Table 2.
Patient Safety Practice | Analysis within HRT Frame | Analysis within NAT Frame |
---|---|---|
Double-checking medications | Incorporates redundancy | Constrained by limits of social redundancy |
Exemplifies a cultural norm | Can hinder and delay problem detection | |
Creates formal procedures to assure reliability | Can lower vigilance | |
Crew resource management (CRM) | Enables people with critical expertise and information to make decisions | Seeks to make risky technologies safer, not reduce their catastrophic potential |
Facilitates flexible responses to unexpected situations | Better suited for loosely coupled technologies | |
Incorporates reward systems and cultural norms that support speaking up to authority | Relies on interpersonal communication skills; these are necessary but not sufficient to identify safety threats | |
Computerized physician order entry (CPOE) | Provides a method for gathering error data for top managers | May reduce interactive complexity, but will increase tight coupling |
May hinder open communication among different professionals | Reduces errors from simple component failures | |
Adds to risk of infrequent, high consequence errors affecting many patients | ||
Illustrates limitations of redundancy “added on” to original design | ||
Incident reporting | Requires end to “culture of blame” | “Politics of blame” hinders reporting |
Relies on individual capacity to engage in valid sensemaking | Incentives lacking for reporting incidents | |
Provides a method to integrate individual heedfulness with organizational-level assessment | Promotes interorganizational exchange of safety-related reports | |
Enables top management to assess the big picture | Pressures from the external environment may influence internal reward system and enhance (or inhibit) reporting | |
Root cause analysis (RCA) | Fits HRO emphasis on learning from adverse events | Constrained by difficulties of learning from adverse events |
Supports sharing expertise from front lines | Interpreting adverse events, their causes and solutions, can be shaped by political and personal interests | |
Works better in organizations with a culture of reliability | Fosters overlooking problems that lack available solutions or ones preferred by management | |
Requires a reward system that does not blame or punish those involved in adverse events | Identifying problems can be hindered by complexityand multiple layers of redundancy | |
Provides big picture to top management | May lead participants to choose solutions based on ease of implementation |
HRT, high reliability theory; NAT, normal accident theory