What are the social processes? In particular, are they computationally distinct from those that process nonsocial information? Are there a set of processes that delineate the “social mind,” analogously to how there might be a set of structures for the “social brain”? Social psychology has generated a number of candidates, but it is unclear how these will be incorporated into a future social neuroscience. What is the social brain? Is there even a “social brain,” a set of structures specifying a neural system for processing social information? Key structures proposed include parts of the temporal cortex (fusiform gyrus, superior temporal gyrus, and sulcus) involved in aspects of social perception, medial prefrontal cortex and temporoparietal junction involved in theory of mind, and posterior cingulate and medial parietal cortex involved in perspective taking and self-reflection. Is there specialization for social processing below the systems level of question 2? Von Economo neurons, a particular morphological cell type found in frontoinsular cortex in apes and humans (as well as some whales and elephants) have been proposed to subserve the long-distance signaling that underlies integration of information from spatially distal parts of the brain necessary for social cognition (Allman et al., 2002). Oxytocin has been proposed as a key neuromodulator for affiliative social behaviors in mammals; receptor subtypes for several biogenic amines such as serotonin have also been noted to subserve important roles in social processing. These findings in particular have great promise for pharmacological intervention of psychiatric illnesses affecting social functioning. What social abilities might be impossible for humans? The flip-side of the question of which social abilities are unique to humans is the question of whether there is anything we could not learn to do. Could we all learn to live together in peace and cooperation, or would our very cognitive flexibility always preclude anything approaching eusocial collective behavior? This question could also be seen as related to a question about the bounds of cognitive and emotional regulation: if we realized the metacognitive need for a particular social behavior, do we have the control to implement it volitionally? How could we best change our social behavior? Questions 3 and 4 point toward this question but neglect the role of context and our power to modify our environment. Rather than trying to change the way our brains work, we could think about changing our environmental and social context so as to change our social behavior. Clever changes in public policies (such as incorporating neuroscience data together with tools from mechanism design to achieve optimal public goods compliance [Krajbich et al., 2009]), ubiquitous education, and strategic design of economic and political structures could all contribute toward such a goal in principle.
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