Table 1. Cooperative strategies: average survival time in 100 evolutionary games (for details of strategies see S 2: IPD strategies employed).
Strategy | Without weapon use (generations) (p = 0.00) | With weapon use (generations) (p = 0.05) | Change (generations) |
AllC | 24.26 | 47.72 | 23.46 |
TFT | 44.56 | 48.46 | 3.90 |
GRIM | 36.84 | 35.29 | −1.55 |
TFTT | 41.44 | 51.05 | 9.61 |
Pavlov | 28.75 | 32.96 | 4.21 |
GTFT | 41.01 | 52.66 | 11.65 |
HTFT | 33.76 | 35.61 | 1.85 |
SM | 41.62 | 47.51 | 5.89 |
TTFT | 36.62 | 36.54 | −0.08 |
CTFT | 45.65 | 47.05 | 1.40 |
ATFT | 42.72 | 45.72 | 3.00 |
SGRIM | 38.96 | 49.53 | 10.57 |
FBF | 40.84 | 44.74 | 3.90 |
Gradual | 36.36 | 36.94 | 0.58 |
Total | 500.03 | 577.84 | 78.39 |
Note: Average change in performance for all strategies is 78.39/14 = 5.6 generations. Average change in performance of all strategies other than ‘Always Cooperate’ is 54.93/13 = 4.2 generations.