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. Author manuscript; available in PMC: 2014 Dec 1.
Published in final edited form as: J Health Econ. 2013 Dec;32(6):1301–1312. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.09.004

Figure 2.

Figure 2

Two simple models of plan bidding.

This figure illustrates the different predictions of the perfect competition model and models of imperfect competition. In panel A, a $1 change in the benchmark payment rate (pay) does not affect the bid, consistent with plans bidding their costs (zero-profit condition) in a perfectly competitive market. Given the design of the bidding system, we would expect Δrebate/Δpay >0 and Δpremium/Δpay < 0. In contrast, panel B illustrates a situation in which a $1 change in the benchmark is reflected in a $1 change in the bid, consistent with a monopoly plan extracting the surplus. In this case, we would expect Δrebate/Δpay =0 and Δpremium/Δpay =0.