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. Author manuscript; available in PMC: 2014 Jul 29.
Published in final edited form as: J Dev Econ. 2011 Mar;94(2):164–180. doi: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2010.01.007

Table B1.

Bribe or not, 2001 vs. 2004. “Fixed effects” logit; 178 firms in 24 districts.

Bribe or not Bribe or not
Small-medium size (500m -1b) .00391 (.579) −.0728 (.611)
Medium size (1b – 5b) −.0705 (.679) .378 (.742)
Large size (>5b) −.00590 (.735) −.358 (.817)
Dummy: export or not .996 (.680) .968 (.747)
Ln (no. of licenses) n.a. n.a.
Time Dummy, 2004 [D2004] −.0775 (.281) −3.33** (1.27)
D2004* share ‘99 PDIP-GOLKAR vote .0598** (.0234)
Control: no vote, no vote X time dummy Yes
N [no. firms] {bribe ‘01 & no bribe ‘04} 140 [70] {40} 160 [70] {40}

One asterisk indicates a 10% significance level and two a 5% level.