

Discussion

In Study 3, we extended the findings from Studies 1 and 2 by showing that conspiracy explanations were less prevalent when politics was described as less psychologically distant. These findings, however, stem from a hypothetical scenario involving a fictional country, and therefore do not indicate that participants' conspiracy beliefs were directly reduced in real life. Rather, they suggest that when politics is construed as ‘psychologically closer’, individuals show a lower tendency to adopt conspiracy explanations, which is in line with CLT (Trope et al., 2007; see also Većkalov et al., 2025).

Importantly, this induced sense of political proximity did not depend on whether the country's politics were depicted positively or negatively, but on the psychological closeness manipulation itself. This demonstrates that perceived proximity to political affairs, without any direct change in the perception valence, may reduce conspiracy thinking.

We should be cautious here and note that the relationship may operate in a reinforcing cycle over time: individuals predisposed towards conspiracy thinking may increasingly distance themselves from politics, further amplifying disengagement and conspiratorial reasoning.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Recent years have witnessed a growing sense of political detachment among citizens worldwide (Grasso, 2016; Parvin, 2018; Valgarðsson et al., 2025). Building on the principles of CLT (Trope & Liberman, 2010), this study examines whether psychological distance to politics predicts conspiracy beliefs. We propose and show that when citizens perceive politics as abstract and ‘far away’, they are more likely to adopt conspiratorial explanations—a phenomenon observed across many countries and contexts nowadays (Cordonier et al., 2021; Imhoff et al., 2022).

Studies 1 and 2 provided consistent evidence that feeling politics is ‘far away’ is positively associated with both conspiracy mentality and belief in specific conspiracy theories. Consistent with our hypotheses and theoretical framework, Study 2 also suggested that psychological distance to politics remains a significant predictor of conspiracy beliefs even after accounting for feelings of powerlessness and political cynicism, two major predictors of political conspiracy beliefs. Study 3 extended these findings by manipulating distance experimentally using a vignette design. Results confirmed our hypothesis about a causal effect: reducing distance to politics weakened belief in conspiracy theories.

These findings have several implications. First, they contribute to ongoing theorizing on conspiracy beliefs by positioning psychological distance to politics as a key explanatory variable for understanding how individuals cognitively and psychologically navigate the complex socio‐political reality around them. Contemporary accounts suggest multiple factors explaining belief in such theories, including epistemic, existential and social motives (Douglas et al., 2017). We add to this literature by identifying psychological distance to politics as an additional factor that intersects with these categories.

When politics is experienced as abstract and remote, individuals may be more inclined to turn to conspiracy theories as a way of making sense of political events. From a cognitive and epistemic standpoint, perceiving political elites and institutions as distant, inaccessible and overly complex can encourage belief in conspiratorial explanations that promise to simplify political reality and make it more comprehensible (Douglas et al., 2017). From a social intergroup perspective, distant political elites are more likely to be perceived as corrupt, unethical, or immoral. Similarly, when ordinary citizens occupy a low position in the socio‐political hierarchy—a reflection of social distance—it can lead to the mobilization of group‐based suspicion for those in power (van Prooijen, 2024).

A second, more methodological implication arises from the experimental design. While previous work has attempted to manipulate psychological distance in an experimental setting (distant vs. near; Van Dijke et al., 2018; Većkalov et al., 2025), our study is the first to manipulate and test the causal effect of psychological distance specifically in relation to politics. We do find causal evidence for the link between psychological distance and politics and conspiratorial thinking, allowing us to identify a potentially important antecedent of vulnerability to conspiracism.

A third important implication of our findings is that politicians and stakeholders may have a tool for addressing the phenomenon of conspiracy theories by working to bridge the gap between politics and citizens, either by bringing politics closer to citizens or fostering a sense of proximity. Our results contribute to a broader trend in social psychological research that focuses on the role of the political system and the status quo in shaping conspiratorial beliefs (Hornsey et al., 2022; Pantazi et al., 2022; Papaioannou et al., 2024). Tackling the root causes of high psychological distance to politics may require politicians and political elites to communicate more clearly and concretely how their agendas affect citizens in the here and now, or more broadly, to reshape their relationship with the electorate by fostering a stronger sense of proximity and relevance of politics in everyday life.

We hope this work paves the way for further research on the psychological construct of distance. Psychological distance to politics emerges as a distinct and robust driver of conspiratorial thinking, showing that even a seemingly valence‐neutral sense of ‘distance’ can open the door to suspicion and conspiracy. Thus, our research extends a long‐standing tradition of studying distance perceptions in various domains, including science (Većkalov et al., 2024), climate change (Spence et al., 2012) and news media (Hmielowski et al., 2023), to the study of conspiracy beliefs.

Limitations and future research

While this study opens interesting directions for future research, there are clearly some limitations that future studies should address. First, while our samples came from two different countries with drastically different political systems and current political environments, both countries are Anglo‐Saxon and fall under the category of Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic (WEIRD) (Henrich et al., 2010). This may put a limit on the generalizability of our findings. Future research could test these findings in a more diverse set of countries, including non‐WEIRD contexts, to better understand how cultural, economic and political diversity might influence the observed effects. In particular, examining cross‐national variables such as Hofstede's power distance (Hofstede, 2009) could provide valuable insights into macro‐level conditions that either amplify or mitigate the effects of political distance on conspiratorial thinking.

Second, while Study 3 provides some directional causal evidence for the impact of distance to politics on conspiracy beliefs, we recognize that these relationships may be harder to influence. Specifically, our vignette paradigm limits the potential generalizability of our findings to real political contexts. Besides, our causal findings do not preclude the possibility of a potential vicious cycle of disengagement for individuals who go down the rabbit hole, with increased exposure to conspiracy theories, leading to further distance from politics. Future experiments could seek to replicate our causal findings in more ecological settings. Longitudinal setups, on the other hand, could help better identify the dynamics of the relationship between psychological distance and belief in conspiracy theories.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Kostas Papaioannou: Conceptualization; methodology; data curation; formal analysis; writing – review and editing; writing – original draft; resources; visualization. Myrto Pantazi: Conceptualization; methodology; formal analysis; data curation; writing – review and editing; writing – original draft; resources; funding acquisition.

FUNDING INFORMATION

This work was supported by funding from the Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This study was approved by the Ethics Review Board of the Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences of the University of Amsterdam. All procedures were carried out in accordance with institutional guidelines. Participants were fully informed about the purpose of the research and their rights, including the right to withdraw at any time. Informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to their involvement. Data were collected and analysed anonymously to ensure confidentiality. The study involved minimal risk. A full debriefing was provided following participation.

Supporting information

Appendix S1.

BJSO-65-0-s001.docx (367.9KB, docx)

Papaioannou, K. , & Pantazi, M. (2025). Please reduce the gap! How psychological distance to politics fuels belief in conspiracy theories. British Journal of Social Psychology, 65, e70019. 10.1111/bjso.70019

Footnotes

1

Detailed descriptions of the four dimensions, the two conspiracy belief measures and the bivariate correlations between each dimension and the outcome variables are available in the Appendix S1.

2

We deviated from the pre‐registration in that we had originally planned a mediation model with powerlessness and cynicism as parallel mediators. For transparency, we report the results of this analysis in the Appendix S1.

3

A qualitative analysis of participants' open‐ended responses, presented in the Appendix S1, supports the validity of the manipulation. Participants in the high‐proximity condition (closer to politics) described a closer connection to politics, while those in the control group expressed greater distance.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

We confirm that all relevant research materials, data and methods will be made available upon successful publication of this article. The processed data, along with details on methods and materials, will be accessible via OSF at the following link: https://osf.io/emvzy/?view_only=6f5d2d2df8dc49798232ded32b2cef8e. Our experimental Study 3 was pre‐registered prior to data collection. The pre‐registration includes the research questions, hypotheses, methods, outlier exclusion and planned analyses: https://osf.io/mjcey/?view_only=75b10ed7643f45d29dac16cb8069a31d.

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Associated Data

This section collects any data citations, data availability statements, or supplementary materials included in this article.

Supplementary Materials

Appendix S1.

BJSO-65-0-s001.docx (367.9KB, docx)

Data Availability Statement

We confirm that all relevant research materials, data and methods will be made available upon successful publication of this article. The processed data, along with details on methods and materials, will be accessible via OSF at the following link: https://osf.io/emvzy/?view_only=6f5d2d2df8dc49798232ded32b2cef8e. Our experimental Study 3 was pre‐registered prior to data collection. The pre‐registration includes the research questions, hypotheses, methods, outlier exclusion and planned analyses: https://osf.io/mjcey/?view_only=75b10ed7643f45d29dac16cb8069a31d.

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