Table 10.
Direct attacks against the intelligent sensor (TOE)—threats expressed by enhanced generics.
| Prefix, mnemonic | Description |
|---|---|
| Threats against data sampled/measured by the sensor (TOE) | |
| TDA.DisruptSampling | Users or intruders [Sparam] could try to manipulate the sensor input [Dparam] causing wrong input data. |
| Direct attacks against data stored, processed and transferred by the sensor (TOE) | |
| TDA.NodeCompromise | Attacker [Sparam] can: eavesdrop the traffic, inject packets or replay older messages, because wireless communication generally is not secure. After the node compromising, all information it holds [Dparam] is known to the attacker and/or node operation or communication is broken [Dparam]. |
| TDA.Access | Users or intruders [Sparam] could try to access functions or data [Dparam] they are not allowed to. |
| TDA.SensorDataEavsdrop | Intruder [Sparam] eavesdrops sensor data [Dparam]. |
| TDA.SensDataMdfy | Intruder [Sparam] modifies sensor data (falsifies them) [Dparam]. |
| Threats exploiting vulnerabilities related to the restricted resources | |
| TDA.LimitResour | Exploiting vulnerability related to the node limited resources [Dparam], an intruder [Sparam] causes misbehavior, disconnection or faults within the system. |
| Threats against the sensor identity | |
| TDA.CloneNode | Attacker [Sparam] duplicates an operational node causing that both nodes (i.e., original and duplicated one of the same identity) are able to communicate with the given node. |
| TDA.ReplaceNode | Attacker [Sparam] steals (disables) operational nodes and replaces them with the malicious ones of falsified identities. |
| TDA.FabricateNode | Attacker [Sparam] adds a malicious node with fabricated identity to the network as an operational node. |
| TDA.SybilAttack | Attacker [Sparam] adds a malicious node presenting multiple identities, as if it were multiple nodes to control a considerable part of the system, breaching its redundancy. |
| Attacks against the security-related data | |
| TDA.PowAnalys | The power consumption of some microprocessors causes leakage of information during certain cryptographic operations. The attacker [Sparam] uses this information to substantially reduce the key space that needs to be considered in a brute-force search for the secret key [Dparam]. |
| TDA.SecDataLeakage | The attacker [Sparam] causes that security sensitive data (authentication data, keys, credentials etc.) [Dparam] leak out from the TOE. |
| Threats dealing with the sensor integrity | |
| TDA.Tamper | Intruder [Sparam] physically/logically compromises a sensor node to get assets [Dparam] or disrupt the node operation [Dparam]. |
| TDA.EnvironAttack | Intruders [Sparam] could compromise the sensor security through environmental attacks (thermal, electromagnetic, optical, chemical, mechanical). |
| TDA.PowerSupply | Users or intruders [Sparam] defeat the sensor security by modifying (cutting, reducing, increasing) its power supply [Dparam]. |
| Unforeseen natural catastrophes, emergencies and failures | |
| TDA.Faults | Faults caused by [Sparam] in hardware, software, communication procedures could place the sensor node in unforeseen conditions compromising its security. |