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. Author manuscript; available in PMC: 2013 Jan 1.
Published in final edited form as: J Dev Econ. 2012 Jan 1;97(1):118–129. doi: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2010.12.003

Table 6.

Interaction between neighbor’s attendance and cash incentive.

Panel A: interaction with any incentive All (1) Females (2) Males (3)
% within 0–0.5 km 0.152** [0.074] 0.061 [0.140] 0.208** [0.102]
Any incentive 0.341*** [0.058] 0.287*** [0.101] 0.371*** [0.087]
Any incentive * % within 0–0.5 km band −0.064 [0.083] 0.000 [0.151] −0.100 [0.122]
Observations 2767 1508 1259
R-squared 0.220 0.220 0.228
F-stata 115.887 57.287 37.607
Panel B: quantifying cash and neighbor effects No neighbors (1) No incentive (2) Any incentive (3)

% Within 0–0.5 km 0.220** [0.089] 0.070 [0.056]
Any incentive 0.513*** [0.102]
Amount of incentive 0.126* [0.070] 0.119*** [0.016]
Observations 154 604 2163
R-squared 0.394 0.096 0.073
F-stata 84.88 189.71

Notes: The results present IV regressions, the instruments used are the percent of neighbors that received various amounts of the incentives that reside within a 500 m radius of the respondent. Robust standard errors are clustered by village. Additional controls not presented here but included in the regression include: age, age squared, HIV status, whether the individual got an incentive, as well as the amount of the incentive received (in USD), a simulated average distance to the HIV results center, a dummy variable indicating if the individual lives further than 1.5 km from the nearest VCT as well as district fixed effects. Asterisks denote the significance of the coefficients:

***

indicates significance at the 1% level;

**

significance at the 5% level; and

*

denotes significance at the 10% level.

a

The F-test statistics reported are the Wald Weak Identification F-test statistic (Kleibergen-Paap).