Figure 3.

Uncovering strategic timescales for power and policers. (a,b) Periodogram and p-values, for the policing class—four top-quartile power individuals who effectively intervene impartially, and break up, conflicts. (e,f) Similarly, for the top quartile in power minus policers (n = 8). (c,d) Similarly, for the second power quartile (n = 12). (g,h) For the third power quartile (n = 12). In all cases, the demographic classes show significant deviations from the mixed-strategy null. In the policing class, and in the top power quartile, there is also significant deviation from daily forcing, suggesting that the timing of the decision to join or avoid a fight is strategic. There is also evidence of strategic timing, in particular, at the α-scale oscillations seen for the 47 socially mature individuals, when treated collectively (figure 1). (Online version in colour.)