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. 2014 May 5;111(20):7242–7247. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1317967111

Fig. 1.

Fig. 1.

The elasticity of agricultural land with respect to agricultural intensification εAOHA as estimated with model 1 (GOV = CORC in A), model 2 (GOV = ROL in B), model 3 (GOV = ACC in C), model 4 (GOV = PA in D), model 5 (GOV = ESI in E), and model 6 (GOV = EPI in F). In computing the elasticity, the governance scores are set at high (sample maximum, red dashed line), moderate (sample mean, blue solid line), and low (sample minimum, black solid line) values. When conventional governance scores are high, intensification leads to agricultural expansion (thus signaling a Jevons paradox), whereas when conventional governance scores are low or moderate, intensification leads to agricultural contraction (thus signaling land sparing). Conversely, when the environmental governance indicator takes high or moderate values, land sparing occurs. For low values of the environmental governance indicator, either a Jevons paradox occurs (D and E) or the intensity of the land-sparing effect is reduced (F).