Table 1.
Coordinating mechanism | Key features | Governance and autonomy | |
---|---|---|---|
(Ham, Smith and Eastmure 2011; Ham 2008) | (Mannion 2011; Checkland, Coleman, Harrison et al 2009) | (Curry, Goodwin, Naylor, et al 2008; Smith and Goodwin 2002) | |
General practitioner fundholding scheme (GPFH) | Market driven/emphasis on competition, strong procurement focus | Good for local commissioning and healthcare practice, local coherence Increased inequities |
No clinical governance, control of real budget, independent body |
Total purchasing pilots (TPPs) | Market driven/emphasis on competition | Better integrated purchasing and provision Higher costs and risks |
No clinical governance, control of indicative budget, body within health authority |
Primary care trust (PCTs) | Market driven/emphasis on competition, focus on administration of purchasing | Better control, budget allocation/management and economies of scale due to centralisation Less clinical input |
Statutory organisation, governed by PCT board (includes clinical input), own budget |
Practice-based commissioning (PBC) | Market driven/emphasis on competition, transactions oriented | Increased engagement of clinicians Higher management and transaction costs |
Led by general practitioners (GPs), little clinical governance, indicative budget, voluntary scheme |
Clinical commissioning groups (CCGs) | Network-centric, trust, collaboration driven with emphasis on good communication, some degree of accountability | Potential to encourage innovation, best practice, higher quality, integration and cost-effectiveness of commissioned services High risk of network instability |
Clinical (GP) governance, real budget (2013), independent body, compulsory scheme |