Table 4.
SIoT relationship types: definitions, examples, and security implications.
| Relationship type | Semantic definition | Example | Security implications (attack surface & trust signals) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ownership Object Relationship (OOR) | Objects continue to interact despite ownership changes | Smart car retaining traffic data after resale | Data leakage risk across owners; requires secure data wiping, provenance, and access control |
| Social Object Relationship (SOR) | Objects interact via owners’ social connections | Friends’ fitness wearables syncing stats | Vulnerable to impersonation or Sybil attacks; trust inferred from social graph strength |
| Sibling Object Relationship (SIBOR) | Objects owned by the same user communicate frequently | Smart home devices (thermostat, lights, sensors) | Lateral compromise risk; trust derives from shared owner identity and credentials |
| Parental Object Relationship (POR) | Sibling devices connected via a parent entity | Fleet of connected vehicles | Centralized control introduces single point of failure; parent trust determines child reliability |
| Co-location Object Relationship (CLOR) | Objects interact due to spatial proximity | Factory robots working together | Susceptible to spoofed/relay attacks; trust based on verified physical presence |
| Co-Work Object Relationship (CWOR) | Objects collaborate to complete a task | Robotic arms and conveyors in packaging | Attack surface in coordination sabotage/DoS; trust validated through task success consistency |
| Guest Object Relationship (GOR) | External objects interact with restricted access | BYOD devices in enterprise | Higher risk of rogue devices; needs strict authentication, sandboxing, and access policies |
| Stranger Object Relationship (STGOR) | Limited interactions with unknown devices | Unknown IoT object in range | High uncertainty and unpredictability; requires anomaly detection and adaptive trust mechanisms |
| Service-Oriented Object Relationship (SVOR) | Objects interact with external service providers | Smart meters subscribed to weather/utility services | Exposure to API/service misuse; trust depends on authentication, SLA compliance, blockchain logging |