Plato, St. Augustine, Descartes [all three on mind-body dualism; see Plato’s Phaedo (many editions), and Descartes on ‘mental substance’ ‘pensee’ or reflexive consciousness, (Descartes, 1644/1911), and Interactionism (Descartes, 1996)] Locke (rejecting ‘mental substance’; see Locke, 1688/1959) Hume (‘bundle concept’; see Hume, 1739/1888) Kant (critique of associationist approaches and stress on ‘phenomenal consciousness’; see Kant, 1787/1929) Berkeley (especially his Subjective Idealism; see Berkeley, 1710/1957) Leibniz (Parallelism; see Leibniz, 1720/1925) Spinoza, Gustav Fechner and W.K. Clifford (Double-Aspect Theories; see, for example, Spinoza, 1985; Clifford, 1879) as also Herbert Spencer and P.F. Strawson (1959) William James (‘stream of consciousness; see James, 1890/1999), Brentano (‘intentionality’; see Brentano, 1874/1924); Cabanis and older masters (Epiphenomenalism; see Cabanis, 1802) Vienna Circle, especially Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap (physicalism or extreme materialism; see Carnap et al., 1938) Edmund Husserl (Husserl, 1913/1931; 1929/1960), Martin Heidegger (Heidegger, 1927/1962) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962)—Phenomenology J.J.C. Smart (Smart, 1959, 1963) and H. Feigl (Feigl, 1958)—Identity theory Russell (‘sensibilia’; see Russell, 1914, 1918, 1921); A.J. Ayer (a type of neutral monism in Language, Truth and Logic; see Ayer, 1936) Geulincx and Malebranche (Occasionalism; see Geulincx, 1893; and Malebranche, 1997) Gilbert Ryle (‘the ghost in the machine’ in The Concept of Mind; see Ryle, 1949/2000) |
