Table 5.
Empirical studies of the implications of patenting on incentive to invent new medicine
Authors/Ref.no. | Period | Setting (Country/medicines) | Objectives | Model | Method |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Grootendorst(2007)/ [42] |
1988-2002 |
Canada, prescription medicine expenditure |
The implications of patent policies (Bills C-22 and C-91) on medicine expenditure and on R&D activity |
Modelling |
1. Estimating the medicine expenditures as a function of year dummies and lagged public drug expenditures, while controlling for a vector of other covariates that could affect drug spending. 2.Estimating R&D expenditure whose patent policy changed as an influenced factor |
Hughes et al. (2002)/[43] |
2001 |
USA |
The effect of patent termination on current and future patients |
Modelling |
From models developed by various scholars during 1987–2002, five step models were estimated:1) the effect of patent termination on total revenue, 2) the effect of total revenue on R&D budget, 3) the effect of R&D budget on new medicine development, 4) the effect of new medicine on life year and 5) life year in monetary term |
Giaccotto C. et al. (2005)/[44] |
1980-2001 |
USA |
The effect of price control policy on number of new drugs |
Modelling |
Estimating the decreased R&D budget as a function of five main items (price, GDP, foreign sales, dummy variables representing the years for which the Kefauver-Harris amendment and the Waxman-Hatch Act). The value of forgone R&D was then used to calculate the number of forgone drugs by dividing with $802 million (cost of R&D per drug) |
Colleen (2003)/[45] | 1980-1990 | USA, six compulsory licensing (CL) medicines | The rate of innovation activities of pharmaceutical companies after CL | Observational study | Observing the rate of patenting and other measures of inventive activity five years before and after CL |