Skip to main content
. Author manuscript; available in PMC: 2010 Jan 1.
Published in final edited form as: J financ econ. 2009 Jan;91(1):38–58. doi: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.12.006

Table 3. Range of efficiency and distributional consequences of unisex pricing.

Estimates are based on the model and algorithm described in Section 3. Columns labeled MWS refer to the high efficiency cost/low redistribution end of the range of possible consequences of a ban on gender-based pricing. This obtains if the market implements the Miyazaki (1977), Wilson (1977), Spence (1978) equilibrium when gender-based pricing is banned. Columns labeled SS refer to the zero efficiency cost/high redistribution end of the range. This obtains if the market implements a pooled-fair full insurance “Social Security-like” outcome when gender-based pricing is banned. The MWS contracts are computed using Eq. (5) and the risk type-distributions estimated in Table 1, pooled across genders. Columns (1)–(6) are computed using Eq. (14) and columns (9)–(10) are computed using Eq. (15).

Relative risk aversion Required per-person endowment needed to achieve utility level from non-categorizing equilibrium when categorization is allowed
Redistribution to women (W), per woman, % of endowment Efficiency cost per dollar of redistn
Women (EW) Men (EM) Total population(E) Efficiency cost as % of total endowment
MWS SS MWS SS MWS SS MWS SS MWS SS MWS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
γ=1 1.020 1.071 0.979 0.929 0.9996 1 0.038% 0% 2.08% 7.14 3.66%
γ=3 1.033 1.071 0.966 0.929 0.9998 1 0.025 0 3.39 7.14 1.45
γ=5 1.040 1.071 0.959 0.929 0.9998 1 0.018 0 4.06 7.14 0.89