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. 2013 Feb 23;9(1):20120878. doi: 10.1098/rsbl.2012.0878

Table 1.

Factors explaining the cooperative investment of helpers. Full models included the observation period (before or after takeover) and the type of takeover (inheritance or dispersal) as fixed factors, the interaction and the individual identity as random factor. All displayed models are based on N = 80 observations on n = 16 individuals.

estimate t/z-value p-value
territory defence against predators
 intercept 0.38 ± 0.18 2.13 0.04
 period (before/after takeover) 0.92 ± 0.24 3.80 <0.001
 takeover type (inheritance/dispersal) 0.56 ± 0.22 2.50 0.03
 period × takeover type −0.83 ± 0.32 −2.60 0.01
territory defence against conspecifics
 intercept −0.78 ± 0.31 −2.54 0.01
 period (before/after takeover) −0.80 ± 0.40 −2.00 0.046
 takeover type (inheritance/dispersal)a −0.62 ± 0.53 −1.18 0.24
 period × takeover typea −1.07 ± 0.92 −1.155 0.25
territory maintenance
 intercept 0.19 ± 0.0.20 0.91 0.36
 period (before/after takeover) 0.69 ± 0.17 4.00 <0.001
 takeover type (inheritance/dispersal)a −0.03 ± 0.36 −0.08 0.94
 period × takeover typea 0.02 ± 0.35 0.05 0.96

aThese terms are displayed with the parameter estimates at the point they were dropped from the model.