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. 2010 Nov 12;5(11):e13749. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0013749

Figure 1. The cooperation level declines to a low but non-zero level.

Figure 1

Fraction of cooperators in every round of the three parts of the experiment (in the first and the last ones players remain in the same node of the lattice along the whole experiment, whereas in the control part players are shuffled every round). Players are arranged in a Inline graphic lattice with periodic boundary conditions, and play a PD game with each of its 8 surrounding neighbors in the lattice. With the notation C for cooperation, D for defection, and Inline graphic for the payoff obtained by a player who plays X against an opponent who plays Y, the payoff matrix of each of these PD games is Inline graphic cents of a euro, Inline graphic cents, Inline graphic cents, and Inline graphic cents. These payoffs conform a weak PD game —the most favorable to promote cooperation— because Inline graphic. This setup is entirely similar to that of Nowak and May's simulations [5] except for the size of the lattice (simulations are performed on Inline graphic lattices, with Inline graphic) and the lack of self-interactions (see [17] for further comments).