Table 15.

Enhanced generics representing security objectives.

Prefix, mnemonic	Description
Security objectives concerning mainly the TOE
OAVB.Reliability	The sensor must provide reliable service. Applying fault tolerance methods and techniques.
OAVB.ResUnderControl	Control resource [Dparam].
OINT.TamperResistance	The TOE guarantees its own physical/logical integrity. The means of detecting physical tampering must be provided (e.g., seals, tampering detection, special reinforced cases, intrinsically safe solutions).
OINT.Processing	The sensor must ensure that the processing of input to derive output data [Dparam] is accurate.
OINT.PowAnalResist	Solutions resistant to the simple/differential power analysis attacks (SPA/DPA) are implemented.
OINT.DataVerification	Verify that the data [Dparam] are valid.
OINT.AntiMalware	Specialized anti-malware software.
OIDA.ControlID	Using the properly managed unique identifiers of sensors [Dparam].
OIDA.Authentication	The sensor must authenticate connected entities.
OACC.Access	The sensor must control access of connected entities.
OCON.DataEncrypt	Encrypt the data [Dparam].
OCON.SecDataProt	When a node is turned off, no security material (such as a shared secret or a static public/private key) [Dparam] should have to be stored permanently in the non-volatile memory of the node (a pre-configured shared secret obviously does not satisfy this requirement).
OADT.Audit	The sensor must audit attempts to undermine its security and should trace them to the associated entities.
OSMN.SecManAdmin	The TOE will provide facilities to enable an authorized administrator [Sparam] to effectively manage the TOE and its security functions, and will ensure that only authorized administrators are able to access such functionality.
Security objectives concerning mainly the TOE operational environment
OAVB.SensorSysMain	The data [Dparam] sampled by the sensor-based acquisition/monitoring system [Dparam] checked by control authorities must be available and reflect fully and accurately the system objectives.
OAVB.RedundNodes	Apply redundant sensor nodes, allowing to lose nodes without any impact on the network (or network application) behavior as a whole.
OAVB.DataFreshness	Ensure that the message received [Dparam] is the message sent by the authorized source [Sparam] but not a replayed message sent by the intruder [Sparam].
OINT.MajorityVoting	Apply the majority voting scheme to determine the validity of an alarm raised by neighboring nodes based on their own measurement.
OINT.IdentCapVsNodeCap	Testing limited resource (radio communication capability). Assuming that a device can access only one radio channel at a time and checking that each identity has no less capability than a physical node (all identities have channels assigned and must send messages through them simultaneously; the system detects the attack when it receives no message in its channel).
OCON.CryptoScheme	Applying the cryptographic scheme (key management, operations) with respect to the existing communication resources.
OCON.CryptoBoundary	Setup the cryptographic boundary inside the TOE from where security sensitive data [Dparam] shall not leak. The boundary encompasses the TOE parts where security sensitive data are generated, stored, updated and used.
ODEX.MultipleCommPaths	Use redundant communication paths, specialized countermeasures (e.g., against blackholes, misdirection, wormholes), and controlling of the routing information.
ODEX.CommQuality	Avoidance of interference, blocked communication spaces, using specialized measures against jamming, collision and flooding.
OEIT.SecPerimVsTrRangeCtrl	The physically controlled security perimeter, where nodes are placed, should be defined with respect to the range of wireless transmission.
OEIT.IdentPositionVsNodePosition	Assuming that no identities are at the same position, checking the identity position versus the node position claiming this identity. Sensor measurements are credible when they can be associated with their physical locations.
OSMN.RegularInpections	The sensor must be periodically inspected and calibrated (if necessary).
OSMN.SecDatManag	Periodic changes to security data [Dparam] managed by [Sparam].
OSMN.NetAdmin	Network administration and security policy procedures implementation.
OSMN.UserAwarn	User awareness, proper operation regulations and procedures.
OSMN.PatientSecurity	The monitored patient is within the access-restricted area and the medical personnel or household members take care of her/him.
OSMN.HIPAA	The medical system should comply with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).
Security objectives concerning the site processes
OSMN.SiteProcess	Site processes encompassing the development-, manufacturing- and maintenance activities in the life cycle are properly defined, implemented and managed.