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. 2006 Aug;41(4 Pt 2):1654–1676. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6773.2006.00570.x

Table 2.

HRT and NAT Analyses of Patient Safety Practices

Patient Safety Practice Analysis within HRT Frame Analysis within NAT Frame
Double-checking medications Incorporates redundancy Constrained by limits of social redundancy
Exemplifies a cultural norm Can hinder and delay problem detection
Creates formal procedures to assure reliability Can lower vigilance
Crew resource management (CRM) Enables people with critical expertise and information to make decisions Seeks to make risky technologies safer, not reduce their catastrophic potential
Facilitates flexible responses to unexpected situations Better suited for loosely coupled technologies
Incorporates reward systems and cultural norms that support speaking up to authority Relies on interpersonal communication skills; these are necessary but not sufficient to identify safety threats
Computerized physician order entry (CPOE) Provides a method for gathering error data for top managers May reduce interactive complexity, but will increase tight coupling
May hinder open communication among different professionals Reduces errors from simple component failures
Adds to risk of infrequent, high consequence errors affecting many patients
Illustrates limitations of redundancy “added on” to original design
Incident reporting Requires end to “culture of blame” “Politics of blame” hinders reporting
Relies on individual capacity to engage in valid sensemaking Incentives lacking for reporting incidents
Provides a method to integrate individual heedfulness with organizational-level assessment Promotes interorganizational exchange of safety-related reports
Enables top management to assess the big picture Pressures from the external environment may influence internal reward system and enhance (or inhibit) reporting
Root cause analysis (RCA) Fits HRO emphasis on learning from adverse events Constrained by difficulties of learning from adverse events
Supports sharing expertise from front lines Interpreting adverse events, their causes and solutions, can be shaped by political and personal interests
Works better in organizations with a culture of reliability Fosters overlooking problems that lack available solutions or ones preferred by management
Requires a reward system that does not blame or punish those involved in adverse events Identifying problems can be hindered by complexityand multiple layers of redundancy
Provides big picture to top management May lead participants to choose solutions based on ease of implementation

HRT, high reliability theory; NAT, normal accident theory