ABSTRACT
This Systematic Literature Review (SLR) aims to synthesize empirical studies to determine prominent risk factors associated with radicalization and violent extremism (RVE), as well as moderating or mediating factors that trigger the radicalization pathways. Following the prior set eligibility criteria, the PRISMA guideline was used to identify, screen, and select the empirical studies. In this SLR, we have identified some prominent risk factors of RVE and categorized them into micro, meso, and macro level factors. At the micro level, age, gender, education, SES, psychopathological issues, personality and psychological traits, proviolence and hostile attitude, political‐ideological beliefs, intolerance, conspiracy mentality, and moral disengagement, while at the meso level, family dysfunction, a post‐conflict society, social isolation, harsh school environment, perceived intergroup threats, psychological needs, and low social support are considered to be key risk factors. At the macro level, collective strain, political conflict, strong religious and ethnic identity, and group‐based relative deprivation significantly influence radicalization processes. The findings of the current SLR pointed toward multiple risk factors for the radicalization process. These findings can be imperative in developing counter‐radicalization interventions and planning preventive strategies.
Keywords: micro‐meso‐macro, radicalization, risk factors, systematic review, violent extremism
1. Introduction
Over the past 3 decades, radicalization and violent extremism (RVE) have been rising as global threats, which has significantly attracted scholarly attention to understand the process of radicalization, including its causes and developmental pathways. In a similar age, many governmental agencies also engaged themselves in the deradicalization process using distinct psychological and political techniques. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2018) has stated that RVE continues to pose serious global threats, significantly affecting the social, political, and economic stability of the world. To reduce radicalized violence, several social scientists have diverted their attention from individual risk factors and have focused more on identifying the antecedent conditions of extremist violence, a phenomenon often described as understanding “what goes on before the bomb goes off” (Sedgwick 2010). Radicalization is not as simple as it seems. For example, prior literature revealed that only a single causal factor is not always sufficient for triggering RVE; it is a multicausal process, which includes the interaction of socio‐political, psychological, and broad structural factors (Borum 2011; McCauley and Moskalenko 2017; Pfundmair et al. 2019). In a similar vein, some recent studies further indicates that RVE emerges from the dynamic interactions among the risk factors at multiple levels, including micro (individual‐related), meso (group‐related factors), and macro‐level (structural and political factors) (Feddes et al. 2023; LaFree and Schwarzenbach 2021).
In addition, previous theoretical models suggested that examining RVE through a multi‐level approach is essential. It incorporates individual, group, and societal influences into a single framework. In this regard, Moghaddam's (2005) “staircase to terrorism” model provides a basic explanation of how ordinary individuals may gradually progress toward extremist behavior through successive psychological, social, and political stages. To extend this viewpoint, McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) present a comprehensive multi‐level model of the radicalization process that goes beyond the push–pull risk factors. Similarly, Schmid (2013) also highlighted a structured, multi‐layered approach, arguing that radicalization cannot be properly understood through isolated causal factors but instead emerges from complex interactions operating across multiple levels of effects.
Schmid (2013) cautioned that focusing too much on individual characteristics of radicalized youth can be misleading. These youth are often portrayed as passive victims manipulated by extremist organizations. This abundant investment may create risks, ignoring the important role of meso‐ and macro‐level dynamics. He argued that structural conditions, such as repressive state policies, social and political exclusion, and foreign military interventions, often create grievances and perceived injustice among the people and groups. These types of conditions can also lead to the development of a collective identity crisis, and together, may create a fertile ground for RVE. Therefore, a broad, multi‐level approach is necessary. It can provide a more effective understanding of RVE and be highly beneficial for developing policies to reduce radicalization and violence (Kruglanski et al. 2019).
1.1. Theoretical Background
In recent years, several significant incidents of radicalization‐related violence have been witnessed worldwide. For example, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) reported that between 2016 and 2025, 152 attacks were conducted by right‐wing perpetrators, followed by 35 by left‐wing, 25 by jihadist, 10 by ethnonationalist, and 8 by other actors (Byman and McCabe 2025). In this context, bibliometric analysis shows that, as radicalization and violence have increased worldwide, research on radicalization and violent extremism has also grown in recent decades (Sihidi et al. 2024; Yumitro et al. 2023). With the rapid growth in research on radicalization, distinct concepts have also emerged, including political extremism (left‐ and right‐wing), violent extremism, terrorism, online radicalization, lone‐actor radicalization, group radicalization, ethnic/religious radicalization, and Islamist radicalization (Sihidi et al. 2024). Although earlier studies often used the terms radicalization and violent extremism interchangeably, and treated them as part of a single ideological or political continuum (Borum 2011), but recent research investigations have made a clearer distinction between these two concepts, indicating that violent extremism refers to ideologically motivated violence or actions and represents the endpoint of the radicalization process (K. S. Bhui et al. 2012; Feddes et al. 2023). Thus, while not all individuals who undergo radicalization engage in violence, all violent extremists have, to some extent, experienced a process of radicalization.
According to Doosje et al. (2016), radicalization is “a process through which people are highly motivated to adopt violent means toward the out‐group members or to symbolic targets to achieve social and behavioral change and advance political goals.” Although there is a lack of consensus among scholars on defining radicalization (Neumann 2013), there appears to be an alignment on the view that radicalization is a gradual, multicausal process comprising mutually reinforcing phases, during which an individual develops radical and, in some cases, violent extreme attitudes (McCauley and Moskalenko 2014). The Two Pyramid Model (TPM), proposed by McCauley and Moskalenko (2017), conceptualizes radicalization as a dynamic process unfolding across both cognitive and behavioral dimensions of extremism. According to this model, individuals may move through stages of radicalization in non‐linear and context‐dependent ways, influenced by personal, social, and structural factors (see Figure 1). In this context, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2016) emphasizes that preventing people from violent extremism requires a comprehensive understanding of these multifaceted processes, along with careful identification of the individual, community, and structural factors that shape pathways into extremist engagement.
FIGURE 1.

Two pyramid models of political extremism: (a) cognitive radicalization, (b) behavioral radicalization.
1.2. Limitations of Push, Pull, and Personal Factors in Radicalization
Push, pull, and personal are common paradigms to categorize the risk factors of RVE into three broad domains. According to Vergani et al. (2018), push factors represent structural and contextual pressures that create grievances and increase susceptibility to extremist narratives, including perceived injustice, socioeconomic marginalization, political exclusion, and chronic poverty. Doosje et al. (2013, 2016) suggested that pull factors operate at the group and organizational level, such as group belonging, identity affirmation, ideological legitimacy, and material or social rewards, mostly used by extremist organizations to attract individuals (Doosje et al. 2013, 2016). Personal factors make individuals more vulnerable to radicalization processes, encompassing individual‐level vulnerabilities, including psychological distress, personality traits, identity uncertainty, and exposure to traumatic experiences (Doosje et al. 2016; Vergani et al. 2018). Furthermore, Weenink (2019) acknowledged that individuals with certain psychological adversities, such as attention‐deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), mood disorders, post‐traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and psychotic symptoms, are more susceptible to engaging in criminal or extremist activities.
Radicalization is a dynamic and multifaceted process shaped by regional, ideological, and sociopolitical contexts (McCauley and Moskalenko 2017). The conventional categorization into push and pull factors may exaggerate the phenomenon, leading to vague conclusions (Borum 2011; Schmid 2013). In addition, Studies suggest that push, pull, and personal factors are closely interrelated (Vergani et al. 2018), but their interconnection remains unexplored. However, these factors alone cannot account for why only some individuals who go through similar conditions develop extremist beliefs or engage in radical action, while others do not (Doosje et al. 2016; Horgan 2008; McCauley and Moskalenko 2017).
1.3. Factors Influencing the Radicalization Process at Micro, Meso, and Macro Levels
Prior studies suggested that the micro, meso, and macro classification may provide a more comprehensive and structured approach to understanding the radicalization process than the push, pull, and personal factors (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008; Schmid 2013; Vergani et al. 2018). While the push‐pull‐personal framework isolates the influences, the micro‐meso‐macro framework suggests radicalization as a multi‐level process influenced by individual factors (micro), group dynamics and social networks (meso), and broader structural and ideological factors (macro) (Coolsaet 2019; Doosje et al. 2016; Schmid 2013; see Figure 2). For example, at the micro level, an individual is influenced by several personal factors such as the quest for significance, a strong sense of humiliation, poor career prospects, and personal uncertainty. At the meso level, the radicalization process is influenced by social‐environmental factors, including fraternal relative deprivation, feelings of injustice toward the group, and a sense of in‐group belongingness. At the macro level, the radicalization process is influenced by broader societal factors than the meso‐level factors, such as cultural and religious threats, racism, political and economic dominance, and more (Doosje et al. 2016; Jensen and Larsen 2019). Despite extensive research identifying risk factors for radicalization, there remains a critical need for a systematic review to develop a deeper understanding and create effective intervention strategies to counter radicalization at micro, meso, and macro levels.
FIGURE 2.

Factors influencing radicalization at micro, meso, and macro levels.
1.4. The Aim of the Present Systematic Literature Review
The systematic review helps to organize large datasets systematically and scientifically, establishing a general approach or comprehensive picture of the findings (Snyder 2019). Although past systematic reviews identified some risk factors associated with Islamist radicalization, which may limit the establishment of a general approach to radicalization (Ohls et al. 2023; Lösel et al. 2018; McGilloway et al. 2015), some systematic and scoping reviews did not cover the latest publications (Wolfowicz et al. 2021; Vergani et al. 2018). In addition, they did not highlight the role of moderating/mediating factors influencing the risk factors. Feddes et al. (2018) suggested that mediating and moderating (i.e., triggering factors) have a prominent role in radicalization, for example, motivating an individual from a lower stage to a higher stage or from low engagement to high engagement. Moreover, past systematic reviews have not considered the mindset and ideology of women and are unable to explain why women are attracted to engagement in violent extremism and radicalization. Hence, the present systematic review primarily focuses on addressing these gaps, which have not been highlighted by past systematic reviews.
The present Systematic Literature Review (SLR) aims to identify the key risk factors associated with radicalization and violent extremism and to determine the moderating and mediating factors that influence radicalized pathways. Additionally, this study aims to systematically review relevant empirical studies to highlight existing gaps in the literature and provide recommendations for future studies. Furthermore, it consolidates the ideological viewpoints and attitudes of women toward radicalization, a topic that has been largely ignored in previous systematic reviews. Through the systematic analysis of articles, we identified risk factors of radicalization, violent extremism, political extremism, and extremism into different domains:
Family factor (e.g., family dysfunction)
Psychopathology (e.g., psychological distress, intellectual disability, and personality disorder)
Psychological traits (e.g., Trait of entitlement, trait of forgiveness, self‐esteem, self‐control, and self‐efficacy)
Personality factors (e.g., Big Five, HEXACO, and Dark Tetrad personality traits)
Cognitive factors (e.g., Behavioral Inhibition System, cognitive inflexibility, irrational beliefs, and moral disengagement)
Conspiracy beliefs (e.g., conspiracy mentality and political extremism)
Perceived discrimination or unfairness (e.g., perceived unfairness and perception of realistic threat)
Social identity and social factors (e.g., in‐group superiority/narcissism, ethnic identity, post‐conflict society, and religiosity)
Women's radicalization (e.g., the role of gender and ideological differences between men and women)
Psychological moderators/mediators in Radicalization (e.g., multicultural acquisition, psychological well‐being, pro‐violence attitude, dark personality traits, political solution, self‐control, legal cynicism, self‐efficacy, and psychological needs)
Demographic moderators (e.g., age, gender, socioeconomic status, and education)
2. Method
2.1. Eligibility Criteria
The outputs of database search strategies were combined into a single EndNote library. Duplicate records were removed using the Rayyan software (https://www.rayyan.ai/). Titles and abstracts were screened to select studies that met the inclusion criteria and excluded those that did not. The full text of the relevant papers was then read to validate eligibility. Studies were included in the final if they measured radicalization, terrorism, political violence, or violent extremism and investigated their relationship with any other psychological construct. Both published and unpublished studies were eligible for final inclusion. Any study design was included except those where aggregated data were not presented (e.g., qualitative approach, case studies). Studies that were published in the English language and between the period of 2010 to the present (25 October 2023) were eligible. Multiple studies arising from the same sample, but only if they reported different psychological constructs, were eligible for inclusion. However, if two or more studies used the same sample and presented the same psychological constructs, the smaller sample study was excluded. Studies that measured radicalization as an outcome of intervention were excluded unless a relationship between radicalization and psychological factors was reported. All authors performed the full‐text analysis.
2.2. Search Strategy
The primary search strategy included searching the title, abstract, and keywords from five major databases (PubMed, Google Scholar, PsycINFO, Web of Science, and Scopus) using the terms (e.g., “risk factors” OR “factors influencing” OR “relevant factors”) AND (“radicalization,” OR “terrorism,” OR “political extremism,” OR “violent extremism”). The search processes were identical for all five databases. The date restrictions were applied from the period of 2010 to the present. Any study (both published or unpublished) available online before 25 December 2023 was included. In the case of the studies measuring radicalization but not reporting these terms in the title, abstract, or keywords, a secondary search strategy was conducted that involved searching through all of the papers (published or unpublished) that cited the publications of the development and validation of the radicalization or violent extremism scales.
2.3. Data Extraction
The authors extracted the data using a standardized form. The standardized form included information about the author's name, year of publication, location of the study, research design of the study, sample or study population, sample size, measurement instruments, different types of risk and protective factors associated with radicalization, violent extremism or terrorism, and political violence dimensions explored and some key moderators and mediators of psychosocial factors and radicalization were identified and are listed in Table 1. Any conflicts that arose were resolved through discussion among the authors.
TABLE 1.
Summary of included studies.
| Sl. No. | Author/s (Year) | Targeted country | n | Age range (Years) | Mean age | % females | Design | Radical ideology type | Outcomes | Moderators and mediators | Quality score |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Ozer (2020) | Denmark and India | 477 (Students) | 18–29 | 25.56 (India = 256), and 22.74 (Denmark = 223) | 32.7 (India), 71.7 (Denmark) | CS | Attitudes | Life attachment is directly associated with extremist attitude = 0.65. | Multicultural acquisition and ethnic protection | 3 |
| 2 | Sarour and Keshy (2022) | Saudi Arabia | 286 (students and adults) | 17–53 | 23.3 | 69.23 | CS | Attitudes | Relationships between family functions and extremist beliefs and attitudes = −0.14. | Psychological well‐being (β = −0.094). | 2 |
| 3 | Saliman et al. (2016) | Egypt | 662 (Adults) | n/a | 27.7 | 54.83 | CS | Support/intentions |
Cognitive factors (e.g., decision‐making styles such as analytical, rational, intuitive, dependent, and cognitive complexity) = 0.19, Social factors (e.g., social intolerance, emotional intolerance, and discomfort intolerance) = 0.21, Psychopathology (e.g., personality disorders, self‐defeating personality, and obsessive‐compulsive personality) = 0.23. |
n/a | 2 |
| 4 | Pavlovic and Wertag (2021) | Europe | 299 (college students) | n/a | 22.75 | 65.22 | CS | Supports/intentions |
Psychopathology = 0.23, Narcissism = 0.13 Machiavellianism = 0.28 General D3 = 0.30. |
a. Proviolence (mediator) b. Gender (moderator) |
3 |
| 5 | Gotzsche‐Astrup (2021) | USA | 956 | n/a | n/a | n/a | CS | Intentions | Partisan identity is strongly associated with engaging in political violence, which is moderated by D3 personality traits. | Dark triad personality traits | 3 |
| 6 | McGarry and Shortland (2023) | USA | 479 | 40.9 | 52.1 | Experimental design | Willingness/attitudes | Behavioral Inhibition system (BIS) sensitivity was positively associated with radicalization and activism. |
Moderators: a. Age b. Gender c. Ethnic identity |
3 | |
| 7 | Shortland et al. (2020) | USA | 1112 | 18–26 | n/a | 17.54 | Experimental design | Willingness/attitudes | Personality traits such as aggression and hostility are more influenced than exposure to extremist propaganda in extremist beliefs. | n/a | 3 |
| 8 |
Belanger et al. (2019) N = 5 |
USA | Study 1a = 209 | n/a | 33.01 | 55.02 | CS | Intentions | Harmonious passion (r = 0.30), obsessive passion (r = 0.66), and moral disengagement (r = 0.45) were significantly related to violent behavior. | 2 | |
| Study 1b = 220 | n/a | 37.73 | 54.09 | CS | Intentions | Obsessive passion positively predicted violent behaviors (β = 0.40). | Moral disengagement significantly mediated the relationship between obsessive passion and violent behavior among political activists. | 2 | |||
| Study 2 = 172 participants | 18–39 | n/a | 44.18 | Exp. | Willingness/attitudes | Out‐group dehumanization positively mediated the relationship between obsessive passion and violent behavior (β = 0.73). | Out‐group dehumanisation | 3 | |||
| Study 3 = 115 participants | n/a | 34.30 | 40.86 | Exp. | Intention | An obsessive mindset has a greater intention to engage in violent behavior than a harmonious mindset. | Moral disengagement | 3 | |||
| Study 4 = 167 participants | n/a | 40.23 | 60.47 | Exp. | Willingness/attitudes | Results revealed that moral disengagement is strongly associated with radical behavior. | Machiavellianism and sensation seeking | 3 | |||
| 9. | Nivette et al. (2017) | Zurich, Switzerland | 1675 students | 7–17 | n/a | n/a | Longitudinal | Attitudes | The collective strain indirectly affected violent attitudes through moral. neutralization (β = 0.43) and legal constraints (β = 0.30). | Moral disengagement and gender | 2 |
| 10 |
Obaidi et al. (2019) N = 7 |
Denmark and Belgium | 59 (Muslim communities of Denmark) | 18–74 | n/a | 38.98 | CS | Intentions | Group‐based relative deprivation and violent behavioral intentions (r = 0.44). | n/a | 2 |
| 232 (Islam‐related Facebook website in Denmark) | 16–74 | n/a | 57.75 | CS | Intentions | Group‐based relative deprivation was positively associated with violent behavioral intention (r = 0.25). | n/a | 2 | |||
| 259 (Denmark Muslims | 18–34 | n/a | 45.17 | CS | Intentions | Group‐based relative deprivation was positively related to violent behavioral intentions (r = 0.34). | n/a | 2 | |||
| 243 Afghan Dones | 18–65 | n/a | 46.50 | CS | Intentions | Group‐based relative deprivation was positively related to violent behavioral intentions (r = 0.37). | n/a | 2 | |||
| 104 participants (Islam‐related FB site in Belgium) | 18–45 | n/a | 53.84 | CS | Intentions | Group‐based relative‐related deprivation was positively associated with violent behavioral intentions (r = 0.76). | n/a | 2 | |||
| 366 Pakistani Muslims | 18–45 | n/a | 49 | CS | Intentions | Group‐based relative‐related deprivation was positively related to violent behavioral intentions (r = 0. 54). | n/a | 2 | |||
| 60 non‐muslims (Sri Lankan Tamils living in Denmark | 18–40 | n/a | 45 | CS | Intentions | The relationship between birthplace and violent behavior intentions was significantly mediated by group‐based relative deprivation. | Group‐based relative deprivation | 2 | |||
| 11 | Stankov et al. (2020) | Serbia | 600 | 18–30 | 23.53 | 51 | CS | Attitudes | Ethnic identity, ethnic narcissism, contact frequency with the intergroup, and political efficacy were positively related to pro‐violent attitude, whereas contact experience, perceived group equality, education, employment, economic status, and social ladder were negatively related to pro‐violent attitude. | SES, and positive contact | 2 |
| 12 |
Zwiker et al. (2020) N = 3 |
Germany and the Netherlands | 397 | n/a | 36.15 | 57.43 | CS | Attitudes | Political ideological beliefs are more stable in political extremism than in political orientation. | Age, gender, and education | 3 |
| 291 | 18–75 | 38.09 | 43.30 | Exp. | Attitudes | Political ideological beliefs are more stable among extreme people regardless of their political orientation. | Age, gender, and education | 3 | |||
| 5929 (in 3 waves) | 56–64 | n/a | 22.39 | Longitudinal | Attitudes | People of both political polarities (right and left‐wing) have more stable political ideologies than political moderates. | Age, gender, and education | 3 | |||
| 13 |
Van Prooijen et al. (2015) N = 4 |
USA and the Netherlands | 185 (Americans) | 18–76 | n/a | 52.43 | CS | Attitudes | Stronger ideology was associated with a tendency to believe in conspiracy beliefs that were moderated by gender and age. Climate conspiracy was higher among right‐extremist people than left‐extremist people. | Gender and age | 2 |
| 1010 (Dutch) |
< 30 = 306, 35–49 = 372, and > 50 = 619 |
n/a | 47.13 | CS | Attitudes | Both right and left extremists are more susceptible to conspiracy beliefs and theories than moderates. |
Moderators: Age and education Mediator: Political solution |
3 | |||
| 1297 (Dutch) |
< 30 = 172, 35–49 = 298, and > 50 = 540 |
n/a | 47.49 | CS | Attitudes | Political solutions and conspiracy beliefs are significantly correlated (β = 0.28), and political solutions significantly mediated the relationship between political ideology and conspiracy beliefs. | Political solutions ‐ mediator | 3 | |||
| 268 | 27–88 | n/a | 37.37 | CS | Attitudes | The effect of political extremism may not be possible due to extremist attitudes. | 2 | ||||
| 14 |
Pavlovic and Franc (2023) N = 2 |
Croatia | 279 | n/a | 22.72 | 66 | CS | Intentions/supports | General dark personality traits (D3) and perceived group relative deprivation (PGRD) significantly predicted political violence (r = 0.34 and 0.24). The interaction effect of D3 and PGRD also predicted political violence (β = 0.18). | Gender moderates this relationship | 3 |
| 461 | 18–77 | 43.9 | 53 | CS | Intentions | Men with low economic status, higher PGRD, and higher negative emotional responses to this perception and higher D3 were strongly associated with radicalized intentions. Higher D3 with the presence of cognitive and emotional group relative deprivation was strongly associated with the radicalization process. | Gender ‐ moderator | 3 | |||
| 15 | Rottweiler and Gill (2020) | Germany | 1502 | 19–95 | 55 | 49.3 | CS | Intentions | Violent intentions increased by individuals' conspiracy mentality (r = 0.13). This relationship was much higher among people with lower self‐control, low scores on law‐related morality, and high self‐efficacy. | Age and gender highly moderated the relationships | 3 |
| 16 | Tetreault and Sarma (2021) | 43 countries | 398 | 18–78 | 32.75 | 72.11 | CS | Attitudes | Machiavellianism and Narcissism were significantly associated with RWA (r = 0.15 and 0.15), and Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and sadism were significantly associated with state‐sponsored extremism. RWA was strongly associated with SSE (r = 0.58). | Gender, age, and education | 3 |
| 17 | Brugues and Caparros (2021) | Spain and European countries | 63 offenders | 25–80 | 40.29 | 30.2 | CS | Actions/behavior | People who were using higher moral disengagement for convicted crimes are more susceptible to further engagement in violence. | Age, gender, origin pattern, education, religion, and dysfunctional personality patterns | 2 |
| 18 | Thomas et al. (2013) | Australia | 114 university students | n/a | 29.48 | 60.66 | Exp. | Intentions | Although social interaction may work as a solution to both radical and political extremism, radicalization believes that extreme action is legitimate. | Shared grievance, triangulation, and willingness to break the law. | 3 |
| 19 | Morgades‐Bomba et al. (2020) | France | 643 | 18–29 | 20.38 | 100 | CS | Action/behavior | Women engaged in radicalization are darker than disturbed. Both dark personality traits and socio‐cultural factors worked as predictors of radicalization. | Dogmatism, radicalized cognitions | 2 |
| 20 | Haugstvedt and Sjoen (2021) | Norway | 7801 (school students) | n/a | n/a | n/a | CS | Willingness/attitudeS | Results revealed that students who were willing to use violence at a group level were more open to engaging in dialogue with other people in local religious communities. | n/a | 2 |
| 21 | Bhui et al. (2014) | Pakistan and Bangladesh | 608 | 18–45 | n/a | 45.55 | CS | Willingness/attitudes | People who were showing sympathy toward violent protest and terrorism were at least suffering from mild depression and had low levels of social capital. Social isolation was also identified as a risk factor for radicalization. | n/a | 2 |
| 22 | Moss and O’ Connor (2020) | USA | 512 | 18–84 | 45.7 | 51.56 | CS | Attitudes | Political extremism of left‐wing authoritarianism (LWA) was associated with personality traits such as agreeableness, social media use, perceived overprotective parenting, and racial differences. In contrast, RWA was associated with low agreeableness and openness. | Age, gender, and education | 3 |
| 23 |
Zmigrod et al. (2019) K = 2 |
UK | 304 | 18–72 | 38.02 | 47 | CS | Attitudes | Cognitive inflexibility was associated with higher confidence to sacrifice one's life for in‐group situations of trolley problems, and it is a strong predictor of extremist attitude. | Age, education, and gender | 3 |
| USA | 743 | 18–81 | 36.54 | 55.4 | CS | Attitudes | Cognitive rigidity was considered an antecedent of extremist attitudes. |
Willingness to fight for the group, And identity diffusion |
3 | ||
| 24 | Trip et al. (2019) | Romania | 295 | 15–18 | 16.41 | 42.37 | CS | Action/behavior | Global evaluations of self and religiousness are two good predictors of a militant extremist mindset (MEM). Big five personality factors such as low intellect/imagination, high agreeableness, and low extraversion were strongly associated with MEM. | n/a | 2 |
| 25 | Furnham et al. (2020) | UK | 506 (students) | n/a | 20.34 | 42.49 | CS | Action/behavior | Personality disorder, religiousness, self‐monitoring, and liberalism were used as predictors of a vile world mindset. Proviolence was negatively correlated with openness, conscientiousness, and agreeableness personality traits, and gender and religiousness were good predictors of MEM. | Age, gender, and religion | 3 |
| 26 | Markovic et al. (2021) | Serbia | 271 (high school students) | 15–18 | 16.30 | 72 | CS | Intention/supports | Proviolence, which is a factor of MEM, was strongly associated with family dysfunctions (r = 0.22), harsh school environment (r = 0.27, social dominance orientation (r = 0.45), and loneliness (r = 0.28). | n/a | 2 |
| 27 | Isenhardt et al. (2021) | Switzerland | 8317 (students) | 16–21 | n/a | 50.3 | CS | Attitudes/willingness | The relationship between identity diffusion and extremist attitude was highly significant for LWA and Islamist attitudes. Parental control and parental inconsistency were strongly and indirectly associated with extremist attitudes. | Mediator: Identity diffusion | 3 |
| 28 | Braddock et al. (2022) | USA | 268 (students) | 18–76 | 33.24 | 20.9 | Exp. | Actions/behavior | Machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy, sadism, thrill‐seeking, neuroticism, and intention to support were positively associated with beliefs of violence, but agreeableness was negatively related to beliefs of violence. | Narrative exposure and narrative vividness | 2 |
| 29 | Rottweiler and Gill (2022) | UK | 1500 | n/a | 44.92 | 51.3 | CS | Intentions/supports |
Study‐1 People who perceived higher group relative deprivation showed higher support and intentions to engage in violent extremism, and the need for uniqueness positively moderated this relationship, need for status, and trait entitlement. Study‐1B High levels of traits of forgiveness, self‐control, and critical thinking negatively moderated the relationship between perceived higher group relative deprivation and violent extremism. |
Moderators 1. Risk factors: Need for uniqueness, need for status, and trait of entitlement 2. Protective factors: Traits of forgiveness, self‐control, and critical thinking |
2 |
| 30 | Grimbergen and Fassaert (2022) | Netherlands | 34 (offenders) | n/a | n/a | n/a | CS | Actions/behavior | Major psychiatric issues were found to be mood‐related disorders, anxiety issues or disorders, and mild intellectual disability (each 29.4%). In addition, substance disorders (35.3%), psychotic disorders (14.7%), and personality disorders (41.2%). | n/a | 2 |
| 31. | Anastasio et al. (2021) | USA | 1202 | n/a | 38 | 42 | CS | Intentions/supports | Strong negative emotions such as anger and anxiety have the potential to increase political violence and extremism. They attempt to restore emotional balance by utilizing and adapting radical beliefs and actions as a way of projecting their anger to the external environment. | n/a | 2 |
| 32 | Furnham and Robinson (2021) | UK | 397 | 19–71 | 39.9 | 50.13 | CS | Actions/behavior | All personality disorders, excluding avoidant personality disorder, showed positive and significant correlations with the proviolence factor of MEM. | Moderators: Age, sex, and education | 3 |
| 33 | Pfundmair et al. (2019) | Eighteen countries in Western Europe | 75 | n/a | n/a | 19.6 | CS | Actions/behavior | Some specific needs, such as transcendence, self‐control, and self‐esteem, added with strong group identification, perceived group threat, and perceived collective injustice, further lead to the application of violent extremism. | n/a | 2 |
| 34 | Moskalenko et al. (2023) | USA | 372 | 18–80 | 42.05 | 58 | CS | Intentions | QAnon conspiracy theories and extraversion personality traits were positively associated with radicalization, but it is the reverse among men. | n/a | 2 |
| 35 | Briki (2022) | USA | 509 | 18–78 | 33.20 | 49.9 | CS | Attitudes | Basic psychological needs such as autonomy frustration (r = 0.20), competence frustration (r = 0.24), relatedness frustration (r = 0.31), dogmatism (r = 0.13), and belief personification (r = 0.29) were positively associated with violent extremist attitudes. | n/a | 2 |
| 36 | Koirikivi et al. (2021) | Finland | 2837 | 16–18 | 17.2 | 54.6 | CS | Intentions | The results revealed that people who had low scores in resilience profiles, such as self‐regulation, peer relations, caregiver support, and school safety and correctness, were associated with radicalization. | Gender, education, and geographical location | 3 |
| 37 | Jahnke et al. (2020) | Germany | 303 | 18–30 | 24.23 | 49.5 | CS | Intentions | Observer sensitivity (r = 0.32) and strength political orientation (r = 0.63) were positively associated with radicalization. | Gender | 2 |
Note: Quality score 3 = Good, 2 = Fair, 1 = Poor.
Abbreviations: CS, Cross‐Sectional Research Design; Exp, Experimental Research Design; n/a, Not Available.
2.4. Study Quality and Risk of Bias Assessment
The quality of selected studies was assessed using a modified version of the Newcastle–Ottawa Scale (NOS) (Wells et al. 2014). Five methodological domains were evaluated: (a) sample size justification (1 point awarded if a justification was reported; 0 points if not); (b) response rate (1 point awarded when comparability between respondents and non‐respondents was described; 0 points if non‐response or its characteristics were not reported); (c) ascertainment of exposure (0 points for no description of the measure, 1 point for use of a non‐validated measure, and 2 points for use of a validated measure); (d) ascertainment of outcome (0 points for no description, 1 point for self‐report measures, and 2 points for interview‐ or clinician‐based measures); and (e) statistical analysis (1 point awarded if appropriate statistical analyses were conducted and effect estimates with p‐values or confidence intervals were reported; 0 points if analyses were inappropriate or insufficiently described).
3. Results
3.1. Search Outcome
Through the process of searching, we initially identified a total of 10,855 articles, among them 10,728 records were from five major databases (PubMed = 438, Google Scholar = 1743, PsycINFO = 141, Scopus = 6749, Web of Science = 1784), 34 records from registers, 53 records from websites, 3 records from organizational library, and 37 records were received from citation searching. After removing 4683 duplicates and 27 other languages, we were left with 6238 papers for further screening. Subsequently, all authors evaluated the titles and abstracts based on the inclusion criteria. Finally, 1683 papers were selected for a full‐text analysis. Among them, 37 articles met the inclusion criteria, as illustrated in the PRISMA flow chart (Page et al. 2021) in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3.

PRISMA flow diagram (Page et al. 2021).
3.2. Study Characteristics
In total, 37 studies with 54 different samples included 48,443 participants, ranging from 34 to 8317 (median, 1309) participants per study. The total number of females participating in the included studies was 23,682 (49%), and the total number of males was 24,761 (51%); three studies (Gøtzsche‐Astrup 2021; Nivette et al. 2017; Grimbergen and Fassaert 2022) did not provide any information regarding the gender of the participants. The included studies were conducted in different countries, as shown in Figure 4.
FIGURE 4.

Country‐wise international publications of articles.
The studies included participants across diverse age groups. The lowest age of participants was 7 years, and the highest age of participants was 95 years. However, 15 distinct sample populations did not specify any age range. The average age of the sample across 37 studies (54 different samples) was 43.82 years; 12 studies (k = 21 samples) did not report any average age of participants. The included studies primarily assessed radicalization and violent extremism using the Activism and Radicalization Intention Scale (ARIS; Moskalenko and McCauley 2009), while studies on extremist mindset used the Militant Extremist Mindset (MEM) scale of Stankov et al. (2010).
We covered the analysis of studies between 2010 and 2023. In the year‐wise publications, no study was included between 2010–2013, and 2018. However, between 2014–2017, there were five studies. Whereas 2019 had four studies, the number of studies increased to eight in 2020 and nine in 2021. Similarly, 2022 has eight studies, and 2023 has three studies that were included in this systematic review (see Figure 5).
FIGURE 5.

Year‐wise publication of selected studies.
In this systematic review, the quality of the selected studies was assessed using the Newcastle‐Ottawa scale, which includes both the case‐control and cohort forms. The quality scores were categorized into three levels: good quality, fair quality, and poor quality, with corresponding ratings of 3, 2, and 1, respectively. Included 54 sample studies, 25 of which were rated as good quality, indicating robust methodological rigor. In addition, 29 studies were rated as fair quality, suggesting moderate methodological quality.
3.3. Study Outcomes
The potential risk factors identified in the current systematic review are categorized across the micro (individual), meso (group), and macro (societal) levels. At the macro level, an individual is influenced by broad societal factors, including factors like strong religious identity, group‐based relative deprivation, ethnic or cultural identity, and perceptions of unfairness or injustice. At the meso level, an individual is influenced by group‐related factors such as family dysfunction, school or institutional environments, perceived intergroup threats, low social support, and shared grievances, all of which may also interact with and intensify toward the macro level. This systematic review further identified a range of individual‐level factors operating at the micro level, including age, gender, education, socioeconomic status (SES), psychopathology, personality traits, and psychological and cognitive characteristics (as outlined in Table 2). Additionally, the review highlighted several potential moderating and mediating factors, and the ideological differences between men and women in the radicalization process (presented in the synthesis of findings section).
TABLE 2.
The risk factors in radicalization at micro, meso, and macro levels.
| Micro level | Meso level | Macro level |
|---|---|---|
|
|
|
3.4. Synthesis of Findings
3.4.1. Psychopathology
Researchers have reported that radicals are similar to delinquents who are expected to suffer from a lack of attachment which causes them to be unable to relate to others or feel sympathy and empathy (Furnham et al. 2020; Soliman et al. 2016). Individuals experiencing major psychiatric disorders may exhibit increased susceptibility to radicalization and violent extremism, primarily through the influence of intermediary psychological and social factors (Grimbergen and Fassaert 2022). The categorization of personality disorders, such as clusters A and B, as well as personal political beliefs strongly associated with proviolence and vile world components (Furnham and Robinson 2021). K. Bhui et al. (2014) further observed that persistent psychological distress can lead to maladaptive coping behaviors, social withdrawal, and impaired personality development, which, in turn, may increase susceptibility toward extremist ideologies. Thus, having the disorder does not directly cause radicalization but can make individuals vulnerable to radicalization. Social isolation was identified as a risk factor for radicalization (K. Bhui et al. 2014). Marković et al. (2021) suggested that feelings of loneliness serve as a key mediating mechanism linking family problems to increased support for violence. Individuals who lack belonging and emotional security at home may become more receptive to extremist groups that appear to offer identity, purpose, and social inclusion.
Lower levels of well‐being may contribute to greater susceptibility to extremist ideologies (Sarour and Keshky 2022). For example, Marković et al. (2021) suggested that family dysfunction significantly contributes to radicalization and pro‐violent attitudes by fostering emotional and cognitive vulnerabilities. They indicated that dysfunctional family environments heighten feelings of loneliness, which serves as a key mediating mechanism linking family problems to increased support for violence. Individuals who lack belonging and emotional security at home may become more receptive to extremist groups that appear to offer identity, purpose, and social inclusion.
3.4.2. Psychological Traits
Individuals with higher levels of trait entitlement, lower levels of forgiveness, and closed‐minded thinking styles tend to exhibit lower levels of self‐control and perceive greater injustices within their group, leading them to predominantly engage in violent extremism (Rottweiler and Gill 2022). In addition, individuals with high self‐threat (global evaluation of self) easily adopt the conspiracy theories of others and are highly vulnerable to developing extremist mindsets (Trip et al. 2019). This relationship is quite strong among people with lower self‐control, high self‐efficacy, and lower law‐related morality (Rottweiler and Gill 2020).
3.4.3. Personality Traits
Big Five and HEXACO personality traits: Personality traits strongly predict violent extremism among adults. Higher levels of neuroticism and extraversion, and lower levels of openness, conscientiousness, and agreeableness strongly predicted violent extremism (Gøtzsche‐Astrup 2021). Stronger partisan identities increase intentions for both activism and violence; this effect on violence is significantly stronger only for individuals with high dark triad scores. In another study by Trip et al. (2019), it was found that while general neuroticism did not directly influence the extremist mindset, personality traits like low intellect/imagination, high agreeableness, and low extraversion were strongly associated with the extremist mindset (Trip et al. 2019). Personality also plays a role in the impact of exposure to extremist content online. An individual's personality traits, particularly aggression, plays a stronger role in the development of extremist cognitions than mere exposure to the online propaganda itself (Shortland et al. 2020).
Dark Personality Traits: Pavlović and Franc (2023) reported that dark personality traits significantly predicted radicalism, activism, and political violence even after controlling for the other associated factors. Higher dark personality traits strongly influence extremism, right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA) (Tetreault and Sarma 2021; Moss and O’Connor 2020), and moral disengagement (Brugués and Caparrós 2021; Moss and O’Connor 2020). For example, Moghaddam (2005) suggested that individuals perceive unfairness and injustice when they believe their group is deprived of the same advantages as other groups. It is the initial foundation of radicalization, even if it may be subjective. Consequently, in the radicalization process, they justify terrorist acts based on the desire to attain an ideal society. In situations where individuals experience deprivation, as members of a group, they may perceive out‐group members as behaving in ways that threaten their very existence of the in‐group (as realistic threat), leading to greater distance from the out‐group and development of violent attitudes (Pavlović and Franc 2023). The dark personality traits significantly amplify the risk of radicalization among individuals experiencing relative group deprivation. These personality traits are acting as moderators, exacerbating feelings of injustice and making individuals more vulnerable to radicalization and violent extremism when they perceive their group is not treated fairly (Rottweiler and Gill 2020).
3.4.4. Cognitive Factors
Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS). Studies found that the BIS manages motivations to disengage from the stimulus and build coordination between anxiety responses and acts of terrorism (Carver 2004). Therefore, individuals are motivated to engage in different radicalized groups to reduce anxiety. In addition, BIS sensitivity predicted radicalism and violent intentions after online exposure to terrorist content (McGarry and Shortland 2023). Moreover, victim sensitivity positively predicted general radicalization, whereas observer sensitivity negatively predicted it. These relationships were further moderated by individuals' age and the surrounding political context (Jahnke et al. 2020).
Cognitive inflexibility. Individuals with higher cognitive inflexibility are more inclined toward extremist violence, including increased willingness to harm people of other groups and communities and sacrifice of their lives for their group (Zmigrod et al. 2019).
Irrational beliefs. A previous study suggested that individuals with highly irrational beliefs may easily adopt the conspiracy theories of others and are highly vulnerable to developing extremist mindsets (Trip et al. 2019).
Moral disengagement. The included studies indicate that frequent reliance on moral disengagement is associated with a greater willingness to engage in criminal activities, including collective forms of violence or mob aggression (Brugués and Caparrós 2021). In addition, a study also reported that individuals with obsessive passion are more likely to use moral disengagement to justify radical beliefs and violent actions (Bélanger et al. 2019). These cognitive mechanisms cause individuals to legitimize harmful behaviors, such as misbehavior or harassment towards other individuals. Overall, moral disengagement emerges as a significant risk factor for both violent intentions and actions (Bélanger et al. 2019).
3.4.5. Conspiracy Beliefs
Conspiracy mentality. According to Bruder et al. (2013), believing in conspiracy theories is often influenced by an individual's inherent tendency, commonly known as conspiracy mindset. Therefore, individuals who believe in one conspiracy theory are more likely to accept additional conspiratorial beliefs, even when these beliefs are inconsistent. Hence, those who hold a conspiracy mentality tend to believe in conspiracy theories and have a higher willingness to engage in violent extremism than others (Bruder et al. 2013).
Political extremist ideology. Van Prooijen et al. (2015) suggested that political extremists tend to perceive the world in more rigid and homogeneous categories than political moderates. Compared to moderates, they exhibit strong ideological stability and often show an overconfidence effect regarding their knowledge and ideology (Zwicker et al. 2020; Van Prooijen et al. 2015). Because they are displaying stronger confidence in the accuracy and superiority of their beliefs and are more likely to reject viewpoints that diverge from their own (Van Prooijen et al. 2015). Moreover, conspiracy beliefs have a mediating role in the relationship between simple political solutions and social issues among both left‐ and right‐wing extremists (Thomas et al. 2013; Zwicker et al. 2020). Furthermore, Sarour and Keshky (2022) suggested that a positive family environment also functions as a protective factor against the RVE. Participants who had belonged to more balanced family functioning tended to have low extremist beliefs (Sarour and Keshky 2022).
3.4.6. Social Identity
According to Stankov et al. (2020), strong ethnic identification is positively associated with extremist mindsets and radicalized attitudes.
Ethnic identity and post‐conflict society. Stankov et al. (2020) reported that in post‐conflict societies, intergroup conflicts play a major role in making ethnic identity salient. In this context, adherence to ethnic identity may lead to the retrieval of the historical grievances and collective trauma (Stankov et al. 2020). Individuals in post‐conflict societies often face significant challenges in moving beyond the past and constructing a shared future. However, this process is frequently hindered by persistent intergroup divisions and enduring oppositional attitudes that can continue long after the cessation of conflict (Haugstvedt and Sjøen 2021).
Religiosity. High religiousness is strongly associated with the development of extremist ideology (Trip et al. 2019; Furnham and Robinson 2021). The degree of religiosity and violent extremism is not directly related to the exact type of views held (e.g., fundamentalist) or the specific religious affiliation (Furnham et al. 2020). Although religiousness was found to have a low correlation with personality and personality disorders, it contributed to all subscales and strongly predicted the Divine Power mindset (Furnham et al. 2020). Furthermore, greater religiousness was found to be strongly correlated with the Divine Power mindset within the MEM framework (Furnham and Robinson 2021).
3.4.7. Women's Radicalization
Role of gender in radicalization. The findings revealed that extrovert women were more likely to endorse activism and radicalism compared to their extrovert male counterparts (Moskalenko et al. 2023). Conversely, introvert men were more supportive of activism and radicalism than introverted women. Women were more likely to believe in QAnon conspiracy theories compared to their counterparts. Only, a smaller number of women rejected certain aspects of QAnon's ideology compared to men (Moskalenko et al. 2023). Moreover, their findings reported that if conspiracy beliefs work as a motivating factor for engagement in radicalization, then women may share equal levels or higher than men (Moskalenko et al. 2023).
Ideological difference between men and women. Men and women engage in the QAnon movement or radicalization for unique reasons. Men tend to be primarily driven by a desire for societal change, including violent and illegal means. However, women tend to be driven by the desire for unique experiences and to make social connections through their radical behaviors, as well as support others' radical behaviors. In addition, dark personality traits play an important role in both cognitive and behavioral components of religious radicalization in women. Conversely, psychopathological factors such as schizotypal traits as well as depressive disorder, did not significantly trigger religious radicalization among women. It is also suggested that the religious radicalization process in women seems to be “darker” than disturbed (Morgades‐Bamba et al. 2020).
Dark personality traits. Higher partisan identity strength interacted with higher dark personality traits, and the likelihood of predicting violent extremism was higher, particularly among male participants. This indicated that gender moderated the relationship between partisan identity strength and dark personality traits in predicting violent extremism (Gøtzsche‐Astrup 2021). Dark personality traits, such as narcissism, were found to be strongly associated with extremism among males, whereas general dark personality and Machiavellian traits showed a moderate and positive association with extremism among females (Pavlović and Wertag 2021).
3.4.8. Psychological Mediators/Moderators
Multicultural acquisition. Selected studies have revealed that multiple factors influence radicalization and violent extremism. Multicultural acquisition and ethnic protection have emerged as crucial mediators in the association between insecure life attachment and violent extremism. Multicultural acquisition has been identified as a protective factor against radicalization. In a society, it has a major role, such as promoting openness, intergroup communication, understanding, and inclusive identity formation. On the other hand, rigid in‐group boundaries and defensive ethnocentrism have been associated with an increased risk of radicalization, which further leads to increased exclusionary attitudes and intergroup threat perceptions (Ozer 2020).
Psychological well‐being. The study found that psychological well‐being significantly mediated the relationship between family dysfunction and extremism. It indicates that higher levels of psychological well‐being may weaken the relationship between family dysfunction and extremism (Sarour and Keshky 2022).
Proviolence. Pro‐violent attitude significantly mediated the relationship between Dark Triad personality traits and support for political violence and extremism (Pavlović and Wertag 2021).
Dark personality traits. Dark personality traits also serve as moderators for radicalization (Gøtzsche‐Astrup 2021). In addition, Machiavellianism's dark personality traits significantly moderated the relationship between terrorist narrative propaganda and persuasion (Braddock et al. 2022).
Political solutions. Political solutions worked as moderators between conspiracy beliefs and political extremism, providing practical routes for mitigating extremist attitudes (Van Prooijen et al. 2015).
Self‐efficacy, self‐control, and legal cynicism. Self‐efficacy, self‐control, and legal cynicism have been found to moderate the relationship between conspiracy mentality and violent extremist intentions. Self‐control and legal cynicism act as protective factors, whereas high self‐efficacy poses a risk factor (Rottweiler and Gill 2020).
Moral disengagement. Moral disengagement has emerged as a strong mediator between obsessive passion and violent behaviors/political extremism, and acts as a risk factor (Bélanger et al. 2019).
Psychological Needs. The selected studies also found that stronger in‐group deprivation or injustices lead to support toward violent extremism, and it was much greater for individuals who showed a higher need for uniqueness, need for status, and need for entitlement (Rottweiler and Gill 2022).
3.4.9. Role of Demographic Factors
Age and Gender. Studies indicated that some demographic factors influence radicalization and violent extremism. For example, gender significantly moderates the relationship between collective strain and violent extremist attitudes, with young males being particularly susceptible (Nivette et al. 2017; Rottweiler and Gill 2022). Young individuals and men in gender are more vulnerable to radicalization ideology and violent attitudes (Brugués and Caparrós 2021; Rottweiler and Gill 2022; Pavlović and Franc 2023).
SES and education. Socioeconomic status (SES) and education portrayed through a ladder analogy suggest that individuals with higher socioeconomic status and higher education worked at the top of the ladder, and those with lower education and lower SES, including unemployed people, worked at the bottom in a radical group (Tetreault and Sarma 2021; Stankov et al. 2020; Pavlović and Franc 2023).
4. Discussion
4.1. Major Findings
The main objective of the present systematic literature review was to identify and determine the key risk factors and protective factors of radicalization. The findings of this systematic review clearly demonstrate that radicalization is a multilevel phenomenon influenced by the dynamic interaction of micro‐, meso‐, and macro‐level factors. At the micro level, factors increasing the individual vulnerabilities toward radicalization include psychopathology, dark personality traits, low self‐control, cognitive inflexibility, conspiracy beliefs mindset, and moral disengagement. On the other hand, protective factors such as higher self‐esteem, forgiveness, and psychological well‐being reduced susceptibility, while demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, education, socioeconomic status) served as important moderators. At the meso and macro levels, dysfunctional family environments and social group processes, including ethnocentrism, nationalism, and religiosity, further shaped identity‐based motivations and strengthened in‐group attachment, thereby increasing openness to extremist narratives. Further, structural and societal conditions, such as perceived discrimination, collective deprivation, inequality, and intergroup threat, fueled shared grievances that amplified support for radical ideologies. In addition, some mediating mechanisms, including pro‐violent attitudes, moral disengagement, and self‐efficacy, explained how influences at these multiple levels translated into extremist intentions and behaviors.
The findings of this systematic review are supported by a previous study by LaFree and Schwarzenbach (2021), which categorized radicalization risk factors into micro and macro levels. According to them, gender, age, peer groups, employment and marital status, prior criminal activity, imprisonment, ideologies, and mental illness come under micro‐level risk factors, whereas religious ethnic and linguistic diversity, poverty, democratic standards, long‐term civil conflict and war, political crises, massive human right violations, group structure and dynamics, governmental response style, population size, higher immigrants/refugees and history of terrorist attacks come under macro‐level risk factors of radicalization (LaFree and Schwarzenbach 2021).
Dark personality characteristics such as Machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy, and sadism have a significant influence on the processes of radicalization. Machiavellian individuals use tactical manipulation of others in a calculated and unemotional manner, agreeing to participate only when they believe the personal advantages outweigh the risks, without worrying about possible repercussions (Tetreault and Sarma 2021). Individuals who possess high degrees of narcissism tend to have a belief in their superiority and entitlement. They often respond angrily when their sense of self‐worth is criticized, such as when they get criticism regarding their occupation or societal position (Tetreault and Sarma 2021). Individuals who possess a high degree of psychopathic traits often display antisocial tendencies, including high impulsivity, emotional detachment, and low empathy. The selected studies also suggested that the Machiavellianism trait is associated with a greater willingness to use violence particularly, when perceived personal risk is low (Braddock et al. 2022). Those who have high sadistic personality tendencies take pleasure from watching others' suffering and violence, and experience low well‐being when this is missing (Morgades‐Bamba et al. 2018). Some studies also revealed the gender role in the relationship between personality and radicalization. For example, women with higher extraversion reported higher vulnerability to violent pathways in certain contexts than their counterparts (Moskalenko et al. 2023). However, findings in this area remain inconsistent. Therefore, large‐scale as well as longitudinal empirical investigations are needed to clarify how personality traits influence social and contextual factors in RVE.
A systematic review suggested that psychopathology can affect radicalization by increasing individuals' vulnerability to radicalization, especially people with schizophrenic spectrum conditions, who may interpret extremist ideology as personally meaningful or threatening, making violent narratives appear justified (Catapano et al. 2024). These symptoms can increase the feelings of persecution, grievance, and the beliefs of “special mission”, which are frequently observed among lone‐actor extremists. Another systematic review reported that some personality traits may tend to develop extreme ideologies (Misiak et al. 2018).
The frustration of basic psychological needs, such as autonomy, competence, and relatedness, is associated with stronger endorsement of violent extremist attitudes (Briki 2022). For example, autonomy frustration refers to a perceived lack of control over one's actions or life circumstances. It may lead to decreased motivation, lower task engagement, and poor performance, while increasing the hostility towards perceived causes of restrictions. Competence frustration, which refers to consistent feelings of incompetence or inadequacy has been associated with burnout, discontent, and low psychological well‐being, which further increasing susceptibility to adopting extremist ideologies and rigidity in nature. However, relatedness frustration is associated with loneliness and social isolation. These conditions can increase the attractiveness of extremist groups' belonging and identity. Despite these findings, the application of self‐determination theory in radicalization remains limited. Therefore, further empirical studies are required to examine how the frustration of basic psychological needs interacts with social and political contexts to shape pathways into radicalization and support for violence. Previous systematic review by Wolfowicz et al. (2021) highlighted cognitive factors, such as perceived grievances, moral disengagement, strong in‐group identification, and rigid cognitive styles, particularly black‐and‐white thinking, that increase vulnerability to radical beliefs through the triggering of how individuals perceive injustice, interpret threats, and legitimize extremist ideologies. They further suggested that violence justification, conspiracy thinking, and selective exposure to radical content trigger extremist attitudes by fostering echo chambers that normalize and reinforce radical worldviews (Wolfowicz et al. 2021).
The family environment plays an important role in radicalization and the development of extremism in individuals. Perceptions of positive family functioning are associated with enhancing the well‐being of children. On the other hand, family dysfunction negatively affects their well‐being. For example, a previous longitudinal study and systematic review suggested that dysfunction in the family and among the parent and child relationship, such as ongoing conflicts, lack of affection, extreme permissiveness, and high authoritarianism, leads to a high risk for the development of psychopathology in children and substantially increases the likelihood of radicalization (Yang and Chen 2025; Zych and Nasaescu 2021). On the other hand, overall family well‐being, such as higher socioeconomic status, joint family status, and warm and supportive parenting styles, acts as a protective factor that may lower the susceptibility to RVE (Zych and Nasaescu 2021). Scremin (2020) noted that family dysfunction, including low emotional and family support, ineffective communication, and unresolved intra‐family conflicts, can disrupt healthy identity formation and socialization processes and function as a significant risk factor for RVE. Thus, future empirical investigation may focus on family dynamics, including parent‐child relationships, communication patterns, parenting styles, and family cohesion, to explore how these factors may make individuals vulnerable to RVE.
Moreover, perceived in‐group deprivation or injustice is strongly associated with group RVE (Rottweiler and Gill 2022). When people feel that their in‐group has not received equal benefits or resources, they interpret it as an injustice toward their own group. Often, members of an in‐group perceive threats to their resources and properties; therefore, they justify their violent actions (Pavlović and Franc 2023). For example, a systematic review by Franc and Pavlović (2021) suggested that perceived socio‐political inequality functions as a key predictor of extremist attitudes. They also reported that when individuals experience unfair treatment, such as discriminative behaviors, political exclusion, or violations of fundamental rights, they may develop strong feelings of relative deprivation and shared grievance, which further leads to higher cognitive radicalization and increased support for violence. Similarly, a systematic review by Echelmeyer et al. (2023) noted that experiences of cultural separation, marginalization, and social alienation in minority groups are positively associated with violent extremist attitudes and intentions. Although past studies established that perceived in‐group deprivation or unfairness is a prominent risk factor for RVE, there are few empirical studies available to explain the relationship between intergroup threats and radicalization. Therefore, future studies must address the intergroup threats to fill this limitation.
4.2. Strengths and Limitations
The current systematic literature review has several strengths, including the examination of a large number of studies from six major databases, the analysis of a wide range of sample data, and adherence to the PRISMA guidelines for maintaining inclusion and exclusion criteria. It evaluated the quality of each distinct sample and provided the quality scores. In addition, it also identified both risk and protective factors of radicalization and highlighted the current research gaps, offering future directions. However, the current SLR has some limitations that should be addressed. First, the outcomes were derived solely from a systematic literature; the strengths of the relationships were not examined, and no meta‐analysis was conducted. Second, only quantitative studies were included in the current SLR; studies with qualitative and mixed approach were excluded. Third, the review included studies from the year 2010 to the period of December 2023 and excluded the studies that had been published before 2010. The year 2010 was selected as the lower cutoff point because it marks the period when radicalization research began to incorporate digital, psychological, and socio‐political dimensions, coinciding with the global expansion of social media and the emergence of new forms of online extremism. In addition, the number of empirical studies published before this period were relatively low, and those that did exist were largely context‐specific and lacked the multidimensional perspective necessary for the present review.
4.3. Implications of Current SLR
In the current SLR, we identified some risk factors for radicalization, which help us to understand, prevent, and benefit from intervention programs for radicalized individuals. It would be beneficial for the parents to adopt appropriate parenting styles to nurture a well‐rounded personality in the children. Furthermore, this systematic review may assist the counselor and therapist in gaining a deeper understanding of the mindset of a radicalized individual. It may be useful for developing various de‐radicalization policies and programs. At the meso level, the current SLR would be effective for developing laws to restrict discrimination and stereotypes among different communities. In addition, this review will also help in providing women with knowledge about radicalization and may help in preventing their engagement in radical activities. Also, it would be beneficial in educational settings for growing knowledge among students and teachers, which may restrict the expansion and development of homegrown radicalization ideologies. The government should not socially categorize people based on ethnicity and religion, and must place importance on fostering a sense of nationalism. Empirical investigations have suggested that nationalism can function as a protective factor against RVE. Because when individuals perceive themselves as valued members of a cohesive national community, irrespective of their ethnic, religious, or cultural differences, they are more likely to develop a sense of belonging, stakeholdership, and shared purpose. This form of inclusive nationalism often leads to a common identity and shadows the narrower, exclusivist identities (Echelmeyer et al. 2023).
The included studies also indicated that individuals who have experienced social alienation, discrimination, and marginalization are more vulnerable to radical ideologies that may provide them a purpose to engage in RVE. On the other hand, fostering an inclusive national identity may lower these vulnerabilities by enhancing social cohesion, mutual respect, and collective efficacy (Moghaddam 2005; Lyons‐Padilla et al. 2015). Therefore, every society must strive to operate on ideals and laws that ensure equal opportunities, justice, and recognition for all communities and individuals. By emphasizing equality and shared citizenship, governments can reduce intergroup polarization and undermine the appeal of extremist narratives that exploit religious or ethnic divisions.
5. Conclusion
The present systematic review contributes to the literature on radicalization and violent extremism by systematically examining the role of different risk factors. Family dysfunction, personality factors, psychopathology, cognitive factors such as moral disengagement, cognitive inflexibility, conspiracy beliefs, perceived discrimination, social identity, and some moderators and mediating risk factors for radicalization are identified. In addition, in this SLR, authors analyze the status of women in radicalization, and the role of some psychological traits such as self‐esteem, self‐efficacy, self‐control, trait of forgiveness, and trait of entitlement in radicalization. The present SLR offers a valuable contribution to current efforts by highlighting the multiple domains, several risk factors, and some mediating and moderating factors that affect radicalization.
Author Contributions
The first author contributed to reviewing the empirical assessment, risk of bias assessment, data extraction, manuscript checking, editing, and grammatical checking. The second author was involved in the systematic reviewing process, including correcting, revising, and synthesizing the studies, as well as writing the manuscript.
Funding
The authors have nothing to report.
Ethics Statement
The authors have nothing to report.
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
Acknowledgments
The first author would like to acknowledge IOE and BHU for providing a conducive environment for conducting quality research, and the second author would like to acknowledge UGC for providing the research fellowship.
Data Availability Statement
Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analyzed during the current study.
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Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analyzed during the current study.
