Table 2.
Projected changes in African civil war incidence to 2030, by emissions scenario
| Median % change | % increase in civil war relative to baseline | 5th–95th percentile observations of projected % increase | % of observations < 0 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A1B | ||||
| Model 1 | 5.9 | 53.7 | 6.2–119.4 | 3.0 |
| Model 2 | 6.1 | 55.8 | 2.7–128.8 | 4.1 |
| A2 | ||||
| Model 1 | 5.2 | 47.4 | 5.4–101.8 | 3.0 |
| Model 2 | 5.4 | 49.2 | 2.3–109.8 | 4.2 |
| B1 | ||||
| Model 1 | 4.8 | 43.4 | 5.0–99.4 | 3.0 |
| Model 2 | 5.0 | 45.1 | 2.0–107.1 | 4.2 |
Projections are for all of sub-Saharan Africa for 3 emissions scenarios, based on 10,000-run bootstrap of models 1 and 2 in Table 1, which combine uncertainty in climate model projections and in the responsiveness of conflict to climate. Eleven percent of the country-years in the 1981–2002 baseline experienced civil war.