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. 2013 Feb 20;3(2):e002112. doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2012-002112

Table 1.

Healthcare network implications of primary care-led commissioning organisations

Coordinating mechanism Key features Governance and autonomy
(Ham, Smith and Eastmure 2011; Ham 2008) (Mannion 2011; Checkland, Coleman, Harrison et al 2009) (Curry, Goodwin, Naylor, et al 2008; Smith and Goodwin 2002)
General practitioner fundholding scheme (GPFH) Market driven/emphasis on competition, strong procurement focus Good for local commissioning and healthcare practice, local coherence
Increased inequities
No clinical governance, control of real budget, independent body
Total purchasing pilots (TPPs) Market driven/emphasis on competition Better integrated purchasing and provision
Higher costs and risks
No clinical governance, control of indicative budget, body within health authority
Primary care trust (PCTs) Market driven/emphasis on competition, focus on administration of purchasing Better control, budget allocation/management and economies of scale due to centralisation
Less clinical input
Statutory organisation, governed by PCT board (includes clinical input), own budget
Practice-based commissioning (PBC) Market driven/emphasis on competition, transactions oriented Increased engagement of clinicians
Higher management and transaction costs
Led by general practitioners (GPs), little clinical governance, indicative budget, voluntary scheme
Clinical commissioning groups (CCGs) Network-centric, trust, collaboration driven with emphasis on good communication, some degree of accountability Potential to encourage innovation, best practice, higher quality, integration and cost-effectiveness of commissioned services
High risk of network instability
Clinical (GP) governance, real budget (2013), independent body, compulsory scheme