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. 2009 Jan 13;276(1660):1379–1384. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2008.1546

Figure 4.

Figure 4

Examples of the pay-off matrices in the general n-player game. (a) Although the Malthusian fitness of A is positive when p=1/3, ρA<1/N. (b) The Malthusian fitness of A is positive when p=1/2, but ρA>ρB does not hold. (c) A is ESSN and B is not ESSN when 4≤N≤9. For 9<N<41, neither A nor B is ESSN and for N≥41, only B is ESSN. (d) Both A and B are traditional ESS, but neither A nor B is ESSN for large population size.