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. Author manuscript; available in PMC: 2014 Aug 1.
Published in final edited form as: J Public Econ. 2013 Apr 29;104:40–51. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.04.007

Table 6.

Impact of Retiree Health Coverage on Probability of Turnover (Males)

VARIABLES (1)
Age 58		 (2)
Age 59		 (3)
Age 60		 (4)
Age 61		 (5)
Age 62		 (6)
Age 63		 (7)
Age 64		 (8)
Age 65		 (9)
Age 66		 (10)
Age 67		 (11)
Age 68		 (12)
Age 69
Ineligible 0.013 (0.014) 0.013 (0.015) −0.020 (0.015) −0.005 (0.020) −0.003 (0.022) 0.033 (0.023) 0.014 (0.024) −0.071* (0.041) −0.059 (0.036) −0.062 (0.046) −0.059* (0.033) 0.016 (0.033)
Access Only Eligible −0.014 (0.012) 0.007 (0.019) −0.029* (0.017) −0.007 (0.030) −0.013 (0.023) 0.007 (0.046) −0.023 (0.030) −0.013 (0.060) −0.073* (0.040) 0.001 (0.070) −0.028 (0.037) 0.083 (0.127)
Subsidy Eligible −0.000 (0.012) 0.007 (0.013) 0.003 (0.018) 0.000 (0.015) 0.065** (0.027) 0.094*** (0.025) 0.063*** (0.020) 0.007 (0.056) 0.044 (0.034) 0.045 (0.040) 0.011 (0.035) 0.088** (0.039)
No Coverage Turnover 0.097 0.104 0.139 0.130 0.193 0.174 0.158 0.314 0.319 0.252 0.239 0.203
***

p<0.01,

**

p<0.05,

*

p<0.1

Notes: Regression based on 88,283 observations. Coefficients are average marginal effects from logit model. Standard errors (clustered by firm) in parentheses. All regressions include age dummies, retiree health dummies, and their interactions, as well as controls for gender, years of service, years of service squared, firm turnover at age 57, firm size, DB and DC pension provision dummies, age-specific 2005 salary decile dummies, year dummies, and firm sector dummies.