

Strange Bedfellows: The History of Collaboration Between the Massachusetts Restaurant Association and the Tobacco Industry

ABSTRACT

Objectives. This article examines the historical relationship between the tobacco industry and the Massachusetts Restaurant Association, a nonprofit trade association aligned with the food and beverage industry.

Methods. The study analyzed data from Web-based tobacco industry documents, public relations materials, news articles, testimony from public hearings, requests for injunctions, court decisions, economic impact studies, handbooks, and private correspondence.

Results. Tobacco industry documents that became public after various state lawsuits reveal that a long history of collaboration exists between the Massachusetts Restaurant Association and the tobacco industry. For more than 20 years, their joint efforts have focused primarily on the battle to defeat state and local laws that would restrict smoking in public places, particularly in beverage and food service establishments. The resources of the tobacco industry, combined with the association's grassroots mobilization of its membership, have fueled their opposition to many state and local smoke-free restaurant, bar, and workplace laws in Massachusetts.

Conclusions. The universal opposition of the Massachusetts Restaurant Association to smoking bans in food and beverage establishments is a reflection of its historic relationship with the tobacco industry. (*Am J Public Health*. 2001;91:598-603)

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The Massachusetts Restaurant Association ("the Association"), a nonprofit trade organization associated with the food and beverage industry in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, was incorporated in February 1934.¹ According to its informational materials, the Association advocates for the interests of its members at the state and local levels, organizes annual trade shows, supports "food recycling" programs to supply edible food from restaurants and colleges to needy and homeless persons in participating communities, helps to sponsor "school-to-career" programs that provide interested high school students with paid internships and trained food service industry worksite mentors, and engages in various other activities that allow it to fulfill its mission, which is "to protect and improve the food and beverage industry."² The Association's membership exceeds 2000, and it represents "over 7000 restaurants and all phases of the food service industry" throughout Massachusetts.²

On the basis of information collected from archives of tobacco industry documents available as a result of various state class-action lawsuits, the Association is also an ally of the tobacco industry. Since the mid-1970s, the tobacco industry and the Association have worked together to defeat regulations to restrict smoking in public places, workplaces, restaurants, and bars. However, the Association has downplayed its relationship with "Big Tobacco." The *Boston Globe* published an article about the relationship between the Association and the tobacco industry on May 3, 1999, and a connection was admitted by Bruce Potter, the Association's director of membership services, but only insofar as the tobacco industry "might sponsor an event . . . that's all."³ According to the *Boston Globe*, Potter also acknowledged that "Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds Tobacco," the nation's top 2 cigarette makers, "are dues-paying members, but . . . their role is entirely passive."³ However, tobacco industry documents

reveal that much more than a "passive" relationship exists between the Association and the tobacco industry.

In this article, we examine the history of collaboration between the Massachusetts Restaurant Association and the tobacco industry, and we discuss numerous documents that demonstrate the scope of this alliance. Contrary to public statements made by the Association that it is working independently of the interests of the tobacco industry, documentary evidence proves that the Association helps to mask the true extent of tobacco industry activity in Massachusetts. In addition, the documents show that the tobacco industry is engaged in similar relationships with restaurant associations in other American states. Therefore, state and local lawmakers, as well as local boards of health, must realize that when restaurant associations oppose anti-smoking legislation, they do so primarily because they are allies of the tobacco industry.

Methods

Data were collected from the following sources: tobacco industry documents released as a result of various state class-action lawsuits (<http://www.tobaccoarchive.com>), public relations materials, news articles, testimony from public hearings, requests for injunctions, court decisions, economic impact studies, handbooks, private correspondence, and additional public records.

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Results

1978: Ballot Question 8

The relationship between the Massachusetts Restaurant Association and the tobacco industry spans more than 20 years. In October 1978, the Association and the tobacco industry joined forces to oppose Question 8, a non-binding ballot initiative that could have restricted smoking in public places to clearly marked, enclosed areas.⁴ In a memorandum regarding Question 8, the Tobacco Institute, an industry political and public relations organization, indicated that low industry visibility had to be maintained and that “any public approach should be directed through locally based allies, such as the Massachusetts Restaurant Association, and not through either the Tobacco Institute or the member companies.”⁴ The Tobacco Institute estimated that it would cost less than \$50,000 to mobilize groups to fight this initiative in communities throughout the state, and they used the Association to direct this opposition.⁴

The Tobacco Institute, with “concerned citizens of the Massachusetts Hotel and Restaurant industry,” formed “a political committee,” Independent Citizens for an Effective Government, to “fund the opposition to the referendum.”⁵ Dennis Dyer, the public affairs manager for the Tobacco Institute, was appointed the treasurer of the committee, while Stephen Elmont became the chairman.⁵ Elmont was the president of the “Soups On” restaurant chain, a nonsmoker, and the incoming president of the Association.⁵ Question 8, which would have required district representatives to vote for legislation to ban or restrict indoor smoking in public places, was defeated.

1984: Restaurant Restrictions in Boston

In March 1984, the State Activities Division of the Tobacco Institute compiled a report on a number of smoking restriction laws that were being proposed in the Massachusetts legislature, as well as those being considered by local governments and boards of health across the state.⁶ For example, at the state level, bill S.1382, which called for the self-extinguishing of smoking materials in public places, was “killed in the Senate . . . on recommendation of [the] Joint Public Safety [Committee].”⁶ It was also reported that there was “good news in Boston,” where the city council “accepted the Government Operations Committee’s unanimous ‘ought not to pass’ recommendation on [a] restaurant [smoking] restriction measure.”⁶

According to the Tobacco Institute, “solid coalition building sunk [sic] Boston restaurant restriction ordinance . . . [the] Government Operations Committee hearing [was] attended by

[the] Chamber of Commerce, [the] Massachusetts Restaurant Association, [the] Greater Boston Restaurant Association, [the] Massachusetts Hotel/Motel Association, two-thirds of the major Boston hotels as well as 30 of the City’s major restaurants.”⁶ The defeat of the proposed restaurant smoking restrictions was aided by the testimony of the “President of Boston’s oldest restaurant,” who “experimented with voluntary ‘no smoking’ sections” and whose “two month test yielded only two ‘no smoking’ requests from 17,000 customers.”⁶

1985: Clean Indoor Air Acts

The Massachusetts legislature began to consider major clean indoor air legislation in the 1970s, and in 1975 it passed a law to regulate smoking in public elevators, supermarkets, museums, libraries, hospitals, and nursing homes and on trains, airplanes, single-car public transportation, and transportation provided by the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority.⁷ By February 1985, no further restrictions had been passed at the state level, but a \$0.05 tobacco tax increase was enacted in 1982.⁷ Tobacco industry documents reveal that the industry was very successful in influencing the state legislative process during this period. In a 1985 memorandum, the Tobacco Action Network, an organization that furthers the political interests of the tobacco industry, stated that “historically, the industry has been successful by keeping tobacco issues off the floor. Legislative leadership changes effected in 1985 may limit our ability to keep legislation off the floor. A floor vote in either house would be, at best, a very narrow and difficult win for the industry.”⁷

To help fight clean indoor air laws in the state legislature, the Tobacco Action Network created an elaborate plan of action that included direct lobbying, fostering legislative support, and creating alliances with businesses in Boston and throughout the state.⁷ The Massachusetts Restaurant Association figured prominently in the tobacco industry’s plan, as did hospitality associations, chambers of commerce, and organized labor. According to the Tobacco Action Network, “the education of their members and direct lobbying of legislators is the aid we seek from these groups,” as well as contacting of subsidiaries, suppliers, and advertisers within Massachusetts to secure their early opposition to this legislation.⁷ As an added boon, tobacco industry support in the form of materials or services would be almost impossible for the state to track because many of “the actions requested herein do not require the participants to register as legislative agents [or] lobbyists.”⁷

1986–1989: Opposing Smoking Restrictions

The Association and the tobacco industry continued their joint opposition to state and local clean indoor air legislation, as well as to workplace and restaurant smoking restrictions, through the end of the 1980s.^{8–10} One state-level smoking restriction bill, H.3697, that was in its third reading in the Senate in October 1987 was the target of pro-tobacco intervention; the “[Tobacco Institute] staff and legislative counsel continue[d] to work closely with the [Association] to defeat this bill.”⁹ The bill, which passed, required nonsmoking sections in restaurants, but it did not mandate the size of those sections.

Similar activities were mentioned in a Tobacco Institute report issued in September 1989 that discussed an Institute pilot program designed to reduce stringent smoking restrictions in 3 localities in eastern Massachusetts—Somerville, Malden, and Braintree—to the level of the state’s statute requirements.¹⁰ The Tobacco Institute, if successful in these efforts, planned to attempt to enact comparable restaurant restriction “rollbacks” in additional cities.¹⁰ Even though the Tobacco Institute admitted that “in reality, most of these laws have been in place for a number of years” with “little impact [on restaurant businesses] and no legal ramifications,” it was still determined to reverse these laws.¹⁰

Likewise, the Association knew that restaurants in these 3 cities experienced “little impact,” yet it still led this rollback effort, with the support of local restaurant owners and managers.¹⁰ However, “the function of the [Tobacco] Institute” was “limited to resources and organizational activities,” because “direct tobacco contact with this effort would have a negative impact on its ultimate outcome.”¹⁰

1990–1992: Economic Downturn

Although the Massachusetts economy was booming in the early and mid-1980s, an economic downturn began in 1988 that left the state with little option but to raise taxes. This fiscal reality was anticipated in a 1990 memorandum of the Tobacco Institute that foresaw an increase in tobacco taxes as inevitable for 2 reasons: first, because the industry had successfully defeated “proposed increases during the past eight years while all other taxes increased,” and second, because a Democratic legislature would be “looking for minimal cost legislation that looks progressive,” which could “prove to be a problem for the tobacco industry.”¹¹

To counter these “problems,” the Tobacco Institute created a detailed plan of action for 1991 that ranged from the coordination of efforts with the legislature and Republican Gov-

ernor William Weld's administration to the cultivation of alliances with organized labor, business associations, chambers of commerce, and other potentially interested parties.¹¹ The Tobacco Institute's plan of action contained a number of "Pro-Active Proposals" with section headings such as "State Tax Plan," "Hiring Discrimination," "Indoor Air Quality," "Minors," and "Restaurant Restriction Rollback."¹¹ Each proposal listed the coalition allies that needed to be developed or called upon, as well as the specific tobacco industry resources that had to be accessed or minimized to successfully implement the proposals.¹¹

As "the primary sponsor" of these efforts, the Massachusetts Restaurant Association figured prominently in the tobacco industry's planned restaurant restriction rollbacks.¹¹ Once again, tobacco industry involvement was limited to "resources and organizational activities," such as providing the Association with smoker mailing lists, letters to local officials, and telephone scripts.¹¹ However, the Tobacco Institute also used its own public affairs organization to "assist the local business people and coordinate a media campaign."¹¹

In 1990, Philip Morris launched the "It's the Law" campaign, which claimed to be aimed at curbing tobacco sales to minors.¹² Educational, training, and display materials were distributed to retailers in all 39 states where the minimum age to purchase cigarettes was 18 or 19 years. The Association was one of the 3 cosponsors of this program in Massachusetts.¹² In addition, the Association was listed as a general source of support for tobacco industry activities, specifically as a "state co-sponsor/participant" in 1991 and 1993, as indicated on in-house directories of Philip Morris allies.^{13,14}

The Association also worked closely with the tobacco industry in 1992, when it provided witnesses and community attendees for a hearing in Marlborough. The Marlborough Board of Health considered a ban on couponing, self-service sales, and advertising on public transportation, as well as vending machine restrictions.¹⁵ In the same year, the Tobacco Institute purchased "prime advertising space" in the Association membership directory, which was distributed to members and allied members constituting "75% of the buying power in the restaurant industry throughout the state."¹⁶

1993–1995: A Uniform Statewide Solution to the Smoking Issue

Many New England states, as well as localities within these states, considered adopting restaurant smoking bans in the early 1990s. In response to the US Environmental Protection Agency's report on the dangers of exposure to secondhand smoke, released in January 1993, some New England restaurant owners

made their establishments smoke free to assuage liability concerns.¹⁷ Other restaurateurs found support through Philip Morris' "Accommodation Program," a nonprofit program designed to address restaurant owners' concerns about tobacco smoke.¹⁷ A free Accommodation Program packet that was sent to restaurateurs included signage to clearly demarcate smoking and nonsmoking sections, information on heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) upgrades to provide cleaner air in these establishments, a toll-free hotline staffed by HVAC engineers, and other materials that would address these issues and would also discourage restaurateurs from making their establishments smoke free.¹⁷

In August 1993, Philip Morris stated that "restaurant owners know what their customers need and want, and they should be free to accommodate all of their customers as best they can. Feedback from restaurant owners that have been using the [Accommodation] program has been very positive."¹⁷

In December 1993, the Massachusetts Senate considered bill S.458, a "unified statewide smoking bill that allows restaurant owners the freedom to determine their own smoking policies that accommodate all of their customers and does not handicap some restaurants and give advantages to others."¹⁸ The bill was supported by the Association for 2 reasons: it gave restaurateurs the power to decide how to handle the issue of smoking in their establishments, and it would have preempted all local restaurant smoking restrictions, which were generally much more stringent than S.458. Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, and the Tobacco Institute issued a statement of support for S.458, stating that they "recognize the danger of government intervention and the competitive issues that [restaurants] are faced with" but that the bill was "common sense legislation that will simplify and unify state law while giving back policy making power to the private sector."¹⁸

The Association's executive summary on S.458 contained a question-and-answer section, so that its spokespeople would know how to address certain issues that would arise in interviews. One section of the executive summary directed spokespeople to avoid answering the question "Are you being used as a front group for the tobacco industry?" and instead to redirect the focus to S.458.¹⁸ If asked, "Is your whole effort being bankrolled by the tobacco industry?" they were instructed to say, "No, but we certainly would encourage and appreciate any support the tobacco industry and anybody else for that matter can provide to help us get this legislation passed."¹⁸ As for questions on statewide smoking bans and separate section restrictions, the spokespeople were to respond that the Association was "opposed to any kind of mandates."¹⁸

Statewide preemption bill S.458 did not pass, and communities throughout Massachusetts continued to consider and enact local restrictions and bans on restaurant smoking during 1994 and 1995. Consequently, the Association continued to oppose these smoking restrictions and bans and supported a statewide preemption bill so that the playing field would be level for all restaurants in the state.¹⁹ In a March 1994 article in the *Boston Globe*, Cynthia Eid, a spokesperson for the Association, stated that restaurant owners would welcome "a national smoking ban, if only because it will be uniform from town to town, city to city, state to state."²⁰ However, once Peter Christie, the executive vice president of the Association, succeeded Eid as the organization's primary public voice, the Association no longer advocated for a national smoking ban.

Instead, Christie championed a statewide uniform legislative solution to the smoking issue that would allow restaurant owners to "reasonably accommodate" all of their patrons while establishing policy consistency throughout Massachusetts.^{19,21} Christie and the Association endorsed Senate bill S.508 in 1995, a statewide bill that mandated that restaurant owners make at least 60% of their seating nonsmoking and no more than 40% of their seating smoking, with any restaurant owner allowed to go smoke free if he or she so chose.^{21,22} S.508 would have preempted local legislative activity on the smoking issue and required that any changes to the statewide law be made only by city councils or township supervisors, "as opposed to local boards of health across the state."²² This bill later died in the Committee on Senate Rules.

At this time, the legislature also considered bill S.514, which would have "preempt[ed] local decision-making authority by imposing a complete ban on smoking in restaurants" throughout Massachusetts.²² S.514 failed to pass in the Senate. According to a news article written by Christie, "if we must have a law dealing with smoking in restaurants and bars, [the Association] prefers the uniform compromise. It is far more rational and accommodating than an outright ban, and most importantly, leaves the decision up to the restaurant owner[s] based on the needs of their customers."²²

1996: An Economic Impact Study, a Congressional Report, and a Public Relations Campaign

In 1996, the Association and the tobacco industry jointly commissioned InContext, an "information company" based in Washington, DC, to conduct a study on the economic impact of smoking restrictions on restaurants in 23 cities and towns in Massachusetts.^{23,24} The towns included in the study had passed smok-

ing bans or restrictions between 1993 and 1995. InContext concluded that, with few exceptions, restaurant smoking bans were detrimental to business, and this was demonstrated by the study's finding that the highest losses of restaurant jobs typically were concentrated in those Massachusetts communities with the strictest restaurant smoking restrictions.²⁴

InContext and the Association did not mention, in either the study's executive summary or in any of the publicity for the report, that restaurants in 5 "college towns" also participated in the study. College towns were defined as "those communities where the transient student population exceeds ten percent of the town's permanent population base."²⁴ When restaurant smoking bans in every college town positively correlated with a significant increase in restaurant jobs, from 20% to 70%, depending on the specific town, these results were excluded from the publicized study findings. According to InContext, "for college-town restaurants both the seasonal cycle and the non-local customer target base are derivative of the local higher education facility, not the local economy," so there was "no meaningful correlation" between smoking restrictions and restaurant job gains in college towns.²⁴

The Association and InContext did not admit that any tobacco company or organization was involved in the financing, design, or production of the Massachusetts economic impact study, but several tobacco industry documents reveal that the Association, InContext, and the tobacco industry collaborated on this project. A Philip Morris memorandum dated March 1, 1996, stated that J. Dunham of Philip Morris "met with Bill Lilley," the chairman and cofounder of InContext, "to develop a methodology for determining the economic impact of restaurant smoking bans . . . [and] started work on [a] Massachusetts restaurant ban study."²⁵ A Philip Morris memorandum dated March 8, 1996, stated that Dunham "continued to work with Bill Lilley on [a] study showing [the] economic impact of restaurant smoking bans. Met with Bill Lilley and Matt Paluszek to discuss [a] similar study for Massachusetts . . . conference call scheduled for next Thursday with Matt Paluszek, Mass. Restaurant Assn, and Bill Lilley."²⁶

In January 1996, the Association and the tobacco industry were joint proponents of study results released by the Congressional Research Service, a "non-partisan research component of the United States Congress" that "responds to inquiries from Congressional offices by providing statistical and historical research for the policy objectives of legislators."²⁷ The Congressional Research Service study, titled "Environmental Tobacco Smoke and Lung Cancer Risk," examined the same 30 studies that the Environmental Protection Agency analyzed

in its 1993 report on the health risks associated with exposure to secondhand smoke.²⁸ According to an Association press release that was "sent to 175 newspapers and used for a radio talk show pitch," the study concluded that "the statistical evidence does not appear to support a conclusion that there are substantial health effects of passive smoking," and "it is clear that misclassification and recall bias plague [environmental tobacco smoke] epidemiology studies."²⁸

However, Edward Sweda, the senior attorney for the Tobacco Products Liability Project in Boston, offered a different interpretation of the Congressional Research Service study in an article published in the *Middlesex News* on January 28, 1996. In this article, Sweda quoted passages from the study that contradicted the Association pro-tobacco interpretation of the report.²⁹ He also accused Christie and other "pro-tobacco apologists" of manipulating the study results in an attempt to "deflect public awareness away from the central issue: should nonsmokers . . . be forced . . . to breathe the poisons contained in secondhand tobacco smoke?"²⁹ In spite of arguments to the contrary, the Association used its interpretation of the study to urge town leaders to support the policy of accommodation for smokers instead of restricting or banning smoking at the local level.²⁸

At the end of 1996, the Tobacco Institute mailed out materials for the "It's the Law" campaign, which was supposed to educate retailers about the illegality of tobacco sales to minors.³⁰ Flyers were distributed to retailers, for use by employees, that explained the law, how to ask for identification, and what to do if a customer refused to produce identification.³⁰ The "It's the Law" packets also included order forms for materials, such as point-of-purchase signs and buttons, that were specific to each retailer's state.³⁰ In Massachusetts, the Association was listed as one of the 4 "cooperating organizations" for the Tobacco Institute's "It's the Law" public relations campaign.³⁰

1997–1999: A Mixture of Success and Failure

A July 1997 "issues update" report by RJ Reynolds discussed a number of smoking restrictions that were being considered by local boards of health throughout Massachusetts.³¹ This report indicated that RJ Reynolds "met with [the Association] on July 8 to discuss alternatives to present to the [Wakefield] Board of Health," because restaurant owners wanted to change a 2-year-old smoking ban in this town.³¹ An October 1997 issues update mentioned actions related to smoking bans and restrictions pending in 17 different localities throughout Massachusetts.³² For example, Am-

herst, South Hadley, and Northampton conferred on the passage of a regional ban on smoking in bars to supplement the restaurant smoking restrictions that already existed in these towns.³² Again, the restaurant industry figured prominently in the opposition to these ordinances.³²

Local smoking bans and restrictions continued to occupy the attention of boards of health, the Massachusetts Restaurant Association, and the tobacco industry in 1998. An April 1998 internal memorandum between employees of RJ Reynolds indicated that "our partisans are prepared to challenge the [Falmouth] Board of Health with a series of questions and have speakers prepared to speak in opposition to the article [to ban smoking in restaurants], including restaurant owners, citizens, and the Chamber of Commerce."³³ The same week in April, RJ Reynolds also noted that they were "working with the [Association] to notify all partisans of [a] hearing [in Worcester on proposed new smoking restrictions] and [we] have a meeting on 4/21 at Tweed's Restaurant to prepare for the hearing."³³ The 1998 president of the Massachusetts Restaurant Association, Jim Donoghue, who joined the Association in 1982 and had been a member of its board since 1989, owned Tweed's Restaurant.³⁴

In July 1998, the Association challenged the Boston Public Health Commission's ban on smoking in restaurants.³⁵ These restrictions had been adopted on March 19 and were scheduled to go into effect on September 30, 1998 (Lori Fresina, American Cancer Society [lfresina@cancer.org], e-mail, September 25, 1998). The Association filed a preliminary injunction against the new smoking regulations in Boston, claiming that (1) the regulations were not "reasonable" under Massachusetts general law 111 s.31, (2) the health commission considered economics in making the decision when it had only the authority to consider health, and (3) the regulations were "unconstitutionally vague" (Lori Fresina, American Cancer Society [lfresina@cancer.org], e-mail, August 31, 1998). On September 25, 1998, Judge Mitchell J. Sikora Jr of the Suffolk Superior Court ruled against the Association, denying its application for an injunction against the health commission's smoking regulations (Lori Fresina, American Cancer Society [lfresina@cancer.org], e-mail, September 30, 1998). In spite of the efforts of the Association and the tobacco industry to block the Boston smoking restrictions, they went into effect as scheduled. The health commission's smoking regulations made more than 1400 restaurants in Boston smoke free and restricted smoking to the bar areas of an additional 200 restaurants (Lori Fresina, American Cancer Society [lfresina@cancer.org], e-mail, September 30, 1998).

In 1999, many communities throughout Massachusetts, such as Northampton, considered the passage of smoking restrictions and bans, while others, such as Amherst, faced tremendous opposition to bans that had already been enacted.³⁶ The Association was an active participant in the opposition to the Northampton workplace smoking ban because bars were included in the scope of the ban. At the July 20, 1999, public hearing before the Northampton Board of Health, Andrea Bolton, the Association's legislative coordinator, referred to the proposed ban as "ludicrous." Bolton stated that "this kind of ban will wreak havoc. It will negatively affect these bars."

However, during her commentary, Bolton failed to address the earlier testimony of W. A. R., a tobacco policy researcher at the University of Massachusetts, who discussed the results of the 1996 Massachusetts Restaurant Association/Philip Morris/InContext economic impact study as they related to Northampton. The researcher speculated that because a restaurant smoking ban in Northampton had resulted in a 20% increase in restaurant jobs in 1996, a bar smoking ban in Northampton might have a similarly positive economic impact on the city's bar business. One year after this public hearing, Northampton had not yet adopted a workplace smoking ban.

Conclusions

The Massachusetts Restaurant Association and the tobacco industry have been allies in the battle against state and local smoking restrictions in Massachusetts for several decades. Multitudes of tobacco industry documents testify to the lengthy history of collaboration between the 2 parties. The Association and the tobacco industry have joined forces to sponsor and oppose tobacco-related bills in the Massachusetts legislature and in localities across the state and have collaborated on local restaurant restriction rollbacks.

The close political association between the Association and the tobacco industry has been mutually beneficial. The Association has helped to conceal the tobacco industry's state and local political activity in exchange for a variety of industry resources. Public documents also reveal that the tobacco industry has cultivated similar relationships with restaurant associations in states other than Massachusetts.^{25,26} However, using information contained in tobacco industry archives, health advocates and tobacco control activists across the country now have the power to oppose state and local pro-tobacco policy initiatives by publicly exposing the alliance that exists between the tobacco industry and state restaurant associations. □

Contributors

W.A. Ritch and M.E. Begay designed the study, collected the data, and wrote the paper.

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