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. Author manuscript; available in PMC: 2008 May 27.
Published in final edited form as: Evolution. 2007 Aug 17;61(10):2281–2292. doi: 10.1111/j.1558-5646.2007.00196.x

Figure 1. Evolutionary dynamics of a two-player, two-strategy game.

Figure 1

The entries of the matrix specify the payoff for the row player. There are four possibilities: (i) if a > c and b > d, then strategy A dominates strategy B; (ii) if a > c and b < d, then both A and B are evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS); the game is bi-stable and is called a ‘coordination game’; (iii) if a < c and b > d, then both strategies are best replies to each other, and we have a Hawk-Dove game, where both strategies coexist; (iv) if a < c and b < d, then B dominates A.