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. 2013 Dec 12;8(12):e80814. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0080814

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© 2013 Zagorsky et al

This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are properly credited.

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a| Convergence probability to the Forgiver equilibrium of a uniform-random point in the -simplex. Note that for higher error rates (increasing noise-level), the probability to converge to the cooperative equilibrium is much lower. b | Population share of Forgiver () in the Forgiver equilibrium. Observe the relationship between the higher error rates and the lower population share of Forgiver. c | Population share of sink-state C strategies (, , , ) in the Forgiver equilibrium. Higher error rates lead to higher proportions of unconditional cooperators. d | In the infinitely repeated game, for all value pairs of and in the blue shaded area, ALLD cannot invade Forgiver since the average payoff of Forgiver playing against itself is higher than the average payoff of ALLD against Forgiver (see Inequality (1)).

Inline graphic — a| Convergence probability to the Forgiver equilibrium of a uniform-random point in the -simplex. Note that for higher error rates (increasing noise-level), the probability to converge to the cooperative equilibrium is much lower. b | Population share of Forgiver () in the Forgiver equilibrium. Observe the relationship between the higher error rates and the lower population share of Forgiver. c | Population share of sink-state C strategies (, , , ) in the Forgiver equilibrium. Higher error rates lead to higher proportions of unconditional cooperators. d | In the infinitely repeated game, for all value pairs of and in the blue shaded area, ALLD cannot invade Forgiver since the average payoff of Forgiver playing against itself is higher than the average payoff of ALLD against Forgiver (see Inequality (1)).