ris/rid
|
probability that a focal group member will play INSIST if it is the ith member (in terms of time) that prefers to change activity and is either a subordinate (ris) or dominant (rid) |
(1−ris)/(1−rid) |
probability that a focal group member will play GIVE IN if it is the ith member (in terms of time) that prefers to change activity and is either a subordinate (1−ris) or dominant (1−rid) |
Ris/Rid
|
probability that an individual drawn at random from a population will play INSIST if it is the ith member (in terms of time) that prefers to change activity and is either a subordinate (Ris) or dominant (Rid) |
(1−Ris)/(1−Rid) |
probability that an individual drawn at random from a population will play GIVE IN if it is the ith member (in terms of time) that prefers to change activity and is either a subordinate (1−Ris) or dominant (1−Rid) |
B3/B2 |
expected grouping benefits gained by being in a group with three (B3) or two (B2) members |
C1 |
expected consensus costs if changing activity a bit too early or too late (in the case of symmetric costs in homogeneous groups) |
C2 |
expected consensus costs if changing activity much too early or too late (in the case of symmetric costs in homogeneous groups) |
Csmall
|
expected consensus cost arising through timing differences between the small- and medium-sized or between the large- and medium-sized group members in a heterogeneous group (assuming symmetric costs) |
Clarge
|
expected consensus cost arising through timing differences between the smallest and largest group members in a heterogeneous group (assuming symmetric costs) |
C1late
|
expected consensus costs if changing activity a bit too late (in the case of asymmetric costs in homogeneous groups) |
C2late
|
expected consensus costs if changing activity much too late (in the case of asymmetric costs in homogeneous groups) |
C1early
|
expected consensus costs if changing activity a bit too early (in the case of asymmetric costs in homogeneous groups) |
C2early
|
expected consensus costs if changing activity much too early (in the case of asymmetric costs in homogeneous groups) |