Table 4.

Treatment-Effects Regression Results: Joint Effect of Public Reporting (PR) and Financial Incentives

	Second Stage	First Stage
	POCMI	Both PR and Income Incentives
Practice incentives tied to quality reports
Both PR and financial incentive	10.12 (2.456)***
Community-level PR activity
% Pop in private HP with quality reports		0.003 (0.004)
Length of physician PR >4 years		−0.579 (0.088)***
PR contents (omitted: no physician PR available)
PR contain quality info at individual-physician level		0.67 (0.173)***
PR do not contain at individual-physician level		−0.034 (0.173)
Physician characteristics
No. of physicians in the practice	−0.062 (0.118)	0.005 (0.019)
Specialist-only practice	−2.482 (2.376)	−0.195 (0.276)
Practice ownership†
Owned by larger medical group	0.556 (1.463)	−0.272 (0.261)
Owned by hospital	−1.192 (0.959)	0.022 (0.194)
Owned by nonphysician managers	−9.231 (2.372)***	4.467 (0.86)***
Owned by other entities	−2.747 (2.31)	0.527 (0.357)
Patient characteristics
% Patients with limited English	0.018 (0.045)	−0.004 (0.007)
% Patients who are black	0.021 (0.012)*	0.004 (0.003)
% Patients who are Hispanic	0.055 (0.056)	0.012 (0.01)
Revenue source‡
% Revenue: Medicare	0.007 (0.023)	0.001 (0.005)
% Revenue: Medicaid	0.043 (0.031)	−0.002 (0.005)
% Revenue: Other insurance	0.164 (0.067)**	−0.005 (0.01)
% Revenue: Self-pay low Inc.	−0.041 (0.068)	−0.013 (0.011)
% Revenue: Self-pay high Inc.	0.002 (0.057)	−0.011 (0.012)
% Revenue: Other	0.034 (0.042)	−0.008 (0.01)
Constant	3.334 (1.382)**	−0.332 (0.386)

Note: Sample is restricted to those practices that either publicly report physician quality, receive additional income from quality performance, or both (N = 489).

^†Omitted: Owned by physicians in practice.

^‡Omitted: % Revenue from commercial payers.

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.