Table 6.
Synopsis of 11 successful infection control studies for CPE infections in nonendemic and endemic settings
| Reference | Study design | Health care setting and geographic region | Infection control measures |
Outcome | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Baseline | Additional | ||||
| Studies in regions where CPE are not endemic | |||||
| 110 | Retrospective | 36-bed ICU in a tertiary care hospital, Melbourne, Australia | 1. Surveillance of culture results | 1. Universal contact precautions in ICU | Decrease of CPE cases from 3 to 1 per month |
| 2. Standard precautions | 2. Single-room isolation of CPE patients (all wards) | ||||
| 3. Environmental cleaning | 3. Restriction of carbapenem use | ||||
| 122 | Retrospective | Abdominal surgery center, Paris, France | 1. Active surveillance for ESBLs | 1. Preemptive isolation of contact patients and newly admitted patients | Rapid control of the outbreak |
| 2. Isolation of CPE patients | 2. Dedicated nursing staff | ||||
| 3. Contact precautions | 3. Limited transfer of CPE patients | ||||
| 4. Environmental disinfection | 4. Antibiotic restriction policy (imipenem) | ||||
| 5. Active surveillance | 5. Screening campaign targeting contact patients discharged from the hospital | ||||
| 43 | Retrospective | 7 hospitals, Paris, France | 1. National early warning system for multiresistant isolates | 1. Cohorting of CPE cases and contacts | Rapid control of the outbreak |
| 2. Active surveillance for ESBLs | 2. Flagging of CPE cases | ||||
| 3. Active screening of contact patients | 3. Dedicated health care workers | ||||
| 4. Evaluation of duodenoscope disinfection practices | 4. Reinforcing hand hygiene and contact precautions | ||||
| 5. Limited transfer of CPE cases and contacts | |||||
| 6. Revision of duodenoscope disinfection procedure | |||||
| Studies in regions of endemicity | |||||
| 127 | Retrospective | 10-bed ICU in a tertiary care hospital, New York, NY | 1. Contact isolation of CPE patients | 1. Active surveillance for CPE on admission to ICU and weekly thereafter | Incidence decreased from 9.7 ± 2.2 to 3.7 ± 1.6 CPE cases per 1,000 patient-days |
| 2. Environmental cleaning | 2. ICU closure and disinfection | ||||
| 3. Infection control supervising | 3. Cohorting of CPE patients | ||||
| 4. Active surveillance for vancomycin-resistant enterococci and carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter | 4. Dedicated nursing staff 5. Promotion of hand hygiene |
||||
| 176 | Retrospective | 20-bed surgical ICU in a tertiary care hospital, Miami, FL | No data | 1. Point prevalence surveillance | Control of CPE spread |
| 2. Isolation and contact precautions for CPE patients | |||||
| 3. Dedicated nursing staff | |||||
| 4. Daily chlorhexidine baths on all patients | |||||
| 5. Environmental cleaning after every shift and evaluation with environmental cultures | |||||
| 6. Educational campaigns | |||||
| 177 | Retrospective | 70-bed long-term acute care hospital, Chicago, IL | 1. Active surveillance on admission | 1. Active surveillance cultures for CPE and point prevalence surveys during the intervention | Colonization prevalence of CPE decreased progressively, from 21% to 12, 6, 3, and 0% |
| 2. Baseline point prevalence surveillance | 2. Isolation and contact precautions for CPE patients | ||||
| 3. Preemptive isolation of high-risk patients | |||||
| 4. Environmental cultures and enhanced environmental cleaning | |||||
| 5. Daily chlorhexidine baths for all patients | |||||
| 6. Educational campaign | |||||
| 83 | Retrospective | Long-term acute care hospital, South Florida | No data | 1. Active surveillance culture | Termination of the outbreak |
| 2. Point prevalence survey | |||||
| 3. Isolation and contact precautions for CPE patients | |||||
| 4. Dedicated nursing staff and equipment | |||||
| 106 | Retrospective | Tertiary care hospital, Puerto Rico | No data | 1. Contact precautions for CPE patients | Control of the outbreak |
| 2. Cohorting of CPE patients | |||||
| 3. Dedicated nursing staff | |||||
| 4. Hand hygiene audits | |||||
| 5. ICU closure | |||||
| 6. Restriction of broad-spectrum antibiotics | |||||
| 7. Active surveillance on admission to high-risk units (ICU, diabetes ward) and weekly thereafter | |||||
| 15 | Retrospective | Tertiary care hospital, Tel Hashomer, Israel | 1. Contact precautions for CPE cases | 1. Active surveillance on admission to ICU and in step-down units and weekly thereafter | Incidence decreased from 6.93 to 1.8 CPE cases per 10,000 patient-days |
| 2. In other departments, active surveillance of patients with epidemiologic links to CPE carriers | |||||
| 3. Daily reporting of CPE cases to hospital manager and the national coordinator | |||||
| 53 | Prospective intervention study | Tertiary care hospital, Rehovot, Israel | No data | 1. Active surveillance on admission to ICU, in roommates of new CPE cases or carriers, and in patients at high risk for carriage | Incidence decreased from 8.2 to 0.5 CPE case per 10,000 patient-days |
| 2. Isolation-cohorting and contact precautions for CPE cases and carriers | |||||
| 3. Dedicated nursing staff | |||||
| 4. Environmental cleaning and disinfecting during hospital stay and after discharge | |||||
| 5. Education and training to all medical staff members, patients, and caregivers | |||||
| 6. Automatic warning system | |||||
| 234 | Prospective intervention study | 27 acute care hospitals, Israel | No data | 1. Isolation-cohorting and contact precautions for CPE patients and carriers | Monthly incidence decreased from 55.5 to 11.7 CPE cases per 100,000 patient-days |
| 2. Dedicated nursing staff and equipment | |||||
| 3. Mandatory reporting to public health authorities of every CPE case | |||||
| 4. Establishment of Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance and Infection Control | |||||